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ABSTRACT 
Accident mode ling methodologies in literature such as System Hazard Identification, 
Prediction and Prevention (SHIPP) [I] consider accident precursors to assess the 
likelihood of accident occurrence and to design preventive, contro lling and mitigating 
measures for improving the industrial process safety . The SHIPP methodo logy considers 
five engineering safety barriers represented using fau lt and event tree to model the cause-
consequence re lationship between the failure of safety barriers and potentia l adverse 
events [I , 2]. In this method, to evaluate the probabilities of end events' occurrence, a 
restrictive assumption is used that the severity of the adverse events increases only 
through sequential failures of the five safety barriers considered. 
First, it is strengthen by append ing two important non-mechanical safety barriers 
v1z. human and management & organizational factors. We propose to improve the 
shortcoming of the SH IPP methodology in the fo llowing ways. First, we relax the 
restrictive sequentia l event assumption in SHIPP methodology by allowing non-
sequential failure of safety barriers to cause adverse event of any o rder. Secondly, in the 
prediction of posterior probabilities of adverse events for real time industrial data, we 
include an important mechanical safety barrier viz. ' Damage Contro l and Emergency 
Management Barrier (DCEMB)' and as a result we include an adverse event of highest 
order viz. 'Catastrophe ' . Further, posterior probabilities of adverse events are calculated 
using Bayesian network approach. The posterior probabilities are used to update the 
safety barrie r fai lure probabilities through a backward ana lysis and in turn update the 
estimates of the likelihood continually. T he utility of this approach is tested and 
II 
demonstrated with the data from a liquefied natural gas (LNG) process fac ility. The 
method allows fo r continual updating of occurrence probability for adverse events and 
fa ilure probabilities of safety barriers for successive monthly data from industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Process accidents are major cause of concern tn industrial process facilities. These 
accidents are often caused by equipment malfunction, process dev iation, structural 
failure , and human error [3]. Their inadequate control can increase the probability of 
occurrence of industrial accidents. These are reflected in a few accident examples that 
have occurred in the last few decades, such as the Ocean Ranger, North Atlantic accident, 
the British Petroleum (BP), Texas City disaster [ 4-7], BP's deepwater horizon offshore 
drilling rig explosion and oil spill [8-13], Imperial sugar refinery dust explosion (Figure 
1.1) on February 7, 2008 in Port Wentworth, Georgia [14] . Between 1926 and 1997,3222 
accidents have occurred, ofwhich a large number of accidents belong to chemical process 
facility [ 15-23]. Major process accidents between 1944 and 20 12 are well described in 
literature, and experts' opinions [ 16-21, 24-30]. Hence, onl y the LNG accident 
occurrences are highlighted in Table 1.1 . 
Recent advancement in science and engineering is helping to decrease the number 
of incidents; however, the level of damage from these few incidents has radically 
increased [ 19, 31, 32]. During the 90s, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of UK studied 
on 600 accidents and found average cost per accident on oi l platform £295 1 [33]. In 
Austral ia, the estimated safety pay for injuries was about $20 billion in same era which is 
equivalent to 5% Australia's GOP [34, 35]. Bhopal (1984) chemical plant disaster cost at 
least 2000 lives, injuries over 200,000 [36] and a hefty pay of$470 million to the victims 
[35]. Aftermath of these disasters leaves an unpleasant past of losses which is unbearable. 
A long term health survey (1985-2007) at Sambhavna Trust Clinic in Bhopal confirms 
high pregnancy loss, acute deaths and even effect on offspring [37]. Financial impact of 
catastrophic events is briefly discussed in Kim et a!. [31], Cutler & James [33], IC [34], 
Hopkins [35], Kletz [36], Lepkowski [38] and NOHSC [39]. 
Figure 1.1: Imperial Sugar Refi nery Explosion [ 14) 
Table 1.1 : Major Accidents in LNG Process Facility ( 1944-20 12) 
Year Location Chemical Event Deaths/injured 
1944 Cleveland, OH LNG Fire and explosion 128/300 
1973 Staten Island, NY LNG Fire 40 
1979 Lusby, Maryland LNG Fire I I I 
2004 Skikda, Algeria LNG Explosion 27/56 
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Industrial facilities including the offshore process fac ilities can never be made 
complete ly safe and risk free. Safety of the process facility specifies risk free environment 
which means, prevention from any accident or damages that might cause personal health 
hazard. According to JEC 61508 [ 40] safety means, "Freedom from unacceptable risk of 
phys ica l injury or of damage to the health of people, ei ther direct ly, or indi rectly as a 
result of damage to property or to the environment" [41]. However, experts review 
suggest that a proper accident model and like lihood assessment technique can improve 
the degree of inherent safety [3, 42-49] and ensure the ma intenance of risk level as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP) [3, 12, 49-52]. To limit or avoid hazard at source, Kletz 
[44] deve loped the concept of inherently safer design in the late 70s [47]. 
Industrialists, researchers, workers, - members of regulatory bodies, po licy makers 
can all learn from past inc idents. So it is essentia l to collect data and maintain a database 
for research purpose. The Center for Chem ical Process Safety (CCPS) of US was 
established aftermath of Bhopal tragedy to implement safety pract ice in workplaces. 
Since I 51 of April , 1996, RrDDOR 95 (The Report ing of Jnjuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 1995) act mandate to report all work related inj uries, diseases 
and dangerous occurrences to HSE (Health Safety Execut ive) [53]. Organizations and 
Research center viz. Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center 
established in 1984 [54, 55], the American Institute of C hemical Engineers (A !ChE) 
Center fo r Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) established in 1985 [56], Nationa l Response 
Center (N RC) [57] and Mary Kay O ' Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M 
Univers ity (TA MU) established in 1995 [58] have taken in itiatives to co llect and share 
inc ident database w ith industrialists, researchers and experts. Past Industrial accident 
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investigation and rev iew c learly identify that most of the accidents occurred due to 
improper like lihood assessment of ri sk contributors and correlations of these contributors 
to occurrence of a potential acc ident. Experts' judgment emphasize on learning from past 
acc idents [ 19, 31, 59, 60] to prevent further occurrences in future. The Cullen report on 
Piper A lpha disaster [6 1] made a s ignificant change to manage safety process by the 
industry and the regulator [ 47]. Baker Pane l [62] proposed I 0 recommendations to 
improve process safety after its investigations on process safety management in BP ' s US 
refineries [63]. Process safety leadership, process safety knowledge & expertise, process 
safety cultures are among those recommendat ions which are thoroughly practiced 
nowadays by many US companies. The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) strictly 
emphas izes process safety culture in highly hazardous industries [5] . 
1.1 Motivation 
In order to improve industrial safety, it is essential to predict the likelihood and 
posterior probab ilities of adverse events through an acc ident modeling mechanism. The 
System Hazard Identification, Prediction and Prevent ion (SHIPP) methodology is one 
such method recently proposed by Rathnayaka et al. [ I]. ft is assumed in this method that 
an adverse event occurs only as a result of the fa ilure or otherwise of the safety barriers in 
a sequential manner [I , 2, 66]. In a real life industrial system, the safely barriers need not 
fa il in a sequential manner to cause an adverse end event. In the current dissertation we 
propose a new mechanism to improve this situation. 
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1.2 Objective 
Fault and event tree methods are widely used in process fac il ity to estimate ri sk of 
accident occurrence though they are inadequate to show the conditional depende ncy in a 
rather sequentia l approach. The o bjective of this ana lysis is to present a Bayes ian network 
based non-sequentia l accident mode l which w ill inc lude two non-mechanical safety 
barriers v iz. human and management & organizational factors w ith other fi ve eng ineering 
safety barrie rs. T his mode l is able to address the limitation of current accident models 
such as: no n-sequentia l, conditional and the inte rdependence re lationsh ips of safety 
barriers . In addition, this model is able to calculate the occurrence of adverse events in 
any order us ing Bayesian network approach. It can perfo rm real t ime occurrence and 
posterio r pro bability estimation using industria l data. Furthermo re, a Bayesian updating 
mechanism is a ble to update the probabilities of end events' as well as success/fa ilure of 
safety barriers' w hen real time information becomes availab le. In this case, Bayesian 
network is an ideal approach which not only describe the dependency and evaluate the 
likelihood of end events' occurrence but a lso able to demo nstrate the conditiona l 
likelihood assessment fo r di ffe rent scenarios. T he improved m ethodo logy presented here 
can be extended eas ily to other process facilit ies or accide nt scenarios. 
1.3 Goal of the Project 
T he goal of the proj ect is to develop a Bayes ian network based accident model 
that he lps to predict the occurrence likelihood of end events and update as usual when 
real time in fo rmation becomes ava ilable in the system. Bayes ian updating mechan ism is 
being integrated to update the occurrence like lihood of end events' when real time 
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information becomes available. Further, developed accident model will be implemented 
on a case study of LNG process facility. 
1.4 Approach 
In th is work, analyses of event trees and Bayesian network modeling have been 
applied. Theoretical explanation of the model and analysis will be laid out. Analysis will 
consist of fi ve parts; (i) Design Bayesian network model, (ii) Calculation and analyses of 
the likelihood results using forward analysis on Bayesian network, (iii) Calculation of 
posterior results using prior and likelihood results, (iv) Estimation of each barrier 
contribution on occurrence of end events using backward analysis on Bayesian network, 
and (v) Updating safety barrier probabilities in real time. Further, the model will be able 
to update the occurrence likelihood of end events' with real time information from the 
system. The process will continue every time new information becomes available. 
1.5 Result 
The result of this analysis will drive the users to use this improved accident model 
for different accident scenarios and estimate the occurrence likeli hood of the end events. 
ft will also help to update prior safety barrier fa ilure probabilities real time for the given 
system and incorporate necessary steps to mitigate or minimize end events' occurrences. 
1.6 Layout of the Thesis 
In the background, several accident models are discussed along with the concept 
of safety barriers together with end events' definition in chapter 2. A brief review of 
SHIPP methodology is also included in chapter 2. A brief discussion of rev ised event tree 
(3 .1.1 ) and Bayesian network modeling (3. 1.2) along with fundamentals of Bayesian 
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network are included in chapter 3. Conditional probability assessment technique, 
Bayesian inference, likelihood and updating model are also incl uded under mathematical 
formulation and discussed in chapter 4. This is fo llowed by the implementation of the 
developed model on a case study of LNG process facility with a step-by-step explanation, 
in chapter 5. The findings are analyzed in chapter 6. A brief discussion followed by 
conclusions is included in chapter 7. Recommendations for further analysis in future are 
provided in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER2 
Background: Accident Model 
An effective accident modeling approach along with an appropriate likelihood assessment 
technique can help prevent and mitigate the process accident in industrial facility. 
Hollnagel [64] defines accident model as a causal mechanism of conventional rules. 
Leveson [65] states, "Accident models form the basis for investigating and analyzing 
accidents, preventing future ones, and determining whether systems are suitable for use 
(risk assessment)". Rathnayaka et al. [66] simply illustrate accident model as "a 
theoretical and simplified representation of incidents occurring in real life". Huang et al. 
[67] implies accident model as a theoretical demonstration of incidence and progression. 
VI 
Q) 
VI 
VI 
0 
...J 
Figure 2. I : Swiss Cheese Model [70] 
VI 
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:I: 
Domino theory proposed by Heinrich [68] is one of the first sequential accident 
models, where an accident event is described as a chain of independent events that occurs 
in a particular order and terminates from the system as an injury. According to Domino 
theory, an accident can be prevented by removing one of the factors from the chain of 
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events [ I, 69]. Non-mechanical accident factors viz . human and management and cause-
effect re lationship between these factors are ignored in this mode l. 
Swiss Cheese mode l by Reason [70] in Figure 2.1, is another example of 
conventional sequential accident mode l where hazard propagates and ends up w ith losses. 
It demonstrates the influence of human and organizational fai lu res in accident process. 
Currently, av iation industry uses Reasons' Swiss Cheese mode l to replicate human erro r 
[71]. 
Among the acc ident model, Kujath ' s model uses successive safety barriers to 
minimize end events [72] . It comprises both sequential and epidemiological models. It 
was demonstrated in offshore accident analys is w ith the safety barrier concept. The 
SHIPP mode l by Rathnayaka et a l. [1 , 2] is also based on the concept of Kujath ' s model 
where successful integration of human and management factor is il lustrated. However, no 
guidance has been given on how to implement these factors for evaluating the likelihood 
(i.e. probability) of final events ' occurrence. SHIPP model [I , 2] uses fou r successive 
safety barriers in accident ana lysis viz. release prevention, dispersion prevention, ignition 
prevention and escalation prevention. In a subsequent paper, Rathnayaka et al. [66] 
inc luded human and management barriers in SH IPP model and demonstrated the fai lu re 
probabi li ty through fault and event tree s imulation. In the SHIPP methodology, the safety 
barriers have to be arranged in sequential order, which restrict the escalation of different 
end events ' occurrence sequentially rather than randomly. 
Another acc ident model, called Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP) is based on system theory to evaluate system accidents [65, 73]. This accident 
model demonstrates no quantitative ana lysis and has limited graphical illustration. In the 
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STAMP model , "an acc ident is descri bed as an event that occurs from inappropriate or 
inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related constraints on the development, 
design, and operation of the system, rather than simply occurring due to independent 
component fai lures" [I , 41]. 
Fleming [74] introduced the Safety Culture Maturity Model (SCMM) in Health 
and Safety Executive. The concept of SCMM was being used for a potential safety 
cu lture improvement in the offshore oil and gas industry. The concept was deve loped by 
the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) which possessed fi ve level processes for 
organizations safety. Later ten e lements were included in the safety cu lture maturity 
mode l. It was assumed based on research that safety performance improves in 
organization with increasing levels of maturi ty. More det(\ils about SCMM can be found 
in Fleming [74]. 
Table 2.1 li sts number of accident models that are available for acc ident scenario 
analys is e.g. Domino theory, Swiss Cheese model, Kujath's model, SHIPP model and 
proposed Bayesian network model and comparison among these models. These acc ident 
models are well summarized in Rathnayaka et al. [1]. All of these existing accident 
models consider that the occurrences of end events have to be sequentia l with the failure 
of safety barriers; however, in real life events occurrence is not always sequentia l and 
could be happened in any order. Furthermore, human and management & organizationa l 
barrier have been ignored in all models except SHIPP which have significant influence to 
the occurrence of end events. Moreover, end event occurrences are cond itional to the 
functiona l and non-functional states of safety barriers. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Available Accident Models 
Domino Swiss Cheese Kujath 's SHIPP Bayesian Network 
Features Theory [68] model [70] Model [72] Methodology [I] (Proposed) [75] 
Use fau lt tree Use Bayesian Cause integration Not to integrate the network 
of accident well defined Defined Not defined potential causes to integrate the 
occurrence potential causes 
Likelihood 
assessment of Quantitati ve Quantitative 
safety barriers Quali tative Qualitative Qualitative and qualitative and qualitative 
Accident Ut ilize previous Utilize previous 
precursor data Not Not Not accident data to accident data to predict end event predict end event integration defined defined defined probabilities probabi lities 
Updat ing Able to update Able to update 
mechanism Never used Never used Never used prior infonnation prior infonnation 
Accident Sequential and 
modeling Sequential Sequential Epidemiological Sequential Non-sequential 
Human and 
Management Defined, Included 
barrier Ignored Ignored Ignored and used and used 
II 
2.1 End Events' Definition 
Consequence and occurrence of events 1n every stage of the accident model is 
defined as end events. End events are occurring frequently in process facility; however, 
end events' occurrence probability estimation has received little attention unti l experts, 
researchers taking initiatives to keep in account. End events get ini tiated, as deviation 
from safe state (e.g. fa ilure of safety barriers) propagates and gradua lly toward 
catastrophic accident. Sklet [76] has brie fl y defin ed ' initiating events' as, "An initiating 
event for a release scenario is the first significant deviation from a normal situation that 
under g iven c ircumstances may cause hydrocarbon release (loss of containment). A 
' normal s ituation' is a state where the process functions as norma l according to design 
specifications without significant process upsets or direct interventions in the process 
plant" . For example, a safety va lve placed in wrong position during regular production 
hour (s) is an initiating event; and prevention of materials' release due to wrong position 
of safety va lve (by detecting wrong position) is the barrier function. 
In the description of end events, severity of end events ' occurrence is categorized 
as 'safe ', ' near miss', ' mishap' , ' incident', 'accident' and 'catastrophe' . The 
categorization may vary from industry to industry based on different definitions. 
Following de finition of end events is available in literature: 
Safe: According to online Oxford dictionary, the term 'safe ' means, "protected from or 
not exposed to danger o r ri sk" [77]. 
Near miss: Health and Safety Executive (H SE) of UK defi nes ' near miss ' as "any 
incident, accident or emergency w hich did not result in an inj ury" [78]. In literatu re ' near 
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miss ' is defined as "a hazardous situation and/or an unsafe action where the event chain 
could lead to an accident if it had not been interrupted" [79-81 ]. According to OSHA 
(Occupational Safety & Health Administration), "near misses describe incidents where no 
property was damaged and no personal inj ury sustained, but where, given a slight shift in 
time or position, damage and/or injury easily could have occurred" [82]. According to 
OSHEU (Occupational Safety, Health and Environment Unit), a near miss can be defined 
as, "any event, which under slightly different circumstances, may have resulted in injury 
or ill health of people, or damage or loss to property, plant, materials or the environment 
or a loss of business opportunity" [83]. For example, during the liquefaction process, 
contaminant such as Nitrogen (N2) is leaked but would not harm workers in production 
area. After reviewing incident occurrence in process industry, it can be observed that fo r 
every severe accident, a large number of incidents occurred with little or no damage at all. 
This is well-observed and illustrated in the safety pyramid (Figure 2.2) by Phimister et al. 
[54] which highlights "the ratio of one seriou injury to the number of near misses is very 
small" [48, 54]. However, near miss can provide more information compare to accident 
occurrence about the source of serious accidents [84] . 
Mishap: The term ' mishap' has been defined by HSE, as "an event that, causes any 
person to be harmed; or in di fferent circumstances, might have caused any person to be 
harmed" [78]. Rathnayaka et al. [I] defines it as a sequence of events that might cause 
minor damages to human health, property or environment. For example, oil spill on 
production floor might cause work hour (s) loss. 
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10 minor injuries 
60 incidents including property 
damage 
600 incidents excluding damage or loss 
1 unsafe/hazardous conditions 
Figure 2 .2: Safety Pyramid [54) 
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Incident: OSHA defines ' incident' as, "an unplanned, undesired event that adversely 
affects completion of a task" [82]. According to CCOHS (Canadian Centre for 
Occupational Health and Safety), the term ' inc ident' can be referred "to an unexpected 
event that did not cause injury o r damage this time but had the potential" [85] . 
Accident: The term 'accident' may be defi ned by Skogdalen & Yinnem [12], RoSPA 
[86], and Sklet [87], as undesired and unplanned events which has led to loss of human 
lives, injury to people, damage to plant, machinery or the env ironment. Khan & Abbasi 
[19] , and Suchman [88] c lass ified ' accident ' as, "unexpected", "unavoidable" and 
"unintended" . l-I SE clarifies ' acc ident' as "an undesired ci rcumstance(s) which gives rise 
to ill health, injury, damage, production losses or increased liabilities" [78]. Accord ing to 
CCOHS, 'accident' can be defined as "an unplanned event that interrupts the completion 
of an acti vity, and that may (or may not) inc lude injury or property damage" [85]. 
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Catastrophe: The term ' catastrophe' can be defined as an event that could cause major 
damages to human health, property or environment for a significant time period or forever 
[I]. For example, Bhopal disaster- the worst industrial disaster in history [35, 38] caused 
permanent shutdown of the UC IL (Union Carbide India Limited) pesticide plant. 
The definition of end events is available in several publications, journals, expert 
opinions [I , 54, 90]. 
2.2 Safety Barrier Definition 
The concept of safety barrier is introduced by several authors in different ways 
which shows the same functiona lity. During the 60s, Gibson [91] and Haddon [92] used 
"the concepts of energy and barriers as a bas is" in accident analysis [93]. Skogdalen & 
Yinnem [1 2], Sklet [87], Bento [94], and Duijm et at. [95] use words i.e. ' limit ', ' control ', 
' prevent', ' mitigate', ' minimize' to define the function of safety barriers in a s imilar 
pattern. Bento [94] defines safety barrier as a solution or a system to minimize 
occurrences of events. Skogdalen & Yinnem [12] and Sklet [87] define it as a "physical 
and/or nonphysical" source to "prevent, control , or mitigate undesi red events or 
accidents". For example, after the liquefaction process in the LNG process facility , liquid 
gas is transferred from system A to system B for shipping purposes and the safety barrier 
works in every stage of this process to prevent, control or mitigate any consequences of 
hazardous events. Barrier functions are wel l described in experts' review [I , 12, 87, 96]. 
Safety barriers work as a shie ld in every stage of accident propagation until it 
reaches catastrophic accident. The safety barriers that we consider in the current 
dissertation are (i) ' Release Prevention Barrier' - which mitigates chem ical or energy 
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release, (ii) ' Dispers ion Prevention Barrier' - wh ich restricts the propagation of chemical 
or energy re lease, (iii) ' Ign ition Prevention Barrier ' - which prevents the flammable 
release to ignite, (iv) 'Escalation Prevention Barrier ' - which prevents the escape of 
release materials, and (v) 'Damage Control and Emergency Management Barrier ' - as a 
final stage to shield against catastrophic incident. 
' Human factors ' and ' human error' are two terms often exchanged in the offshore 
process industry without clear explanation [97]. These two terms are often used as the 
general cause of an accident. According to Rasmussen et al. [98] and Rasmussen [99-
101], "Accidents are typically judged to be caused by ' human error ' on the part of a train 
driver, a pilot, or a process operator". Traditionally, human factor is defined as " th e 
scientific study of the interaction between man and machine" [97]. According to HSE 
[I 02], human facto rs refer here is to the environmental, work re lated factors, and 
individual characteristics which influence human behavior at work in a way that affect 
health and safety. In present study, we are considering human factor barrier to refl ect 
above e lements. Failure of human factor barrier refl ect human induced by one or more of 
these factors. The othe r term ' human error ' is defined by Rasmussen [100] as "human 
acts which are judged by somebody to deviate from some k ind of reference act .. . they are 
subjective and they vary w ith time". Human factor was large ly ignored in the past in 
evaluation of accident analys is. Early research shows human factor invo lvement in the 
causation of acc idents. In the 60s, severa l human factors specialists (i .e. Altman [I 03] ; 
Chapanis [I 04]; Christensen [I 05]) associated ' human error' in acc ident causation; 
however, American Research Institute used this concept in accident analysis [I 0 I]. 
Brazier [I 06] studied on human factor involvement in accident causation in various 
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process industries. Wagenaar & Groeneweg [I 07] researched on marine industry in 
findings of human factor causes. Table 2.2 represents statistical analysis of human factor 
contribution in various fields, industry and discipline [70, l 08-113]. 
Table 2.2: Human Error Involvement inDi fferent Fields 
Field 
Nuclear industry 
Chemical and 
petro-chemical industry 
Marine and Offshore 
Aviation 
Drinking water 
di stribution and hygiene 
Failure rate 
over 90% 
over 80% 
over 75% 
over 70% 
over 75% 
The process operator under the supervision of management/organizational factor 
has the vital responsibility to assure a safe operational environment. A study by the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [114] showed that at least 92% of the underlying 
causes of accidents were caused by people. According to Cullen [61 ] report on Piper 
Alpha disaster, insufficient qualified and trai ned personnel were involved in production 
for long time. A report by the UK P&l Club [ 115] indicates that more than 62% error 
resulted by one or more individuals [ 11 6] . In workplace, human interaction advances as a 
cycle through chain of command, as manager affects supervisor, superv isor affects 
subordinates and vice versa, organization 's safety culture (training) which might affect 
the workplace safety. Recent study shows, thirty three major factors might be involved in 
human factor barrier fa ilure [I] which is influenced by the leadership, training, safety 
management procedure etc., under the management of different industry. Kim et al. [31] 
emphasize on root causes responsible for human error such as, ' fat igue', ' inadequate 
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supervision', ' failure of sight navigation' , ' lack of effective pilot and escort system' after 
the analysis of the Valdez oil spill incident. For detailed descriptions of human error refer 
to Reason [70], Rasmussen [100] and Gordon [117]. 
Organizational factors are also involved in accident causation. According to 
Jacobs & Haber [ 118], organizational facto rs encourage unsafe acts and ultimately 
produce system failures. Sklet [87] acknowledges with Hopwood [ 119] about 
"administrative, social and self-control" under the organizational controls. Johnson & Gi ll 
[1 20] clarities administrative control as "to control the organizational behavior(s) of other 
individuals, groups and organizations" [87]. The Swiss Cheese model [70, 121 ] 
illustrates the overall organizational framework for accident causation. In addition, it also 
demonstrates accidents ' contributing factors which include organizat ional influences, 
unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe acts in an organizational 
accident. Failure to ensure any of the organizational safety procedures may lead to 
accident causation. A ven et a!. [ 122] commented on Norwegian oil and gas industry 
safety issue: " Investigation of major accidents shows that technical, human, operational 
as well as organizational factors influence the accident sequence" [59]. Johnson & 
Holloway [ 123] shows a clear statistics for the period between 1996-2006 on aviation and 
maritime accidents in terms of human and organizational factor error. Based on th is 
analys is, it has been revealed that 48% organizational factors and 12% human factors 
contribute on USA av iation accidents. In case of maritime accidents, it is 53% 
organizational and 24-29% human factors error. Therefore, human and management 
factor receive prime attention from the perspective of safety culture in accident causation. 
In the current work, our model allows for human and management & organ izational 
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factors to influence and contribute at every stage of safety procedure. More information 
on safety culture management in industry can be found on Mearns et al. [97], Reason 
[ 121 ], Cox & Cox [ 124], and Turner & Pidgeon [ 125]. 
Human and management & organizational factor barriers are included in proposed 
work and kept common in every stage of event sequence, so they are more emphas ized. 
Leveson [65] highlighted that communication lacking between human and machine 
operating system can be an alarming factor in occurrence of accidents. Hence, all 
influential risk contributing factor including the human communication error have to be 
addressed in each step of accident modeling approach for a comprehensive safety 
assessment and improving overall safety for a system. In the SHIPP methodology, human 
and management & organizational barrier were suggested; however, limited information 
was discussed on these barriers. 
2.3 Accident Modeling: SHIPP 
Recently, Rathnayaka et al. [I , 2, 66] proposed SHIPP (System Hazard 
Identification, Prediction and Prevention) methodology as a quanti tative safety 
assessment approach to evaluate safety at different stage of probable accident sequence 
analysis. In process industry, liquid and gas leaks, cryogenic temperature, flammabi lity, 
and vapor dispersion are potential hazards [66, 126]. "Cryogenic temperature and 
flammability and vapor dispersion characteristics are potential safety issues" among the 
physical properties of LNG [66]. SHIPP is applicable in LNG process facilities to 
maintain and manage these safety issues by identi fy ing potential hazards (i.e. end events) 
through assessing accident scenarios using safety barriers and forecast the future 
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happening. SHIPP methodology is a sequential accident model technique, which 
encompassed the human and management factors, however, Rathnayaka et al. [I, 2] 
provided no guidance on how to implement these factors for evaluating the likelihood 
(i.e. probability) of final events' occurrence. The conceptual diagram of the SHIPP 
methodology is shown in Figure 2.3, which is translated into an event tree as shown in 
Figure 2.4 for calculating occurrence probability of end events. The end events i.e. safe, 
near miss, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe are the outcome events of safe sate 
dev iat ion for an abnormal operation (e.g., LNG release). Tn SHIPP methodology, events' 
consequence follows the hierarchy and sequence viz. first near miss, next mishap, then 
incident and accident to fo llow, which is exactly analogous to the structural development 
of event tree. In real life scenario, end events' occurrence can happen in any random 
order (i.e. near miss can escalate to an incident or accident). However, in the SHIPP 
methodology, the safety barriers have to be arranged in sequential order, which restrict 
the escalation of different end events' occurrence sequentially rather than randomly. 
Sklet [87] identified five release factors responsible for hydrocarbon release (i .e. 
human and operational errors, technical fa ilures, process upsets, external events and 
design fai lures). Following release factor or, safety barrier has been classified in the 
SHIPP methodology for the accident prevention strategies; 
I. Human Factor Barrier (HFB) 
2. Management and Organizational Barrier (MOB) 
3. Release Prevention Barrier (RPB) 
4. Dispersion Prevention Barrier (DPB) 
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Figure 2.3: SHIPP Model [1 , 2, 66] 
The SHIPP methodology incorporates four steps to accomplish accident 
progression and likelihood assessment for a given abnormal operation i.e. system 
definition, hazard identification and analysis, accident modeling and prediction, updating, 
decision making and implementations of the prevention strategies [ I, 2, 66]. However, 
whi le implementing the SHIPP method for LNG data, Rathnayaka et at. [2] used only 
four safety barriers excluding Damage Control and Emergency Management Barrier, 
Human Factor Barrier and Management and Organizational Barriers. In a subsequent 
paper, Rathnayaka et at. [66] included Human and Management Barriers but still 
neglected the Damage Control and Emergency Management Barrier. ln the current work 
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we include the entire seven safety barrier and as a resu lt include an adverse event of 
highest order ' Catastrophe' . The end events' occurrence can be estimated if the pnor 
information of safety barr ier is available. This model with predictive capabi lities can be 
applied to any real-li fe accident situation in process industry (i.e. LNG, LPG). The 
proposed Bayesian network model presented by Baksh et al. [75] adopted the same source 
of the basic event probabi li ty data as used by other researchers such as Rathnayaka et al. 
[66]. 
Deviation from 
normal operation Release 
Prevent ion 
Barrier{RPB) Success 
@ Safe 
Fail 
Dispersion 
4 Prevention 
Barrier(DPB) Success 
@ Near miss 
Fail 
4 
Ignition 
Prevention @ Mishap 
Barrier(IPB) Success 
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L,._ Escalation Prevention 
Barrier(EPB) Success 
(D Incident 
Fail 
L Damage Control & 
.,. Emergency f-- ------,..0 Accident 
Management Success 
Barrier 
Fail IL_________ fr:\ 
,.. ~ Catastro:'.:J 
Success 
Figure 2 .4: Accident Seque nce [ I , 2] 
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CHAPTER3 
Methodology 
3.1 Model Development 
3.1.1 Event tree modeling 
Revised event tree, which is translated from the SHIPP model, is illustrated in 
Figure 3. 1. The failure probability of each safety barrier is denoted by X; (i = I to 7) as 
seven safety barriers (i .e. human, management, release prevention, dispersion prevention, 
ignition prevention, escalation prevention and damage control prevention factor) are 
utilized in revised event tree model to prevent, mitigate or control an end event i.e. safe 
(S) to escalate to a near miss (N), mishap (M), incident (1), accident (A) or catastrophe 
(C). Failure probabilities fo r each safety barrier are ass igned in th e event tree viz. HFB 
(2.90 x i0-3), MOB (4.2 l x l0-2), RPB (5.27 x i0-2), DPB (6 .1 6x i0-2), IPB (10.60x J0-2), 
EPB (2. 7 1 X I o-2) , and DCEMB (I 0.88x 10-2) . There are twenty four potential 
consequences which have been identified exaggerating from the initial safe state in an 
LNG process fac ility. First twelve consequences are: (i) S (A ll X 1, X2, X3 safety barriers 
work properly), (ii) N (XI , X3 both work, but X2 fails), (ii i) S (X I fails, but both X2 and 
x 3 work), (iv) N (X J, x 2 both fail , but x 3 works), (v) N (X3 fa ils, but X I' x 2 and x 4 
work), (vi) M (X2, x 3 both fai l, but both XI and x 4 work), (v ii) N (XI , x 3 both fa il, but 
both X2 and X4 work) and (viii) M (XI , X2 and X3 fa il, but X4 works), (ix) M (X3, X4 both 
fa il, but XI , x 2 and Xs work), (x) I (X2, x 3 and x 4 fai l, but XI, and Xs both work), (xi) M 
(X1, X3 and X4 fai l, but X2, and Xs both work), (xi i) I (X I, X2, X3 and X4 fai l, but Xs 
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work). Similarly, following twelve consequences can be explained. All the consequences 
in event tree network are translated in Table 3.1 . 
Table 3. 1: Revised Event Tree Net work Consequences 
No. Barrier success Barrier failure Consequences 
x1 , x 2, x 3 None Safe 
2 x1 , x 3 x 2 Near miss 
3 X2, x 3 XI Safe 
4 x 3 x1 , x 2 Near miss 
5 x 1, X2, x4 x 3 Near miss 
6 X1 , x 4 x 2, x 3 Mishap 
7 x 2, x4 x 1, x 3 Near miss 
8 x 4 X1, x 2, x 3 Mishap 
9 XI , x 2 Xs x 3, x 4 Mishap 
10 X1 , Xs x 2, x 3, x 4 Incident 
II X2, Xs x1 , x 3, x4 Mishap 
12 Xs x~, x 2, x 3, x 4 Incident 
13 x1 , x 2 x 6 X3, X4, Xs Incident 
14 xl , x 6 X2, X3, X4, Xs Accident 
15 x 2, x 6 XI, x 3, x 4, Xs Incident 
16 x 6 X1, Xz, X3, X4, Xs Accident 
17 x~, x 2 x 7 X3, X4, Xs, X6 Accident 
18 x1 , x 7 X2, X3, x 4, Xs, x 6 Catastrophe 
19 x 2, x 7 X1, X3, X4, Xs, x 6 Accident 
20 x 7 X1 , X2, X3, X4, Xs, x 6 Catastrophe 
21 X1 , Xz X3, X4, Xs, X6, X1 Accident 
22 XI Xz, X3, X4, Xs, X6, X7 Catastrophe 
23 x 2 X1 , X3, x 4, Xs, x 6, X1 Catastrophe 
24 None XI , Xz, X3, x 4, Xs, X6, x 7 Catastrophe 
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3.1.2 Bayesian network modeling 
Bayesian inference is one of the emerging thought got much attention to scholars . 
Nowadays Bayesian theory is implemented in fault diagnosis while engineers, experts are 
using in safety and risk analysis of the system process. Bayesian network can be defined 
by its characteristics; a set of variables, a set of edges (directed), finite set of mutually 
exclusive states in each variable and form of a directed acyclic graph [ 127]. Bayesian 
network is called a directed acyc lic graph (DAG) due to representation of its conditional 
interdependency [128]. In Bayesian Network. ''probability inference of an event is 
conditiona l on the observed ev idence" [129] . Bayesian network can implement forward or 
prediction ana lys is; however, it can perform backward or diagnosis ana lys is as well [130] . 
Direct cause 
P(Y jX) 
Indirect cause 
P(YjX) 
P(Z jY) 
Common cause 
P(Y jX) 
P(ZjX) 
Figure 3.2: Ca use and Effect Relationship 
Common effect 
P(ZjX, Y) 
Figure 3 .2 represents causal network with a set of variables (i.e. X, Y, Z) and a set 
of directed edges between those variables. If there is an edge from X toY, we can say that 
X is a parent of Y and Y is a child of X. It can be represented by P(YIX). S imilarly, if 
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there is link or edges from X toY and Z, we can say that Y and Z are children of X and X 
is parent ofY and Z. This structure is known as directed graph [127]. 
A general Bayesian network is presented in Figure 3.3 where we can see influence 
of A on C and E, influence of C on B and D and influence of E on D. Here, C and E are 
descendants or children of A and A is parent of C and E. Similarly, B and D are 
descendants of C and C is parent of B and D. C and E both influence D. Hence, C and E 
both are parents of D. This network can be explained using chain rule as follows: 
P(A,B,C,D,E) = P(A) P(BIC) P(CIA) P(DIC,E) P(EIA,C) 
Figure 3.3: Gene ral Bayesian Network 
The general chain rule for Bayesian network as follows: 
P(U) = n:~l P(Ai I pa(Ai)), where pa (A;) are the parents of A; in Bayesian network. 
Both converging and diverging connections exist in Figure 3.3 . From top node A, 
connection diverges to C and E; from C it diverges to B and D· from C and E it 
converges to D. If any information exists in A, it will pass between all the children of A 
(i .e. C and E). Similarly, any exist ing information known to C will pass between its 
children B and D. If no information is available about D, only the information of C and E 
exist, then the parents C and E are independent. Evidence of C or E cannot influence each 
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other certainties through D. Figure 3.4 represents both convergtng and diverging 
connections between its variables. From parent node X 1 and X2, connection diverges to 
all consequences (i.e. safe, near miss, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe). For 
each consequence, connection converges such as X 1, X2 and X3 converge to safe 
consequence. Here, X1, X2 and X3 are safety barriers to prevent unwanted consequences. 
These are possible causes as well since failure of these barriers might cause near miss or 
other consequences deviated from safe state. lf we know a possible condition of "how" 
and "why" a near miss occurs, it might lead us to possible causes; otherwise one possible 
cause cannot tell about other causes. Relevant details regarding Bayesian network can be 
found on Jensen & Nielsen [127], Neil et a l. [ 131] and Pearl [ 132] . 
Networking 
Bayesian network diagram includes nodes and edges. The failure probability of 
each safety barrier is denoted by Xi in the relative Bayesian network (Figure 3.4) which 
comprises 'circular' nodes as safety barriers as well as parents from X 1 to X7 (i .e. human, 
management, release prevention, dispersion prevention, ignition prevention, escalation 
prevention and damage control prevention factor) and 'oval' shaped nodes as end events 
as well as children (i.e. safe, near miss, mishap, incident, acc ident, and catastrophe). 
Safety barriers (parents) are linked through edges w ith end events (chi ldren). In current 
network, on ly dotted line represents edges from Human factor (X 1) barrier to a ll end 
events. Management factor is connected through breaking lines/edges to a ll end events. 
Other listed barriers are connected through hard lines/edges. 
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x, . . Human Factor (HFB) 
X2 - - - - Management & Organizational Factor (MOB) 
X3 -----Release Prevention Barrier (RPB) 
x, - ----Dispersion Prevention Barrier (DPB) 
Xs -----Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) 
Xs - ---- Escalation Prevention Barrier (EPB) 
X1 ----- Damage Control & Emergency Management Barrier (DCEMB) 
HFB: 99.71x1o·' MOB: 95.79x1 o·' RPB: 94.73x1o·' DPB: 93.84x1 o·' IPS: 89.40x10·' 
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Considering the SHIPP conceptual model, but non-sequential array, Bayesian 
network model (Figure 3.4) has been proposed which is based on revised event tree (The 
rev ised event tree includes human and management & organizational barriers). Bayesian 
network model is superior for real time accident scenarios and designing accident model 
and analysis and hereby, preferred due to its ability for successive approx imation and 
handle uncertainty. Moreover, it can describe the dependency and conditionality of the 
prior causes and consequences. The current Bayesian model can depict the accident 
scenarios and help to determine the occurrence probability of end events in any order 
conditional to any given state of safety barriers. It requires on ly a small number of 
directed edges in addition to small number of probabilities to add a new piece of 
information in Bayesian network. In the proposed Bayesian model, Bayesian network is 
developed for each safety barrier and their relevant links with the end events. Edges 
between safety barriers and end events are considered as non-sequential ; however, events ' 
occurrence is sequential. Bayesian theory can be implemented in the current Bayesian 
model to update prior belief of safety barriers with observations of actual performance 
[ 130, 133]. Figure 3.4 represents the sequences of safety barriers to prevent and mitigate 
potential end events in an LNG process facil ity. It also depicts fa ilure of re levant barriers 
individually and collectively leading to end states. Depending on the fa ilure 
consequences, the end results might be near miss to catastrophic accident deviated from a 
safe state. 
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CHAPTER4 
Mathematical Formulation and Analysis 
4.1 Conditional Probability Assessment 
The nodes of a Bayes ian network are associated with the conditional probability which 
determines the nodes' probability distribution [ 13 1]. In present analysis, Bayesian 
network is used to estimate prior conditiona l events' occurrence probability. Further, 
us ing the prior occurrence probabi lity of safety barriers in revised event tree (Figure 3.1 ), 
end states occurrence probability has been estimated us ing forward analysis (Equation 
4. 1). Moreover, fa ilure probabilit ies of the safety barriers are updated w ith the help of 
backward conditional probability approach (Equation 4 .2) by us ing the posterior 
probabilities of adverse events and the newly observed data. 
4.1.1 Forward analysis (Posterior probability estimation) 
Bobbio et a l. [ 130] nicely defined forward analys is as, " predictive ana lysis, m 
which the probability of occurrence of any node of the network is calcu lated on the basis 
of the prior probabilities of the root nodes and the conditional dependence of each node" . 
(4.1) 
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To estimate the probability of an end event ' occurrence in a given time period, the 
specific safety barrier contribution in every stage is kept in count by summing over the 
possible s ituations. For each end state (i .e. safe, near miss, mishap, incident, accident, and 
catastrophe), forward analysis has been implemented in fo llowing ways: 
x, 
P(Nearmiss =yes) 
= "f..P(X 1)P(XJP(X4 )P(NotSaje)P(Nearmiss = yes I X 1,X2 ,X4 , NotSaje ) 
P(Mishap = yes) 
= L P(XJ )P(X2 )P(X5 )P(NotNearmiss)P(Mishap =yes I X I ' X z' x 5' NotNearmiss) 
P( Incident = yes) 
= "f..P(XJ )P(X 2)P(X 6)P(NotMishap)P(Incident = yes I x i' x l, X 6, NotMishap) 
P(Accident = yes) 
= "f..P(X 1)P(X 2 )P(X7 )P(Notlncident)P(Accident = yes I X 1,X2 ,Xn Notlncident) 
?(Catastrophe = yes) 
= "f..P(X1)P(XJ P(NotAccident)P(Catastrophe = yes I X~'X2 ,NotAccident) 
4.1.2 Backward analysis (Bayesian failure probability estimation) 
"Backward (diagnostic) analysis concerns the computation of the posterior 
probability of any given set of variables g iven some observation (the ev idence), 
represented as instantiation of some of the variab les to one of their admissible values" 
[ 130]. 
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P(x = work & z = success) P(x
1 
= work I z =success) = ---'___.c_1 _______ ...:.... 
P(z = success) 
LP(x1 = work,x 2 , x3 ,z =success) 
= _,x '---.x"-3 -----------
P(z =success) (4.2) 
The pre ferred method for estimating P(X; I Safe = yes) or P(X; I Nearmiss = yes) is 
using the statistical analysis of accident data. Contribution of each barrier in end events' 
occurrence is estimated by taking probabilities of X; (i = I, .. , 7) given that system is in end 
state (i.e. safe, near miss, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe) and summing over 
the possible situations. Here, X 1, X2, X3, X-1, X5, X6 and X7 are identi fied as safety barriers 
(i.e. human, management, release prevention, dispersion prevention, igni tion prevention, 
escalation prevention and damage control prevention factor). Backward analysis has been 
implemented to check the contribution of each safety barrier in occurrence of any end 
events in fo llowing ways: 
P(X2 I Safe = yes)= L P(X1 ,X 2 = s,X3 , Safe =yes)/ P(Safo =yes) 
P(X3 I Safo = yes)= L P(XpX2 ,X3 = s, Safo = yes) / P(Safe =yes) 
P(X1 I Nem·miss = yes) 
= L P(X1 = s, X 2 ,X4 ,NotSafo =yes . Nearmiss =yes) I P(Nearmiss = yes) 
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P(X2 I Nearmiss =yes) 
= LP(X1 ,X2 = s,X4 ,NotSafe = yes,Nearmiss = yes) / P (Nearmiss =yes) 
P(X4 I Nearmiss =yes) 
= LP(X~'X2 ,X4 = s, NotSafe = yes , Nearmiss =yes) / P(Nearmiss = yes) 
In similar way, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe have been included to 
estimate the barrier contribution in causation of end events. 
4.2 Bayesian Updating Model 
Prior 
probabilities 
P(x ) 
I 
Bayesian Inference 
?(data I x,)P(x,) 
I P(data I x,)P(x,) 
Posterior 
probabilities 
P(x I data) 
i 
Likelihood 
probabilities 
P(data lx) 
I 
Figure 4.1 : Bay esian Updating Process 
Bayesian inference estimates the updated consequence results in case of fai lure of 
safety barriers through Bayesian network analysis. Once the prior failure probabil ities of 
safety barriers, P(xi) are avai lable and likelihood probabilities, P(data I x i) are estimated, 
posterior probabilities, P(xi I data) can be calculated. Bayesian updati ng mechanism is 
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illustrated m Figure 4.1. Subsequently, Bayesian backward conditional probability 
approach helps to update safety barrier success/fa ilure probabilities. The whole 
consequence is demonstrated through a flowchart diagram for an LNG process fac ili ty in 
Figure 4.2. 
Calculate occurrence p robability of 
abnormal events using Bayesian 
ne twork 
Calculate posterio r probability using 
Bayesian analysis 
Update barrier fail ure probability 
using backward analysis 
Figure 4.2: Flowchart fo r Updating Barrier Failure Probabil ities for LNG Process Facility 
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4.2.1 Likelihood estimation 
Using the real life s ite specific data, likelihood probabilit ies are estimated for the 
specific scenario. To define like lihood, identification of end events for a g iven t ime 
duration (each month) in each category is essential w hich is denoted by Ne.i· After 
estimating the occurrence probabilities of each end state, the likelihood probabil ities, 
P(EIX) is calculated fo r each end state using the fo llowing Equation ( 4.3) : 
N e. l 'Ne.2' N e.3 , .. .. . , N e.6 
6 
L N e, i = N e, l + N e,2 + N e.3 + Ne.4 + N e,5 + N e,6 
i= l 
Nei ~ P(E IX)= 6 , , where~N"·' :t=O 
L: N e,i i= l 
1= 1 
4.2.2 Bayes' theorem 
(4 .3) 
Bayes' theorem updates probabi lities [I 34] for g iven new pieces of ev idence 
us ing the fo llowing Equation (4.4). 
P(X I E)= P(X, E) = P(X, E) = P(E I X)P(X) 
P(E) L P(X,E) L P(E I X)P(X) 
(4.4) 
where, 
X represents a specific hypothesis (may or may not be some null hypothesis). 
E represents observed ev idence. 
P(X) is called the pr io r probability of X. 
P(EIX) is ca lled the condit ional probability of seeing the ev idence E if the 
hypothesis X happens to be true. 
P(E) is called the margina l probability of E. 
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Here, occurrence probabil ity of the safety barrie r X is an identical independent 
random variable and P(EIXJ is like lihood probabilities whereas, P(XIEJ is poster ior 
probabilities. Prior probabilit ies, P(X) and like lihood probabilities, P(EIXJ are replaced in 
Bayes ' theorem (Equation 4.4) to estimate posterior probabilities, P(XIEJ or, updated 
occurrence probabilities. The denominator represents the normal iz ing factor. 
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CHAPTERS 
Model Testing 
Bayes ian theory is convenient to estimate posterior probabilities of end events. Safety 
barriers' success/ fa ilure probability esti mation using backward conditional probability 
approach is another advantage of this method. Before testing the improved model, expert 
opin ion, literature review and process component fa ilure data are used to estimate prior 
fa ilure probabilities of the i-th safety barrier fo r different va lues of i ( 1, 2, 3, .. . ,7) through 
re levant fa ult tree simulation [2, 66, 135] (Table 5.1) and is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 5.1 : Prior Occurrence Probabil ity for Each Prim ary Safety Barrier 
Safety Barrier(X;) 
Human Factor Barrier (HFB) 
Management and Organizationa l Barrier (MO B) 
Re lease Prevention Barrier (RPB) 
Dispers ion Prevention Barrier (DPB) 
Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) 
Escalation Prevention Barrier (EPB) 
Damage Contro l and Emergency Management 
Barrier (DCEMB) 
5.1 LNG Process Facility Data Evaluation 
5.1.1 LNG and process train 
Failure Probability, P(X;) 
2.90x I o-3 
4.2 Jx i0-2 
5.27x I o-2 
6.16x i0-2 
I 0.60x I o-2 
2.7 1 x 1 o-2 
I 0.88x I o-2 
LNG (Liquefied Natura l Gas) is a highly demanded condensed natura l gas 
(boiling temperature ranges from - 166° C to -157° C at atmospheric pressure) . It is a 
mixed component of methane, ethane, propane, nitrogen and other part ic les wh ich are 
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combustible with a LFL (Lower Flammable Limit) limit of 4-5% by volume in air and an 
UFL (Upper Flammable Limit) limit of 15%, depending on temperature [136] . To make it 
more economical and meet global energy demand, it is liquefied for easy shipping for 
di fferent reg ions. According to CEE [137], it needs to follow a LNG train which is 
comprised four stages, (I) Exploration and production, (2) Liquefaction, (3) Shipping, 
and ( 4) Regasification and storage. Liquefaction is an important step in LNG process train 
since it transforms natural gases in a liquid form to make it usable for customers. The 
liquefaction plant is fed w ith gas sourced from the production field. During this process, 
contaminants such as, carbon dioxide (C02), water (H20), Nitrogen (N2) is removed to 
avoid freezing up or, any unwanted damages [66]. Liquefaction faci lities are well 
established with several paralle l trains where LNG is stored in double-walled inner and 
outer tanks at atmospheric pressure. Several safety measures are taken in LNG process 
facilities though any catastroph ic hazards have not taken place until today. T he hazardous 
nature of LNG can be fo und on Rathnayaka et al. [66], Bernatik et al. [ 136], and Horn & 
Wilson [ 139]. 
5.1.2 Case study application of proposed model 
The proposed Bayesian model is app lied to LNG process faci li ties to evaluate past 
accident data as well as accident scenarios. In this sect ion, an LNG process plant (Figure 
5. 1) data is studied to demonstrate the app lication of the proposed Bayesian acc ident 
model. In this case study, s ix possible end states/events (i .e. safe, near miss, mishap, 
incident, accident and catastrophe) are identified. From the revised sequential event tree 
(Figure 3.1), it has been observed that the process system is deviated from its normal 
operation which results in 'safe ' events; however, no harm/ loss is occurred. If the 
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management and organizational factor barrier (MOB) fails (i.e. poor safety cu lture), 
re lease might occur and human factor barrier (HFB) might not be ab le to stop/prevent it 
which results in a ' near miss' . Now if the HFB fai ls ( i.e. operator error) and release 
occurs, MOB still can manage it through strong safety culture management and prevent 
the release causing no harms, w hich is sti ll a 'safe' event. If both HFB and MOB fail (i.e. 
operator error, wrong decision), release wou ld happen and 'safe' will escalate to a ' near 
miss' . Simi larly, other end events' consequences can be explained from the given event 
tree. However, all the consequences are happen ing sequentially and that is a drawback of 
this improved sequential SHIPP model. In real li fe scenario, end events ' occurrence can 
happen in any order (i.e. near miss can escalate to an inc ident or accident). So it is crucial 
to use this updated and improved non-sequential approach which is defin ed as Bayesian 
network approach [75]. Now if the non-sequential concept is applied on Bayesian 
network model in Figure 3.4, the end events' consequences can be explained in any order. 
For example, a mishap just happened due to HFB, RPB (Release prevention barrier) and 
DPB (Dispersion prevention barrier) fa ilure which might escalate to an accident and the 
chances of occurrences can be estimated if the ' not incident' , HFB, MOB and DCEMB 
(Damage contro l and emergency management barrier) success probabilities are available . 
In similar way, probabi lities of other consequences can be estimated. Both revised event 
tree and Bayesian network mode l are usefu l to validate the assumption. Prior fa ilure 
probabilities can be applied in the revised event tree model as we ll as in the Bayesian 
network mode l to estimate the occurrence probabi lities for both models. The results are 
li sted in Table 5.2. It may be observed from the listed results that the occurrence 
probabilities for both mode ls c losely match. 
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Table 5.2: Prior Occurrence Probabi li ties of End Events Using SHIPP and Bayesian Model 
Event Tree Cond itiona l Event 
End Occurrence Occurrence 
Events( E) Probability P(Ek) Probab il ity P(Ek) 
Safe (£ 1) 9.07 x 10-1 9 .07x 10- 1 
Near miss (£2) 8.73 x i 0-2 8.69x I o-2 
Mishap (£3) 4.86 x I o-3 5 . 10 x i 0-3 
Incident (£4) 4.43 x lo-4 5.88x I o-4 
Accident (Es) 2.30x I o-5 1.46x I o-5 
Catastrophe (£6) 3.95 x i0-7 1.78 x i 0-6 
5.1.3 Model validation 
End events' occurrence in a process fac ility on a regular basis is not unusual. 
Hence, first I 0 months end events' data (2008) [2] of an LNG process plant is presented 
in Table 5.3 to proof that evidence. This raw data is used in the proposed Bayesian 
network model (Figure 3.4). 
Table 5.3: Real Mo nthly Data of the First I 0 Months of the Year 2008 [2] 
Safe N ear miss Mishap Inc ident Accident Catastrophe Total 
Month (E1) (£2) (EJ) (£4) (£5) (E6) Events 
5 4 2 0 0 12 
2 4 6 2 0 0 0 12 
3 5 7 2 0 0 15 
4 18 44 12 8 0 83 
5 5 18 5 2 0 0 30 
6 3 9 0 0 14 
7 4 6 0 0 12 
8 4 7 3 0 0 15 
9 3 10 3 0 0 17 
10 2 3 2 2 0 0 9 
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The estimated likelihood and posterior probabilities are listed in Table 5.4 and 5.5. 
Here, the posterior probabilities are calculated using both prior occurrence and likelihood 
probabilities of end events. 
Table 5.4: Likelihood of Events Occurrence o fthe First 10 Months o f the Year 2008 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe 
Month (£,) (£2) (EJ) (£4) (£5) (£6) 
4.17x 10-1 3.33 x i0-1 1.67x 10-1 8.33 x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
2 3.33 x i0-1 5.00x I o-1 1.67x 10-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 3.33 x I o-1 4.67x 10-1 1.33 x i 0- 1 6.67x 1 o-2 0.0 0.0 
4 2. 17x I o-1 5.30x I o-1 1.45x I o-1 9.64x I o-2 1.20x I o-2 0.0 
5 1.67x 10-1 6.00x 10-1 1.67x 10-1 6.67x 1 o-2 0.0 0.0 
6 2.1 5x 10-1 6.43 x i0-1 7.14x i0-2 7.14x i0-2 0.0 0.0 
7 3.33 x i0-1 5.00x I o-1 0.0 8.33 x i 0-2 8.33 x i0-2 0.0 
8 2.67x 10-1 4.67x 10-1 2.00x 10-1 6.67x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
9 1.76x i0-1 5.88x 10-1 1.76x i0- 1 5.88 x J0-2 0.0 0.0 
10 2.22x 10-1 3.33 x 10-1 2.22x I o-1 2.22x 10-1 0.0 0.0 
Table 5.5: Posterior Events' Occurrence of the First 10 Months of the Year 2008 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe 
Month (£,) (£2) (EJ) (£4) (£5) (£ 6) 
9.27x 10-1 7.1 Ox I o-2 2.08 x I o-3 1.20x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
2 8.72 x i0-1 1.25 x I o-1 2.45 x i0-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 8.80x I o-1 1.18x i0-1 1.98x i0-3 1.1 4x 10-4 0.0 0.0 
4 8.08x I o-1 1.89x I o-1 3.03x I o-3 2.33 x I o-4 7.22x10-7 0.0 
5 7.40x I o-1 2.55 x I o-1 4. 16x I o-3 1.92x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
6 7.76x I o-1 2.23x 10-1 1.45x I o-3 1.68x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
7 8.74x I o-1 1.26x 10-1 0.0 1.42x I o-4 3.52x I o-6 0.0 
8 8.53 x I o-1 1.43x I o-1 3.60x I o-3 1.38x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
9 7.55 x I o-1 2.4 1 x 1 o-1 4.24x I o-3 1.63 x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
10 8.70x to-1 1.25 x i0-1 4.89x I o-3 5.64x 10-4 0.0 0.0 
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Despite careful steps in accident modelling it is a requirement to validate the 
model and verify numerical calcu lation. As a first step, the model can be validated and 
compare a ll numerical values with other models. For the proposed Bayesian model to 
pass the validation, it is necessary to compare the posterior end resu lts with prior months. 
For example, if the ' 0' th (prior) and later month end events' values closely match for both 
SHIPP and proposed Bayesian model then the proposed model will be acceptable. For the 
comparison, the end events' posterior probabil ities for the '0' th (prior) and the ' I 0' th 
month are obtained from the revised event tree and Bayesian network and are listed in 
Table 5.6. Further, these two results are compared. It may be observed from Table 5.6 
that posterior values for both SHIPP and Bayesian model closely match . Graphical 
representation of I 0 months occurrence probabi I ity is avai lable in Figure 5 .2. Another 
case study of Macondo blowout well accident is presented in Appendix B. 
Table 5.6: Model Compari son for End Events' Probabilities 
End SHIPP Proposed 
Month Events Model Model 
Safe (E1) 9.07x10-1 9.07x 10-1 
Near miss (E2) 8.73 x i0-2 8.69x 10-2 
0111 month (prior) Mishap (E3) 4.86x I o-3 5. 10x i 0-3 
Incident (E4) 4.43 x i0-4 5.88 x10-4 
Accident (E5) 2.30x I o-s 1.46x 1 o-s 
Catastrophe (E6) 3.95 x I o-7 1.78x i0-6 
Safe (E1) 8.50x 1 o-1 8.70x I o-1 
Near miss (E2) 1.45 x 10-1 1.25 x 1 o- 1 
I 0111 month Mishap (E3) 4.00x 1 o-3 4.89x I o-3 
Incident (E4) 3.00x I o-4 5.64x 1 o-4 
Accident (E5) 9.2 J X 10-7 0.0 
Catastrophe (E6) 0.0 0.0 
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5.2 Application to 24 Months Data 
5.2.1 Likelihood failure probability estimation 
The 24 months real time data from LNG process plant is listed in Table 5.7. From 
this raw data four end events (safe, near miss, mishap and incident) are ident ified w ith 
frequent number of occurrence. Only three acc ident occurrence in 24 months period and 
no catastrophe has been observed . Columns 2-7 of Table 5.7 represent each end event 
occurrence and column 8 represents tota l occurrence for each month. To calculate 
likelihood probabilities of the g iven data, Equation (4.3) is used . 
The like lihood probabilities are estimated using fo llowing steps: 
• Identify end events fo r each month in each category denoted by N e.i 
• Assess tota l number of end events by taking sum on N e,i, where i is the i-th barrier. 
• Estimate the like lihood for each event of each month by dividing each 
corresponding months' tota L 
For example, in the 2nd month, Safe (E1) events happened twice (i.e. i =2). Total 
events for the 2nd month are 7. 
i= l 
= N e,l + N e, 2 + N e,3 + N e,4 + N e,5 + N e,6 
= 2+2+2+ 1+0+ 0 
= 7 
• Now the like lihood P(EIX) is calculated using the fo llowing equation as illustrated 
in Equation (4.3), 
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P(E I X) 
= 
2 
= 7 
= 2.857 X JO-I 
Likewise, likelihood probabilities for other end events fo r each month have been 
calculated using above equation. Updated like lihood probabil ities are li sted in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.7: Real Monthly Data o f the Years 2008 and 2009 (66] 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe Total 
Month (EJ) (£2) (EJ) (£4) (£5) (£ 6) Events 
3 4 0 0 0 0 7 
2 2 2 2 0 0 7 
3 5 2 0 0 0 0 7 
4 II 26 8 0 0 46 
5 3 5 0 0 0 9 
6 2 3 0 0 0 0 5 
7 4 2 0 0 8 
8 2 0 3 0 0 6 
9 2 0 0 0 0 3 
10 2 3 0 0 7 
II 4 2 0 0 0 7 
12 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 
13 5 4 2 0 0 12 
14 4 6 2 0 0 0 12 
15 5 7 2 0 0 15 
16 10 27 6 3 0 47 
17 3 15 6 2 0 0 26 
18 3 7 0 0 12 
19 4 6 0 0 12 
20 4 7 3 0 0 15 
2 1 3 10 3 0 0 17 
22 2 3 2 2 0 0 9 
23 7 10 2 0 0 0 19 
24 4 4 2 0 0 0 10 
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Table 5.8: Likelihood of Events Occurrence of the Years 2008 and 2009 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe 
Month (EJ) (EJ) (£;) (£4) (Es) (£6) 
4 .29 x 10· 1 5.71 x lo-l 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 
2 2.86x I o- 1 2.86x 10·1 2 .86x I o- 1 1.43 x i0- 1 0.0 0.0 
3 7.14x 10· 1 2.86x I o-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 2.39x 10·1 5.65 x 10· 1 1.74x 10· 1 2.17x i0-2 0.0 0.0 
5 3.33 x 10· 1 5.56x 10·1 1.11 x 1 o- 1 0 .0 0.0 0.0 
6 4.00x 10·1 6.00x I o-1 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 
7 5.00x I o- 1 2.50x I o-1 1.25 x i 0-1 1.25 x 10-1 0.0 0.0 
8 1.67x I o· 1 3.33 x l0-1 0.0 5.00x 1 o-l 0.0 0.0 
9 6.67x I o-1 3.33 x 10-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 2.86 x I o-1 4.29 x 10·1 1.43 x I o-1 0.0 1.43 x i 0- 1 0.0 
I I 1.43 x 10·1 5.7 1x l0·1 2 .86x I o· 1 0.0 0 .0 0.0 
12 6.67 x I o-1 3.33 x I o-1 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 
13 4.17x 10· 1 3.33 x I o·1 1.67 x 10· 1 8.33 x i 0-2 0.0 0.0 
14 3.33 x I o-1 5.00x I o· 1 1.67 x 10·1 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 
15 3.33 x I o-1 4 .67 x l0· 1 1.33x I o- 1 6.67x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
16 2.1 3 x 10· 1 5.74x 10·1 1.28x 10· 1 6.38 x I o-2 2.13 x l0·2 0.0 
17 1.15 x l0· 1 5.77x 10·1 2.3 1x 10-1 7.69x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
18 2.50 x 10· 1 5.83 x i0-1 8.33 x i0-2 8.33 x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
19 3.33 x 10· 1 5.oox 1 o-1 0.0 8.33 x i 0-2 8.33 x i 0-2 0 .0 
20 2.67 x 10· 1 4 .67 x 10-1 2.00 x I o-1 6.67x I o·2 0 .0 0.0 
2 1 1.76x 10· 1 5.88 x 10·1 1.76x 10· 1 5.88x I o-2 0.0 0.0 
22 2.22 x 10· 1 3.33 x i0-1 2.22 x 10· 1 2.22 x 10· 1 0.0 0 .0 
23 3.68 x I o· 1 5.26x I o-1 l.05x I o· 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24 4.00 x I o-1 4 .00 x 10·1 2.00 x I o-1 0.0 0.0 0 .0 
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5.2.2 Posterior events' occurrence probability estimation 
In this step, Bayesian theory is applied to calculate the posterior probability of 
each end state. Using prior occurrence probabilities from Table 5.2 and like lihood 
probabilities from Table 5.8, posterior probabilities have been estimated using Bayes' 
Equation ( 4.4). The posterior probabilities are estimated using subsequent steps: 
• Numerator can be written as for each event: 
where, i = I , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . ..... 23, 24; 
• Denominator can be written for the 2nd month as: 
6 
~ P(EIX)P(X) = (le 1 * Pe 1) + (le 2 * Pe 2) + ··· ··· ··· + Cle2 6 * Pe 6 ) z, 21 21 21 I 21 
i=1 
To calculate the denominator, above approach has been used : 
6 I P(EIX)P(X) = (2.857 X 10- 1 * 9.074 X 10- 1) + (2.857 X 10-1 * 8.688 X 10- 2) + .. . 
i=1 
+ (0.0 * 1.782 X 10- 6) = 2.856 X 10- 1 
_P.....:(_E:_iX.:.._)P_:(:.....X.:...) _ Now, 6 Li=l P(EiX)P(X) 
2.593 X 10-l 
2.856 X 10-l 
= 9.079 x 10-\ posterior value for the 'Safe' event for the 2nd month. 
Likewise, posterior probabilities for other events for each month have been 
calculated using Bayes' Equation (4.4). Updated posterior values are li sted in Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.9: Posterior Events' Occurrence of the Years 2008 and 2009 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe 
Month (E,) (E2) (EJ) (E4) (E5) (E6) 
8.87x I o-1 1.1 3x i 0- 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 9.08x I o- 1 8.69x I o-2 5. 1 Ox I o-3 2.94x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
3 9.63 x I o-1 3.69x I o-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 8. 13x 10- 1 1.84x I o- 1 3.32x I o-3 4.79x l0-5 0.0 0.0 
5 8.6 1xJ0- 1 1.37x I o- 1 1.6 1 x 1 o-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 8.74x 10-1 1.26x I o- 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 9.53 x i 0- 1 4.56x 1 o-2 1.34x I o-3 1.54x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
8 8.38x I o-1 1.60x I o-1 0.0 1.63 x 10-3 0.0 0.0 
9 9.54x I o- 1 4.57x I o-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 8.72 x I o-1 l.25 x I o-1 2.45x I o-3 0.0 7.02 x I o-6 0.0 
II 7.17x 10-l 2.75 x i 0-1 8.06x I o-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 9.54x I o- 1 4.57x I o-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 9.27x 10-1 7. 1 Ox I o-2 2.08x I o-3 1.20x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
14 8.72 x I o-1 1.25 x I o-1 2.45x I o-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15 8.80x I o- 1 1. 18x l0-1 1.98x I o-3 1. 14x 10-4 0.0 0.0 
16 7.92 x I o-1 2.05 x I o- 1 2.67x I o-3 1.54x I o-4 1.27x I o-6 0.0 
17 6.7 1 X 10-l 3.2 1 X 10-l 7.54x I o-3 2.90x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
18 8. 16x 10- 1 1.82x 10- 1 1.53 x i0-3 1.76x i 0-4 0.0 0.0 
19 8.74x 10-1 1.26x 10-1 0.0 1.42x I o-4 3.52 x I o-6 0.0 
20 8.53 x i0-1 1.43 x i 0-1 3.60x I o-3 1.38x i0-4 0.0 0.0 
2 1 7.55 x I o- 1 2.4 1x i 0-1 4.24x I o-3 1.63x 10-4 0.0 0.0 
22 8.70x I o-1 1.25x I o-1 4.89x 10-3 5.64x 1 o-4 0.0 0.0 
23 8.78 x I o-1 1.20x l 0-1 1.41 x 1 o-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24 9. 10x 10-1 8.72x i0-2 2.56x I o-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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5.2.3 Bayesia n updating 
To update the existing safety barrier success pro babili t ies rea l t ime , backward o r 
diagnosis ana lysis has been done . In addit io n, condit ional probability tab le listed in Table 
5 .10 is used to calculate the end events' occu rre nce as well as each safety barrie r 
co ntributio n in occurre nce of any end events. 
Table 5.10: Condi tional Probabil ity Table 
Safety Barrier 
End HFB MOB RPB DPB lPB EPB DCEMB 
Events (X,) (Xz) (XJ) (X4) (Xs) (X6) (X?) 
Success Success Success 
Safe 
Fail Success Success 
Success Success Fa il Success 
Fail Success Fail Success 
Near miss 
Success Fail Fail Success 
Fail Fai l Fail Success 
Success Success Fail Fail Success 
Fail Success Fail Fai l Success 
Mishap 
Success Fai l Fail Fail Success 
Fail Fail Fail Fail Success 
Success Success Fail Fail Fai l Success 
Fail Success Fail Fail Fai l Success 
Incident 
Success Fail Fail Fai l Fai l Success 
Fail Fail Fai l Fai l Fai l Success 
Success Success Fail Fail Fai l Fail Success 
Fail Success Fail Fail Fai l Fail Success 
Accident 
Success Fail Fail Fail Fai l Fail Success 
Fai l Fail Fail Fail Fai l Fail Success 
Success Success Fail Fail Fai l Fail Fail 
Fail Success Fail Fail Fai l Fail Fail 
Catastrophe 
Success Fail Fa il Fail Fai l Fail Fail 
Fa il Fa il Fail Fail Fai l Fai l Fail 
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t = 'N ' -th time barrier success probabilities for X 1, X2, X3, X-1, X5, X6 and X 1 are listed in 
following table: 
Safety Barrier(X;) 
Human Factor Barrier (HFB) 
Management and Organizational Barrier (MOB) 
Release Prevention Barrier (RPB) 
Dispersion Prevention Barrier (DPB) 
Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) 
Escalation Prevention Barrier (EPB) 
Damage Control and Emergency Management 
Barrier (DCEMB) 
Success Probability, P(X;) 
99.7 1 x 1 o-2 
95 .79x i0-2 
94.73 x I o-2 
93 .84x l0-2 
89.40x I o-2 
97.29x I o-2 
89. 12x i0-2 
Posterior in formation of the 19th and 20th months is adopted from the case study (Table 
5.9): 
Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe 
Mo nth P(£,) P(£2) P(£3) P(£4) P(Es) P(£6) 
19 8.74x i0-1 1.26x I o-1 0.0 1.42x I o-4 3.52x I o-6 0.0 
20 8.53 x i0-1 1.43x i0-1 3.60x I o-3 1.38 x I o-4 0.0 0.0 
From conditional probabi lity table we can see the system is in safe state while al l three 
barriers respectively, HFB(X1), MOB(X2) and RPB(X3) are in success/working state. 
Even the fa ilure of HFB(X 1) still keeps the system safe. Since the system is in safe state, 
all three barriers related to safe sequence have significant contribution to keep it safe. 
This individual contribution can be est imated through backward analysis approach. Now 
to estimate HFB(X 1) contribution while the system is in safe state, following equation has 
been used: 
L P(X1 = S , X 2 ,X3 , Saje = yes ) 
P(Xt I Safe= yes ) = -="'l_.x, _ ________ _ 
P(Safe = yes) 
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The numerator can be simplified further using chain rule as follows: 
= P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = S, Safe =yes) + P(X, = S, X2 = F, X3 = S, Safe =yes) 
+ P(X, = S, X2 = S, X1 = F, Safe = yes) + P(X, = S, X2 = F, X3 = F, Safe = yes) 
= P(Safe =yes I x, = s, x2 = s, XJ = S) P(X, = S) P(X2 = S) P(XJ = S) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X, = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = F) P(XJ = S) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X, = S, X2 = S, X1 = F) P(X, = S) P(X2 = S) P(XJ = F) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X, = S, X2 = F, X1 = F) P(X, = S) P(X2 = F) P(XJ = F) 
= (90.48x10-2*99.7 1 X I o-2*95 .79x I o-2*94.73 X I o-2) + 0 + 0 + 0 
= 81.86x I o-2 
Here, only success state of all three barriers is considered. Failure of other barriers 
resulted in system fai l and '0' probabilities. The P(Safe) value in denominator is available 
from 19111 month as 87.43 x I o-2 • The final resu lt 93 .63 X I o-2 is contributed by human factor 
barrier (HFB) to keep the system safe. 
P(X, I Safe = yes) = P(X, & Safe = yes) I P(Safe = yes) 
= 93.63x10-2 
Similarly, fo llowing conditional probability table contribution of each factor 
barrier can be estimated in occurrence of end events. The contribution of safety barriers 
viz. X1, X2, XJ, X-1, Xs, X6 and X 7 are listed here while the system is in 'safe' to 
'catastrophic ' state. 
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State P(X1) P(X2) P(XJ) P(X4) P(Xs) P(X6) P(X7) 
Prior Values 99.7J X J0-2 95.79x 10-2 94 .73x i0-2 93.84 x I o-2 89.40x I o-2 97.29x J0-2 89.12x 10'2 
Safe 93.64 xi0-2 93.64x i0-2 93 .64x I o-2 
Near miss 2.99x 10'2 2.98x 10'2 2.99x 10'2 
Mishap 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Incident 5.83x I o-7 5.83x I o-7 5.83x 10'7 
Accident 8.36x I o-12 8.36x 10'12 8.36x 10'12 
Catastrophe 0.0 0.0 
Here ' success' contribution of the safety barriers X,, X2• X; are estimated whi le these are in 'safe' state and rest X.t. X5, Xr. and X1 
are in 'failure' state. Adding up all the contribution in all state lor X1, X2, X3 and ( I - contribution) for X.t. X5. Xr. and X1 are listed 
as follows: 
Barrier 
Success 
Probabilities 
P(X2) 
96.63 x 10-2 
Mat lab code and step by step analysis is available in Appendix C and D. 
P(~) P(Xs) 
97.01 X J0-2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Now, updated barrier success probabi lities have been estimated after using ·prior' success values of the safety barriers 
and 19'h month 'posterior' information of the end events. To estimate new values fo r the barriers, updated barrier success 
probabi lities need to be considered as prior information from the above table and the 20'h month ' posterior' in formation of the 
end events as normalizing factor in denominator. 
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State P(X1) P(X2) P(XJ) P(X4) P(Xs) 
Prior Values 96.63 x 10"2 96.62 x 10·2 93.64 x lo·2 97.0 i x l0"2 1.0 1.0 
Safe 89.54 x 10·2 89.65 x 10·2 89.65 x 10·2 
Near miss 3.25x I o·2 3.25 x 10"2 3.25 x lo·2 
Mishap I.09x l0-4 1.09x 10-4 
Incident 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Accident 0.0 0.0 
Catastrophe 0.0 0.0 
Adding up all the contribution in all state for X1• X2• X3 and ( I -contribution) for X-1. X5, Xr. and X1 follows: 
Barrier 
Success 
Probabilities 92.80x 10"2 92.9 1 X I 0"2 
P(X3) P(~) P(Xs) 
89.65 x 10"2 96.75x 10"2 99.99x 10·2 1.0 
1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
These barrier success probabili ties will be updated in the next time interval , t+ I. as new information is available in the system. 
Mat lab code fo r the step by step analys is is given in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER6 
Analysis of Results 
Activities in LNG processing facilities are dynamic m nature. Any change in system 
performance, dev iation from a safe state to any abnormal state is alarming. Current study 
has used real li fe end events data from such LNG process faci lities. The improved 
accident model used for current case study comprises of seven non-sequential safety 
barriers; human, management & organizat ional, release prevention, dispersion prevention, 
ignition prevention, escalation prevention and damage control prevention barrier to 
illustrate the accident scenario. It is important to study the performance of the human 
factor barrier (HFB) and management & organizational barrier (M&OB) as they play a 
critical role in wel l integrity and decision making. The prior fail ure probabilities of safety 
barriers indicate vu lnerabi lity of the system or performance of safety barriers to intercept 
the accident sequence. The failure probabilities (prior values) of each safety barrier were 
estimated through relevant fault tree simulation [2, 66, 135] of a particular LNG 
processing unit to test the models' validi ty. In the improved methodology, the 24 months 
L G process facility data are analyzed re lated to end events. In subsequent steps, plant 
real-time end event data is used to formulate the likelihood probabilities. Using the prior 
belief and likelihood data, posterior occurrence probabilities for end events have been 
estimated. As the new information is received, the prior fa ilure probabil ities of safety 
barriers are updated using Bayesian theorem . It is noticed that the results were directly 
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supported by p lant specific data. The posterior probabilities of end events ' viz. safe, near 
miss, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe are shown in Figures 6.1 to 6.6. 
0.95 
~ 0.9 
"' ~
~ 0.85 
..0 
"' ..0 
2 
~ 0.8 
0 
-~ 
00 
0 
0.. 0.75 
0.7 
Occurrence probability of Safe events over 24 months 
Safe I 
0.65 c__ __ _,_ ___ ____. _ _ __ _.._ __ _J.. ___ _____J 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Month 
Fig ure 6 . 1: Posterio r Occurrence Probabil it ies o f Safe Events Over 24 Months 
Occurrence probability of Near rniss events over 24 months 
0.35 ,----,----.-----.---;:::==:!::::====::::;-I 
1 ----- ~~ear miss 1 
0.3 
.:Z 0 25 E . 
(;; 
~ 0.2 
"" 
:.0 
"' 2 0.15 
Q. 
.9 ;;; 
00 0.1 
0 
0.. 
0.05 
~ 
\ A 
\ ) L _ ~ 
\ 
OL----~----L-----'-----L---~ 
I] 5 10 15 20 25 
Month 
Figure 6 .2: Po sterio r Occurrence Probabi lities of Near miss Events O ver 24 Months 
58 
x 10·3 Occurrence probability of Mishap events over 24 months 
9 r-----~------~----~----~~====~ I ..... · Mishap I 
7 
8 ~ \ I I /' ~ /I\ 1/ \ r' /l i\ 
il j\ l 'i J ~, ) \ ,,/ \,,_ ;·' I\ i\,, ;' • ,, I , 
Ill \\f \ A f !I I . \ I \; I \, .! .\ 11 1 • \,JI I II It/ \. i \/ \ v ' o~--~--~~-4~-L--~--~------+-L-------~ 
0 5 
2 
10 20 25 15 
Month 
Figure 6.3: Posterio r Occurrence Probab ilities of Mishap Events Over 24 Months 
x 10·3 Occurrence probabilit y of Incident events over 24 months 
1 .8 1 ----,-----,------,,----;:::::::r::====:::::::;-, I --+-- Incident I 
1.6 
1.4 
c 
(l< 
1l 1.2 
c 
>. 
:.0 
"' _o 2 0.8 
Q. 
.9 
Q; 0.6 
o; 
0 
0.. 
0.4 
0.2 
I 
10 15 21] 25 
lvlonth 
Figure 6.4: Posterior Occurrence Probabilit ies of Incident Events Over 24 Months 
59 
x 10-e Occurrence probabilit y of .i\ccident events over 24 months 
8 
! ··· Accident I 7 
-;::;-6 
I\ 
c 
"' -o 
·;:; 
'-' ~ ~0 
>-. I( 
~ 4 ) i ~ ..0 .I \ 0 0.. I \ .9 3 I, Q; l I 00 0 2 0.. 
J l j\. I I ! .\ ) I 
t I I \ 
0 
. \ 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Month 
Figure 6.5: Posterior Occurrence Probabilities o f Accident Events Over 24 Months 
08 
0.6 
~w .. 
.c 
2 0 .4 
;;; 
'" ~ 0.2 ~ 
D 
"' ~ -0.2 
~~· 
-~ -0.4 
;;; 
0 
0.. 
-0.6 
-0.8 
Occurrence probability of Catastrophe events over 24 months 
I -Catast rophe I 
-1L_ ______ _L ______ ~L-------~------~------~ 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Month 
Fig ure 6.6: Posterio r Occurrence Probab ilities of Catastrophe Events Ove r 24 Mo nths 
60 
Analysis of above Figures highlight that the end events ' occurrence probabi lities 
over the time period have been changed drastically as new in formation is integrated into 
the analys is. Occurrence probabilities have been changed significantly from its initial 
belief. With some exception in the month of April of 2008 and 2009, end events ' 
occurrence is relatively higher compare to other months from the beginning of year 2009. 
Probability of 'Safe' events' occurrence is reduced and as a result, ' near miss' and 
'mi shap' are gett ing increased. ' Incident' and ' accident ' are gradually decreased. In the 
month of April, it' s comparatively higher than any other months though near miss events 
are high in those months. It is evident that the safe events have a higher occurrence 
probability at the beginning of the analysis. As it can be seen from Figure 6.1 , the 
posterior probability is fluctuating all over the months which are never been steady. Near 
miss occurrence in Figure 6.2 shows almost same but upward fluctuation. The number of 
occurrences is on top in the month of April of the year 2009 as it reaches to the peak. Rest 
of the Figures (6.5 and 6.6) show a little fluctuation as there are not enough incident and 
accident events have taken place. Only three acc ident occurrences with low priority 
(7.02 x I o·6, 1.27x I o-6, 3.52x I o-6) has been observed; however no catastrophe has been 
detected in that time period. The performance of the system is degraded with time which 
might resul t in higher occurrence probability of near misses and mishap events. 
Therefore, the prior estimation of consequences indicates that this particular LNG fac ility 
observes accidents with very low frequency whereas the observation of near misses is 
frequent. The past accident statistical data in di fferent process industries displayed the 
same phenomena. In reality, events such as near misses and mishaps are more freq uent 
than incidents or accidents. Therefore, the model results are significantly supported by 
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real data. However, end event probabilities over the months of the year 2008 and 2009 
change significantly as new data are integrated into the analysis. The safe event has a high 
probability of occurrence at the beginning and as time goes by the probability is reduced 
from 9.07x I 0-1 to 8.87x I 0_1 at the beginn ing of January 2008 and then increased to 
9.07x I 0_1 at the beginning of January 2009 The lowest occurrence probability has been 
observed to 6.71 x 1 0_1 in the month of May of 2009. Furthermore, high severity events 
have low probabilities of occurrence at the beginning. As time goes by, the likelihood of 
event occurrence dramatically increases. The probabi I ity of "accident" occurrence 
changes from 1.46x I 0-5 to 3.52x I 0-6 . 
For model compari son, occurrence probabilities are estimated usmg the prior 
fa ilure probabilities of safety barriers in both rev ised event tree and Bayesian network and 
the outcome are relatively favorable. After observing these resu lts, it is assumed that the 
chance of system being safe is 9.07 x 1 o- 1 which is relatively high compare to other end 
events' results. The probability of accident and catastrophic accident causation are 
respecti vely, 1.46x 1 o-5 and 1.78 x 1 o-6. Similar prior belief or fa ilure probabilities of the 
safety barrier are used in rev ised event tree which gives 9.07 x I o-1 for system being safe 
whereas, 2.30x I o-5 for being an accident and 3 .95 x I o-7 fo r a catastrophic accident. From 
both observations, it is clear that the improved model is applicable to real life accident 
scenarios in any process industry with minor adjustment. Due to end event occurrence in 
process faci lity, safety measures are undertaken whether it's mechanical or management 
concern . Variation of posterior probabil ity (Figure 6.1 to 6.6) distribution over time 
period indicates im pairment of the LNG process fac ility. 
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Bayesian network analysis is engaged to estimate updated occurrence probabilities 
of end events. Forward and backward conditional probability approach help to identify 
the contribution of each safety barrier in occurrence of any end events. In addition, 
conditional probability table (Table 5.1 0) is used to identify safety barrier' s contribution 
in occurrence of end events. For justification, posterior probability of the 19th and 20th 
month has been taken into consideration. Updated barrier success probabilities have been 
estimated after using prior success values of the safety barriers and 19th month posterior 
information of the end events. To estimate new values fo r the barriers, updated barrier 
success probabilities has been considered as prior info rmation and the 20th month 
posterior information of the end events as normalizing factor in denominator. Adding up 
all the contribution of safety barriers in each occurrence level prov ides updated success 
probabilities to end . These updated safety barriers' success probability can be used to 
predict the probabilities of end events' occurrence in the next time interval. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A review of existing accident mode ling approaches prov ides a complex picture of 
accident occurrence in process fac ility. Fault and event tree sequentia l method is fa irly 
common in industria l accident modeling w hile non-sequentia l approach Bayesian 
network methodo logy is fairly a new concept. It is evident that the maj ority of ex isting 
mode ls focus on sequentia l accident approach. As in rea l life, occurrence of non-
sequentia l events ' might happen in any stage. The improved methodology with non-
sequentia l characte ri stics g ives the abili ty to overcome this issue . In the current study, 
the restrictive sequential event assumption in SHIPP methodology is re laxed by 
a llowing non-sequentia l fa ilure of safety barriers to cause adverse event of any order. 
Hence, Bayesian updating methodology is proposed to mode l LNG process safety. In 
ex isting model, end event ' s sequence has been c learly demonstrated in every stage. 
The proposed non-sequential mode l has been translated from the origina l SHIPP 
mode l w ith inc lusion of improved feature. The methodo logy is applicable for 
mode ling probable acc ident scenarios, and evaluating the ir occurrence probability 
using industry specific data. The application of the proposed Bayesian network based 
accident model has been demonstrated on a typ ica l LNG process fac ili ty . The model 
has been va lidated using the plant specific 24 month ' s real time data. Current case 
study ana lysis uses seven non-sequentia l safety barriers; human, management & 
organizationa l, re lease prevention, dispersion prevention, ignition prevention, 
escalation prevention and damage control prevention barrier to illustrate the accident 
scenario . This case study shows that inc lusion of two more important safety barriers 
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v1z. human and management & organizational factors, has made a significant 
difference in current study. In add ition, an important mechanical safety barrier viz. 
Damage Control and Emergency Management Barrier (DCEM B) is included in the 
prediction of posterior probabilities of adverse events for real time industrial data and 
as a result an adverse event of highest order v iz. Catastrophe is inc luded in the study. 
The end events i.e. safe, near miss, mishap, incident, accident and catastrophe are the 
outcome events of safe sate deviation for an abnormal operation (e.g., LNG release). 
The 24 months real time raw data from LNG process plant are used for the 
current study w ith freq uent number of adverse event occurrence in every month . 
Bayes' theorem is convenient to estimate posterior probabilities of end events for the 
current study. Similarly, to obtain the posterior information or update the safety 
barrier success/ failure probabilities real-time, Bayes' theorem has been used. For LNG 
release case study, occurrence probabilities of end events are estimated using forward 
ana lys is. From the graphical representation, it is c lear that the posterior probability is 
fluctuating over the months except for the catastrophe events. In studied example, 
near misses and mishaps are more frequent than incidents or acc idents. [t a lso 
demonstrates a higher probability of occurrence of safe events ; as time goes by, the 
system degrade and safety barrier performance is reduced which causes incidents and 
accidents to occur in the process faci lity. From the prior data, it has been observed 
accident occurrence with very low frequency whereas the occurrence of near miss is 
frequent. The end event probabilities over the months of the year 2008 and 2009 
change significantly as new data are integrated into the ana lysis. The posterior 
probabilities are used to update the safety barrier fa ilure probabi lities through a 
backward ana lysis and in turn update the estimates of the likelihood continually . To 
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test the improved model, expert opinion, li terature review and process component 
fa ilure data are used to estimate prior failure probabilities of the safety barrier through 
re levant fault tree simulation. The result (prior estimation) o btained through revised 
event tree and Bayesian network ana lysis is directly supp011ed by the updated 
(posterior estimation) result, wh ich supports the numerical validation. 
The proposed improved methodo logy can predict the occurrence probability of 
the next time internal as soon as the updated barrier success/fa ilure probabilit ies are 
available. The method helps to identify and estimate contribution of different barriers 
in acc ident causation. From the analys is, it has been observed that the model is 
fl exible to incorporate new knowledge or evidence and yie lds updated probabilities 
and provides revised likel ihood estimates for the end events. Based on the current 
study, it can be conc luded that the improved methodo logy can be applied to real-life 
acc ident prediction and development of accident prevention strategies. The proposed 
acc ident model is applicable to offshore o il and gas process industry; however, with 
fut1her modification it can be applied to other industria l fac ilities inc luding 
mechanical pipe line and marine industries for analyzing like lihood of possib le 
accident scenarios. 
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CHAPTERS 
Future Works 
There are several improvements can be implemented in proposed methodology: 
• Uncertainty analysis: Uncertainty analysis or error propagation needs to be 
included as the va lue has been calculated from several measured numbers. 
• Non-cyclic network: To display an event's consequence, sometimes non-
cyclic network is essential in real life ana lysis. Therefore it needs to be 
considered during graphical illustration. 
• Testing and validation: The model can be tested and validated with a new set 
of data which is required. 
• Tools: Several tools are recommended for testing and ana lys is. Hence, a tool 
needs to be developed for easy and effective use. 
• Results: Results can be a ltered to su ite the need of the user; they can be 
displayed graphica lly in a chart. 
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Table A I : Basic event fa ilure probability fo r Human Factor Barrier (HFB) [66] 
Event Event Description '"' 
, ¥ w 
Assigned Probability 
I Safety locking device (safety interlock)failure 0.050 
2 Warning display failure 0.050 
3 Warning alarm fa ilure 0.020 
4 Incorrect labeling 0. 100 
5 Labeling not available 0.100 
6 Unreliable measurement of instrumentation 0.00 1 
7 Inadequate tools or equipment 0.020 
8 False indication 0.020 
9 Inadequate work instruction or procedures 0.025 
10 Inadequate communication 0.050 
II Communication fa ilure 0.025 
12 Inadequate lighting 0.034 
13 High level noise or mechanica l vibration 0.050 
14 Uncomfortable temperature extremes 0.100 
15 Presence of fumes or gases or lack of oxygen 0.034 
16 Physical incapability 0.050 
17 Inadequate knowledge 0. 100 
18 Operator skill improvement program failure 0.020 
19 Regular operator training and awareness fa ilure 0.034 
20 Inadequate ski ll 0.050 
2 1 Operator motivation program failure 0.020 
22 Lack of supervision 0.050 
23 Supervision fa ilure 0.020 
24 Unclear job description 0.034 
25 Inadeq uate permit-to-work 0.050 
26 High work stress 0.067 
27 Continuous night work 0.050 
28 ln Ouence of other people 0.020 (colleague. management, senior workers, etc.) 
29 Unscheduled working hours 0.034 
30 Inadequate workplace accessibili ty 0.020 
3 1 Poor housekeeping 0.050 
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Table A 2: Bas ic event failure probability for Management & Organizational Factor Barr ier (M&OB) 
[66] 
':t:vent' I \CD · Event Description ')/ ·~:. ' ''''"" Assigned Probabiliiy ''" 
I Inadequate safety program 0.0 10 
2 Inadequate supervision 0.034 
3 Inadequate communication 0.050 
4 Inadequate maintenance system 0.020 
5 Inadeq uate control system 0.025 
6 Poor or no work permit procedures 0.050 
7 Inadequate audit and operating procedures 0.034 
8 Inadequate training 0.025 
9 Inadequate company polices 0.020 
10 Inadequate staff resources 0.020 
II Inadequate planning and organization 0.025 
12 Poor decision making or fai lure 0.040 
13 Inadequate management job knowledge 0.020 
14 Inadequate management polices 0.025 
IS Leadership failure 0.0 10 
16 Poor communication 0.050 
17 Incompetent or insufficient management behaviors 0.020 
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Table A3: Basic event fai lure probabili ty fo r Release Prevention Barrier (RPB) [2) 
Even( !:fi ;~t,i,~~"E~~i\;1:;;. , * ,a" ,:k I) :~. f' ..... T: W':' D ,~\ 'i(J. ' Assigned· probability~ b ¥ ' )A - 'At ·· 7 
I Locking of manual actuator I valve I blinding failure 0.050 
2 Labeling of valve I blinding fa ilure 0.008 
3 Automatic activation of blinding fail ure 0.07 1 
4 Check list for control operation failed to perform 0.0 10 
5 Adequate safety operations are not specified 0.040 
6 Operati ng without Permit to Work (PTW) 0.0 10 
7 Sensors failed to initiate the safety system 0.024 
8 Redundant indicators failed to ini tiate manual safety system 0.020 
9 Valve positioning sensor fa ilure (function on demand) 0.090 
10 Valve positioning control system failure 0.0 147 
II Inspection of valve positioning performed but fa iled to detect 0.150 
12 Inspection specified but not performed 0.0 15 
13 Inspection is not specified in program 0.050 
14 Regular inspection for mechanical fai lure did not perform 0.0 10 
15 Regu lar inspection perform but did not identified the fault 0.050 
16 Construction deficiency 0.0 10 
17 Instruments (bolt) fa ilure due to corrosion 0.0138 
18 Compressor failure due to material deficiency 0.0 198 
19 Physical barriers are not avai lable 0.0 10 
20 High external load 0.010 
21 Inadequate corrosion inspection program or method 0.090 
22 Poor inspection 0.100 
23 Long delay in inspection schedule 0.050 
24 Area based leak searc h speci tied but did not perform 0.050 
25 Area based leak search is not specifi ed in program 0.070 
26 Failed to detect minor release by area based leak search 0.050 
27 Regular leak inspection specified but did not perform 0.050 
28 Regular leak inspection is not specified in program 0.010 
29 Failed to detect minor release by Regular inspection 0.050 
30 Welding degrading monitoring performed but fa iled to detect 0.066 
31 Welding degrading monitoring specified but did not perform 0.050 
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Table A4: Basic event fa ilure probability for Dispersion Prevention Barrier (DPB) [2] 
Event Event Description Assigned probability 
I Automatic gas detection sensor failure 0. 128 
2 Automatic gas detection controller fai lure 0.001 
3 Automatic gas detection Alarm failure 0.020 
4 Inadequate detector coverage 0.050 
5 Long delay in Inspection 0.0 10 
6 Manual detection of minor release failure 0.050 
7 Manual inspection did not perform 0.050 
8 Inadequate Ventilation or forced di lution 0.067 
9 Venti lat ion or forced dilution fa il ure 0.040 
10 Manual closing of release fa ilure (Clamping, 0.025 Remediation, etc ... ) 
II Wrong Inflow valve selection or valve not 0.050 
accessible 
12 Long delay in response 0.0 10 
13 Operato r awareness fa ilure 0.040 
14 Operato r response fai lu re 0.050 
15 Long delay in manual response 0.0 10 
16 ESD sensor fai lure 0.024 
17 ESD controller Fai lure 0.250 
18 ESD valve delayed operation 0.050 
19 ESD valve fa ilure to close on demand 0.130 
20 Physical barrier not available 0.00 1 
21 Inadequate barrier performance 0.0 10 
22 lnert ing not available 0.050 
23 lnerting fai lure 0.080 
24 Drainage not available 0.00 1 
25 Inadequate functioning 0.00 1 
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Table AS: Basic event failure probability for Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) [2] 
qi E D .. . ~ < ' Event :@, iii .;r ent esc,nptlOn Assigned probability 
. 0 
I Hot work permit has not been issued 0.033 
2 Inadeq uate procedures or instruction in work permit 0.067 
3 Risk assessment not performed prior to issue work permit 0. 100 
4 External supervision fa ilure 0.083 
5 Inadequate trained operator 0.100 
6 Operation with wrong work permit 0.040 
7 Failure to follow work permit 0.045 
8 Operation without work permit 0.0 10 
9 Hot surface shielding not available 0.067 
10 Burner shielding failure 0.0 10 
II Inadvertent burner flare trip fa ilure 0.044 
12 Flame detector fai lure 0.056 
13 Flame detector not available 0.050 
14 Inadequate detector coverage 0.070 
15 Manual inspection of igni tion source fa ilure 0.050 
16 Insulation of fuel line failure 0.0 10 
17 Insulation of burner fa ilure 0.0 10 
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Table A6: Basic event failure probability for Escalation Prevention Barrier (EPB) [2) 
Event '(w¥< Event Description 
' 
Assigned probability ·. 
I Inadeq uate flaring 0.00 1 
2 Inadequate blow down 0.00 1 
3 Inadequate chemical scrubbers 0.008 
4 Inadequate air ventilation 0.067 
5 Air ventilation failure 0.030 
6 Inadequate water spraying 0.067 
7 Water spraying fai lure 0.045 
8 Fire detection Sensor failure 0.080 
9 Fire detection Controller fai lure 0.00 1 
10 Fire Alarm fa ilure 0.02 1 
II Inadeq uate detector coverage 0.200 
12 Operator did not detect the fire 0.050 
13 Operato r unable to activate the manual fire alarm 0.00 1 
14 Manual fire alarm acti vator fa ilure 0.00 1 
15 Smoke detection sensor fai lure 0.080 
16 Smoke detection Controller fa ilure 0.00 1 
17 Smoke Alarm fai lure 0.02 1 
18 Inadequate detector coverage 0.070 
19 Inadequate smoke isolation or venting 0.060 
20 Smoke isolation failure 0.005 
21 Inadequate fire resistant barrier 0.003 
22 Fire resistant failure 0.030 
23 Sprinkler not avai I able 0.0 10 
24 Inadequate sprinkling 0.040 
25 Sprinkler failure 0.045 
26 Inadequate Firefighting in given duration 0.020 
27 long delay fire fighting 0.080 
28 Firefighting did not perform 0.000 1 
29 Closing release fail ure 0.0 13 
30 Inflow valve not accessible or wrong valve 0.050 
3 1 Long delay in manual operation 0.010 
32 Operator awareness fai lure 0.040 
33 Operator response to activate manual ESD fa ilure 0.050 
34 Long delay in response 0.0 10 
35 ES D sensor failure 0.024 
36 ESD Controller Failure 0. 100 
37 ESD valve delayed operation 0.050 
38 ESD valve fai lure to close on demand 0.070 
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Table A 7: Basic event failure probability for Damage Control and Emergency Management Barrier 
(DCEMB) [135] 
.Eve!:!.t' .if ' '11 Event Des~riptiJl1 ' +\e ··· ' ,~,;1q~~~'v,;i 'i1 . , ·" s · Assigned Probability ., 
I Long delay activating alarm for mustering 0. 15 
2 Onsite and offsite communication failure 0.20 
3 Crew did not detect or hear alarm 0.144 
4 Crew did not identi fy alarm 0.139 
5 Poor access quality of egress roots (obstructed or impaired) 0.175 
6 Evacuation time too short 0.189 
7 Failure to follow path leading to temporary refuge areas 0.161 
8 Unable to obtain successfu l personnel on board (POB) count 0.15 
9 No or inadequate evacuation mode available (helicopters, lifeboats, and 0.0 1 
crafts) 
10 Craft function and preparation fai lure 0.13 
II Failure during transferring and launching process 0.20 
12 Insufficient means to escape to sea 0.25 
13 Adverse weather and visibi lity 0. 10 
14 Inadequate external support fo r evacuation 0.20 
15 Inadequate support fac ility on rescue vessel 0.0 1 
16 Insufficient offshore survival and safety traini ng 0.0 1 
17 Insufficient emergency drill and exercises 0.10 
18 Inadequate or untrained emergency response personnel 0.11 
19 Inadequate emergency preparedness plan 0.0788 
20 Long delay for medical treatm ent 0.05 
2 1 Onsite medical treatment not avai lable or inadequate 0.20 
22 Inadequate training of emergency medical response personnel 0.10 
23 Inadequate or unavailable emergency shelter-i n-place 0.02 
24 Inadequate personal protective equipment 0.00 1 
25 Personal protective equipment failure (li fej ackets, survival suits, etc.) 0.0 1 
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Appendix B 
Case Study: Macondo Well Blowout Accident 
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Figure B I: Event tree diagram of the Macondo well blowout accident [ 135) 
XI - Management & Organizational Barrier (M&OB) 
X2 - Well Control Barrier (WCB) 
X3 - Influx Mitigation Barrier (1MB) 
X4 - Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) 
X5 - Escalation Prevention Barrier (EPB) 
X6 - Emergency Management Barrier (EMB) 
CI - Safe 
C2- Kick 
C3 - Blowout 
C4 - Fire and explosion 
C5 - Catastrophic Accident 
Figure B2: Bayesian network diagram of the Macondo well blowout accident 
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Table B I : Prior Occurrence Probability for Each Primary Safety Barrier [ 135] 
Safety barrier(X;) 
Well control barrier (WCB) 
Influx mitigation barrier (1MB) 
Ignition prevention barrier (IPB) 
Escalation prevention barrier (EPB) 
Emergency management barrier (EMB) 
Management and organizational barrier (M&OB) 
Failure Probabi lity, P(X;) 
7. ]J x 10-2 
6.43 x 10-2 
13 .77x I o-2 
II. I Ox 10-2 
I 0.88x I o-2 
I 0.27x I o-2 
Table B2: Prior Occurrence Probabilities of End Events Using SHIPP and Bayesian Model 
Event Tree Conditional Event 
End Occurrence Occurrence 
Events( E) Probability, P(Ek) Probability, P(Ek) 
Safe (£1) 9.29x I o- 1 9.29x 10-1 
Kick (£2) 6.67x I o-2 6.67x I o-2 
Blowout (£3) 4.45 x i0-3 3.95x I o-3 
Fire and explosion(£~) 1.23 x 1 o-4 5.61 x i0-4 
Catastrophe (£5) 1.52x I o-5 6.25 x 1 o-5 
10 1 
Safe state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Management Barrier s 0.8793 
1 Safe 
Well control Barrier s 0.9287 
Management Barrier F 0.9579 
2 Safe 
Well control Barrier s 0.9287 
Kick state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Management Barrier s 0.8793 
1 Kick Not Safe s 7.1300e-2 
Influx Mitigation Barrier s 0.9357 
Management Barrier F 0.1207 
2 Kick Not Safe s 7.1300e-2 
Influx Mitigation Barrier s 0.9357 
Blowout state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Management Barrier s 0.87g3 
1 Blowout Not Kick s 4.5850e-3 
Ignition Prevention Barrier s 0.8623 
Management Barrier F 0.1207 
2 Blowout Not Kick s 4.5850e-3 
Ignition Prevention Barrier s 0.8623 
Fire and explosion state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Management Barrier s 0.8793 
1 Fire and Not Blowout s 6.3140e-4 
explosion 
Escalation Prevention Barrier s 0.8890 
Management Barrier F 0. 1207 
2 Fire and Not Blowout s 6.3140e-4 explosion 
Escalation Prevention Barrier s 0.8890 
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Catastrophe state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Management Barrier s 0.8793 
1 Catastrophe Not Fire and explosion s 7.0090e-5 
Emergency Management s 0.8912 Barrier 
Management Barrier F 0.1207 
2 Catastrophe Not Fire and explosion s 7.0090e-5 
Emergency Management s 0.8912 Barrier 
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Ns = Not Safe, NKick = Not Kick, Blowout= Bt, Not Blowout= NBt, Fire = Fi , 
Not Fire= NFi, Catastrophe= Cat 
P(Safe) = P(Safe1X1 ,X2)P(X1) P(X2) + P(Safe1X1 ,X2) P(X1) P(X2) 
= (1 *0.8793*0.9287) + (1 *0.1207*0.9287) 
=0.81661 +0.11209 
= 9.2870e-1 
P(Ns) = 1 - P(Safe) 
= 1- 9.2870e-1 
= 7.1300e-2 
P(Kick) = P(Kick I X1 ,X3,Ns)P(X1) P(X3)P(Ns) + P(Kick I X1 ,X3,Ns)P(X1) P(X3)P(Ns) 
= (1 *0 .8793*0 .9357*7.1300e-2) + (1 *0 .1207*0.9357*7.1300e-2) 
= 5.8663e-2 + 8.0525e-3 
= 6.6715e-2 
P(Not Kick) = 1 - P(Safe)- P(Kick) 
= 1 - 9.2870e-1 - 6 .6715e-2 
= 4.5850e-3 
P(Biowout) = P(Bt I X1 ,X4,NKick)P(X1)P(X4)P(NKick) 
+ P(Bt 1 X1 ,X4,NKick)P(X1)P(X4)P(NKick) 
= (1 *0.8793*0.8623*4.5850e-3) + (1 *0.1207*0.8623*4.5850e-3) 
= 3.4764e-3 + 4.7721e-4 
= 3.9536e-3 
P(Not Blowout) = 1 - P(Safe) - P(Kick)- P(Biowout) 
= 1 - 9.2870e-1 - 6.6715e-2- 3.9536e-3 
= 6.3140e-4 
P(Fire) = P(Fi I X 1 ,X5,NBt)P(X 1) P(X5)P(NBt) + P(Fi I X 1 ,X5,NBt)P(X 1) P(X5)P(N Bt) 
= (1 *0.8793*0.8890*6.3140e-4) + (1 *0.1207*0.8890*6 .3140e-4) 
= 4 .9356e-4 + 6. 7751 e-5 
= 5.6131e-4 
P(Not Fire) = 1 - P(Safe) - P(Kick) - P(Biowout) - P(Fire) 
= 1 - 9.2870e-1 - 6.6715e-2 - 3.9536e-3 - 5.6131e-4 
= 7.0090e-5 
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P(Catastrophe) = P(Cat I X1 ,X6,NFi)P(X1)P(X6)P(NFi) 
+ P(Cat I X 1 ,X6,NFi)P(X 1 )P(X6)P(N Fi) 
= (1 *0.8793*0.8912*7.0090e-5) + (1 *0.1207*0.8912*7.0090e-5) 
= 5.4925e-5 + 7.5394e-6 
= 6.2464e-5 
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Fig ure 8 3: Fault tree diagram o f the \Ve il Control Ban·ier (WCB) 
Detailed descript ions and failure probabilities o f basic events o f Well Control Barrier (WCB) are listed in T able 83. 
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Figure B3 : (Conlinucd) Faull tree diagram o f the Well Control Barrier (WCB) 
Detailed descri ptions and failure probabilit ies of basic events of the \Veil Control BmTier (\VCB) are listed in Table B3. 
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Figure B4 : Fault tree diag ram o f the lnOux Mitigat ion Barrier (1MB) 
Detailed dcsc1iption and failure probabilities o f basic events of Influx Mitigation Barrier ( 1MB) are listed in Table 84. 
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Figure 85: Fault tree diagram of t he Ignition Prevention Banier ( IPB) 
Detailed descriptions and fa ilure probabil ities of basic events of Ignition Prevention Ban·ier ( IPB) arc listed in Table 85. 
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Figure 86: Fault tree diagram of the Escalation Prevention Ban·ier (EPB) 
Detailed descri ptions and failure probabili ties of bas ic events of Escalation Pre vention Barrier (EPB) are listed in Table 86 . 
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Figure 8 7: Fault tree diagram of the Emergency Management Banicr (EMB) 
Detailed descriptions and fai lure probabili ties of basic events of Emergency Management Ban·icr (EM B) are listed in Table 8 7. 
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Figure 88: Fault tree diagram of the Management and Organizational Barrier (M&OB) 
Detai led descriptions and failure probabi lities o f basic e vents o f Management and Organizationa l Ba1Ticr (M&OB) arc listed in Table 88. 
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Table B3: Basic event failure probabi lity of the Well Control Barrier (WCB) (135] 
Event r ;;t;; 
K. \ • Jj!; .. 'E V'ent Description fr' ~; l:!!l~i' 1ft§'? :>~,,.'\ ;:]; r;w . -:;? ••••· . • ~ 0\;P. Assigned :Probao1hty 
I Inadequate mud weight design or too low mud weight 5.00x I o-2 
2 Loss of circulation 2.70x 10-2 
3 Unexpected pore pressure 1.50x I o-1 
4 Ballooning (mud loss when pumps are on) 2.00x J0-2 
5 Swabbing during casing 5.40x I o-2 
6 Unstable foam cement slurry design 2.00x 10-2 
7 Low pump rate of cement flow I.OOx 10'2 
8 Incorrect laboratory testing 2.00x I o-3 
9 Operator unable to follow laboratory result I.OOx J0-4 
10 Low/inadequate cement volume I.OOx I o-2 
I I Inaccurate slurry composition 2.00x I o-2 
12 Contamination of spacer and cement S.OOx I o-3 
13 Poor displacement e fficiency 2.00xJ0'2 
14 Failure to place cement according to cement program 3.30x I o-2 
15 Incorrect production casing se lection I.OOx I o-2 
16 Unable to obtain bottoms-up circulation 2.00x 10'3 
17 Inadequate number of centra li zers I.OOx 10'3 
18 Inaccurate centralizer placement I.OO x I o-3 
19 Failure to perform adequate risk assessment I.OOx I o-1 
20 Deficiencies in conducting negati ve pressure test 2.50x I o-2 
2 1 Wrong interpretation of negative pressure test results I.OOx 10'2 
22 Cement bond logging (CBL) not performed I.OOx 10'3 
23 CBL performed but failed to provide adequate in formation I.OOx I 0'3 
24 Volume and pressure test unable to obtain fu ll return I.OOx 10-3 
25 Inaccurate lift pressure indicator I.OO x I o-3 
26 Contamination of tai l cement with spacer 5.00x 10'3 
27 Swapping of mud through rat hole I.OOx 10'3 
28 Inadeq uate tail cement design 2.00x 10'2 
29 Failure to convert due to low fl ow rate 5.00x I o-2 
30 Clogging reamer shoe or fl oat collar 2.00x l 0'2 
3 1 Check valve fa iled to seal properly 3. 12x l0'2 
32 Rig personnel may not have converted float valve I.OOx I 0'4 
33 Float valve damage due to high load I.OOx 10-3 
34 Design and installation failure 2.00x I o-3 
35 Annular seal assembly (pack off) fail ure 1.30x I o-3 
36 Lift-off the casing and casing hanger (casing hanger failure) 1.50x I o-3 
37 Subsea well head failure 2.20x 10'3 
38 Poor design of production casing 3.00x JO-l 
39 Casing crossover breaching and leak through casing threads 6.40x 10'3 
40 Fracture or hole in cas ing 6.40x I o-3 
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Table B4 : Basic event fa ilure probability of the Influx Mitigation Barrier (1MB) [1 35] 
Event ~~ ' ' Event Description . 0;; :; /$1' .,,, if'! ;! Assigned Probability 
I Failure to perform seal assembly test according to standard and 2.00x 10-3 industrial best practice 
2 Wrong interpretation of seal assembly test results J.OOx 10-2 
3 Failure to perform positi ve pressure test 2.00x 10-3 
4 Wrong interpretation of positive pressure test results J.OOx 10-2 
5 Wrong interpretation of negati ve pressure test results 5.00x I o-2 
6 Unable to follow procedures and standards J.OOx 10-3 
7 Inadequate procedures and methods 2.00x I o-3 
8 Inaccuracy of mathematical and simulation models I.OOx I o-3 
9 Spacer fa ils to function as designed or required 2.50x I o-2 
10 Annular preventer did not isolate completely I. 72x I o-3 
II Kick detection indicators fa il (pit gain, drill pipe pressure, etc.) 2.00x 10-3 
12 Inaccurate sensor readings 2.50x I o-2 
13 No advance real-time monitoring system 2.00x I o-2 
14 Unable to provide automation of simple well control calculation 2.00x I o-2 
15 Inadequate alarms and warning systems or coverage 5.00x I o-2 
16 Video feeds fa ilure or inadequate video coverage 5 OOx 10-2 
17 Failure to recognize sign of kick J. OOx 10-2 
18 Misinterpretation of feedback from well control 7.25 x J0-2 
19 Underestimated risk assessment 2.00x 10-2 
20 Communication between BOP and rig personal failure (control 2.60x 10-3 
systems fa ilure) 
2 1 Design and manufacturing failure 2.00x I o-3 
22 Fail-safe valves fa ilure 1.30x I o-4 
23 Hydraulic control system fa ilure 7.58x I o-4 
24 In ternal leakage or failure to close 2.50x I o-2 
25 Kill and/or choke lines failure 3.60x I 0-3 
26 Late response to activate BOP or did not acti vate I.OOx I o-2 
27 Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) fa ilure 3. J2x J0-4 
28 Kick detected but fa il ure to respond timely I.OOx 10-2 
29 Unable to take kick mitigation actions J.OOx 10-3 
30 Kick not detected I.OOx 10-3 
3 1 Inadequate procedures to respond to the kick 2.00x I o-2 
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Table B5: Basic event fa ilure probability of the Ignition Prevention Barrier (IPB) [ 135] 
Ev~nf' '\, ®t . ":' ,,;;: 8vent Description ) til!;!, '•i• /&!Iii" ;/P +,Assigned Pl~babil ltY "' 
I Failure to activate overboard diversion lines l.OOx I o-2 
2 Leakage through diverter packing due to high pressure 8.00x I o-3 
Overboard di verter lines failure due to erosion. corrosion and 
3 mechanical causes 2.00x I o-3 
4 Mechanical failure of mud gas separator equipment 2.00x i0-3 
5 Mud gas separator (MGS) fails due to overpressure 5.00x 10-1 
Fire/smoke damper systems not acti vated upon combustible gas 
6 detection 3. 10x 10-3 
7 No automated action to activate fi re/smoke dampers l.OOx I o-3 
8 Smoke or combustible gas detection malfunctioning 1.98x I o-1 
9 Inadequate exhaust venting 6.70x 10-2 
10 Alarms and visual display failure 2. IOx i0-2 
II Alarms unable to trigger human attention 2.50x I o-2 
12 Fire and gas detector failure 1.23x 10-1 
13 Manual response failure 5.00x I o-2 
14 Inadequate detector coverage 2.00x 10-1 
15 Electric spark inhibitors failure 2.00x I o-2 
16 Static spark inhibitors fa ilure 2.00x I o-2 
17 Equipment over-speed detectio n and control failure or not installed 2.50x I o-2 
18 Cooling system fo r overheating of rotating part failure or not installed 2.50x I o-2 
19 Hot surface shielding not installed 6.70x 10-2 
20 Hot surfaces shielding installed but failed to perform as designed I.OOx 10-2 
2 1 Inadequate electrical area classification 5.00x I o-2 
22 Inadequate hazard and risk assessment prior to design l.OOx I o-2 
23 External superv ision fai lure 8.30x 10-2 
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Table B6: Basic event fa ilure probability of the Escalat ion Prevention Barr ier (EPB) [135] 
Evetit ;,, \!@!> %?' '""' yi'" £;J~;rqesdriptiot~ i ~4 m ~'~ ,,, ;: 2 , ;}ssign~d Pf,qbabilitY!! 
Inadequate operator knowledge about performance of ram under high 
5.00x J0-2 I pressure 
2 Failure to perform testing prior to instal lation 1.50x I o-2 
3 Testing standards and procedures compromised 2.00x 10-2 
4 Leaks unidentified prior to incident J. QQx 10-2 
5 Unable to perform pressure test 5.0Qx 10-3 
6 Unable to perform functio n test 5.00x 10-3 
7 Long delay of activation J. OOx 10·2 
8 Erosion of shear ram due to high flow rate and pressure 2.5Q x I o-2 
Unable to cut off the dri ll pipe due to design fa il ure (blind shear ram 
9 coincide with tool joint) 3.4Qx I o-2 
10 Insufficient hydraulic power of accumu lators J. QQx I o-2 
II Internal hydraulic leakages 7.22x 10-J 
12 Communication (multiplex lines) between rig & BOP fa ilure 2.2Qx 10-3 
13 Rig personnel did not arm or delay acti vation of EDS J. QQx 10-2 
14 Damage of multiplex (MUX) lines (connector fai lure) 2.2Qx 10-l 
Rig personnel did not arm or delay activation of automatic mode func tion 
15 (AMF) J. OOx 10·2 
16 Both control pods and acoustic system fail to activate function 2.20x I o-3 
17 Insufficient hydraulic power of accumu lators J. QQ x I o-3 
18 Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) intervention failure to acti vate AMF 5.00 x 10-2 
19 Rig personnel did not arm or delay activation of auto shear J.OOx I o-2 
20 Both control pods and acoustic system failure to activate function 2.20x 10-J 
2 1 ROV intervention fa ilure to activate auto shear system 5 OOx I o-2 
22 Insufficient hydraul ic power of accumulators J.QQx 10-2 
23 In ternal hydraulic fluid leakages 7.22x I o-3 
24 ROV failure to pump hydraulic fluid as required speed 2.00x I o-2 
25 Delay in ROV intervention 2.00x 10-2 
26 Fire alarm and indicators fa ilure 2.1 Ox 10-2 
27 Inadequate coverage of fire detection 5.00x I o-2 
28 Fire detectors or sensor fai lure 8.00x I o-2 
29 Manual fire detection failure S.OOx 10-2 
30 Inadequate fire and explosion resistance 3.00x I o-3 
3 1 Barriers installed but fai lure to control escalation 3.00x I o-2 
32 Sprinklers not available or inadequate J.OOx 10·2 
33 Sprinklers not activated or do not respond to fire or smoke 4.50x I o-2 
34 Inadequate firefighting in given time duration 2.00x I o-2 
35 Long delay in fire fighting 9.00x I o-2 
36 Firefighting not performed J.QQx I o-4 
11 9 
Table B7: Basic event fa ilure probability of the Emergency Management Barrier (EMB)[ I35] 
Eyent 
'\ 
, Event Description ' ' !,fu Assigned Probability @ 
I Long delay activating alarm for mustering I. SOx I o-1 
2 Onsite and offs ite communication fa ilure 2_00x 10-1 
3 Crew did not detect or hear alarm 1.44x 10-1 
4 Crew did not identify alarm 1.39x 10-1 
5 Poor access quality of egress roots (obstructed or impai red) 1.75x 10-1 
6 Evacuation time too short l _89 x 10-1 
7 Failure to fo ll ow path leading to temporary refuge areas 1.6 Jx t0-1 
8 Unable to obtain successful personnel on board (POB) count I. SOx I o-1 
9 No or inadequate evacuation mode availab le (helicopters, lifeboats, and t.OOx 10-2 
crafts) 
10 Craft function and preparation fai lure I _3 0x 10-1 
II Failure during transferring and launching process 2_00xt0-1 
12 Insufficient means to escape to sea 2_sox to-1 
13 Adverse weather and visibi lity I.OOx I o-1 
14 Inadequate external support for evacuation 2_ 00x 10-1 
IS Inadequate support fac il ity on rescue vessel I .OOx 10-2 
16 Insufficient offshore survival and safety training t.OOx 10-2 
17 Insufficient emergency drill and exercises t.OOx 10-1 
18 Inadequate or untrained emergency response personnel I.I Ox 10-1 
19 Inadequate emergency preparedness plan 7_88 x to·2 
20 Long delay for medical treatment S.OOx 10-2 
21 On site medical treatment not available or inadequate 2,00x 10-1 
22 Inadequate training of emergency med ical response personnel I.OOx 10-1 
23 Inadequate or unavailable emergency shelter-in-place 2_00x I o-2 
24 Inadequate personal protective equipment t.OOx 10·3 
25 Personal protective equipment failure (lifejackets. survival suits, etc,) I.OO x I o-2 
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Table B8: Basic event failure probabil ity of the Management and Organizat ional Barrier (M&OB)[135] 
Event Event Description , Assigned Probability 
I Inadequate leadership at critical time I.OOx 10-1 
2 Poor organizing and reporting structure I.OOx 10-1 
3 Inadequate communication and compartmentalization of in fo rmation S.OOx 10-2 
4 Inadequate onsite technical expertise or did not use effecti vely 3AOx 10-2 
5 Inadequate managementjob knowledge 2.00x 10-2 
6 Inadequate management practices 2.50x I o-2 
7 Inadequate supervision 3.40x JO--
8 Inadequate staff resources or poor management of staff 2.00x I o-2 
9 Inadequate training 2.50x J0-2 
10 Inadequate well design and operation guidance I.OOx 10-2 
II Inadequate control systems 5.00x I o-2 
12 Inadequate maintenance procedures 5.00x I o-2 
13 Inadequate inspection and testing procedures 2.00x i0-2 
14 Lack of clarity about operator, contractor and subcontractor expertise I.OOx I o-1 
and responsibility 
15 Inadequate technology and safety programs I.OO x 10-1 
16 Poor documentation of impo11ant information I.OO x I o-2 
17 Poor risk assessment and risk based decision making I.OOx I o-1 
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Appendix C 
Matlab Code 
%% Safe = Sf; Near miss = Nm ; Mishap = Mh ; 
%% Incident = In ; Accident = Ace ; Catastrophe = Cat ; 
%%--------------------Prior barrier probabi l ities (success ) ------- ----
px1= 0 . 9971 ; p x2= 0 . 9579 ; px3= 0 . 94 7 3 ; px4 =0 .938 4 ; px5=0 . 894 ; 
px6=0 . 9729 ; 
px7=0 . 8912 ; 
%%-----------------Prior occurrence probability estima t i on----- - - ----
Sf1 = (px1*px2*px3) ; 
Sf2 = ((1-px1)*px2*px3) ; 
Sf Sfl + Sf2 ; 
Ns = 1-Sf ; 
Nm1 (px1*px2*px4*Ns ) ; 
Nm2 ( ( 1-px1 ) *px2 *px4 *Ns ) ; 
Nm3 (px1*( 1 -px2)*px4*Ns ) ; 
Nm4 (( 1- px1)*(1-px2) *px4*Ns ) ; 
Nm = Nm1+Nm2 +Nm3+Nm4 ; 
NNm 1- Sf- Nm; 
Mh1 (px1 *px2*px5*NNm) ; 
Mh2 ( (1-px1) *px2*p xS*NNm) ; 
Mh3 (px1*(1-px2 )*px5*NNm) ; 
Mh4 ((1- px1)*(1-px2 ) *px5*NNm ) ; 
Mh = Mh1+Mh2+Mh3+Mh4 ; 
NMh 1- Sf - Nm- Mh ; 
I n1 (px1 *px2*px6*NMh) ; 
In2 ( (1 - px1) *px2 *px6*NMh) ; 
I n 3 (p x1* (1 -px2 )*px 6*NMh) ; 
In4 ( ( 1-px1 ) * ( 1-px2) *px6*NMh ) ; 
I n = I n 1 +I n 2+ I n3+In4 ; 
Ni n 1-Sf - Nm-Mh- In ; 
Ac 1 (px1 *px2* p x7* Ni n) ; 
Ac2 ( (1-px 1 ) *px2 *px 7*Nin) ; 
Ac3 (px1*( 1-px2 )*px 7 *Ni n) ; 
Ac 4 ( (1-px1 ) * (1 - px2) *p x 7 *Nin ) ; 
Ac = Ac 1+Ac2+Ac3+Ac4 ; 
NAc = 1-Sf - Nm-Mh- I n-Ac ; 
Catl 
Cat 2 
Cat3 
Cat4 
Ca t = 
(p x1* px2 *NAc) ; 
( (1- p x1 )* px2 *NAc) ; 
(px1*( 1- p x 2)* NAc) ; 
( (1-px1 ) * (1- px2 ) *NAc) ; 
Cat1 +Ca t 2 +Ca t 3+Ca t 4; 
Prior = [Sf Nm Mh In Ac Ca t ] ; 
122 
%% ---------------Likel ihood calculation (improved met hodology) ------ %% 
%%---------------------Cumulative data 10 months---------- -----------
Safe = [5 9 14 32 37 40 44 48 51 53] I ; 
NearMiss [4 10 1 7 61 79 88 94 101 111 114] I ; 
Mishap = [2 4 6 1 8 23 24 24 27 30 32 ] I ; 
Incident [ 1 1 2 10 12 13 14 15 16 18] I ; 
Accident [0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 ] I; 
Catastrophe [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OJ I; 
Events = [Safe NearMiss Mishap Incident Accident Catastrophe] ; 
%% ---------- 10 months Cumulative Data Conversion to Real Data--------
m = 10 ; 
SafeN = zeros(lO , l) ; NearMissN = zeros( l O, l ) ; 
MishapN zeros(lO , l ) ; IncidentN = zeros(lO , l ) ; 
AccidentN = zeros(lO , l ) ; CatastropheN = zeros ( l O, l ) ; 
UpdatedRealData = zeros(m , 6) ; 
SafeN (1 , 1) = Safe (1 , 1 ) ; 
Ne arMi s sN( l , l) = Ne arMiss(l , l ) ; 
MishapN(l , l ) = Mi shap ( l , l ) ; 
IncidentN( l , l) = Incident ( l , l); 
AccidentN(l , l) = Accident ( l , l); 
CatastropheN ( l , l) = Catastrophe(l , l) ; 
for i = l : m- 1 
e nd 
Sa feN(i+l , l) = Safe( i +l , l) - Safe (i , l) ; 
NearMissN ( i +l , l) = NearMiss (i +l , l ) - Ne arMiss ( i , l ) ; 
MishapN (i+l , l ) = Mi shap(i+l,l ) - Mishap ( i , l ) ; 
IncidentN (i+l,l) = Incident (i+l , l ) - Inc i dent (i,l ) ; 
AccidentN (i+l , l) = Ac cident (i +l , l) - Accid e nt( i , l ) ; 
Catas trophe N(i+l , l ) = Catast r op he(i+l , l ) - Catas t rophe (i , l ) ; 
disp( 1 Sa f e Near mi ss Mi shap I nc i dent Acc i de n t 
Catastrophe 1 ) 
disp( ~ ----------------------------- -- -- - - -------- --------------------
- I ) 
Upda t e dReal Da t a = [SafeN Ne a r MissN Mish apN I n c ide n t N AccidentN 
Cat a stro phe N] 
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%%----- - - ----------Likelihood estimation 10 months data---------- - ---
m = 10 ; 
SafeL = zeros(10 , 1) ; NearMissL = zeros(10 , 1 ) ; 
MishapL = zeros(10 , 1) ; I ncidentL = zeros(10 ,1 ) ; 
AccidentL = zeros(10 , 1) ; CatastropheL = zeros(10 , 1 ) ; 
LikelihoodData = zeros(m, 6) ; 
for i = 1 : m 
SafeL(i , 1) = SafeN(i , 1)/sum(UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
NearMissL(i , 1) = NearMissN(i , 1)/sum(UpdatedRealData ( i , : ) ) ; 
MishapL(i , 1) = MishapN(i , 1 )/sum(UpdatedRealData ( i , : ) ) ; 
IncidentL(i , 1) = IncidentN(i , 1)/sum(UpdatedRealData (i , : ) ) ; 
AccidentL(i , 1) = AccidentN(i , 1)/sum(UpdatedRealData (i , : ) ) ; 
CatastropheL(i , 1) = CatastropheN(i , 1 ) /sum(UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
end 
disp( ' Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident 
Catastrophe ' ) 
disp( ' ---------------------------------------------------------------
1 ) 
LikelihoodData = [SafeL NearMissL MishapL IncidentL AccidentL 
CatastropheL) 
%% -------- - ------Posterior probability estimation 10 months----------
m = 10 ; 
SafeP = zeros(10 , 1) ; NearMissP = zeros(10,1 ) ; 
MishapP = zeros(10 , 1) ; IncidentP = zeros( 1 0 , 1) ; 
AccidentP = zeros(10 , 1) ; CatastropheP = zeros(10 , 1 ) ; 
PosteriorData = zeros(m, 6) ; 
TotalProb = zeros(m, 1) ; 
for i = 1 : m 
TotalProb(i , 1)=(Saf eL(i , 1)*Sf)+(NearMissL(i , 1)*Nm) +(MishapL(i , 1)*M 
h)+ 
(IncidentL(i , 1)*In)+(AccidentL (i , 1)*Ac)+(CatastropheL (i , 1 )*Cat) ; 
end 
for i = 1 : m 
SafeP(i , 1) = (Sa f eL(i , 1 )*Sf ) /Tota lProb (i,1 ) ; 
NearMissP(i , 1) = (NearMissL(i , 1)*Nm) / Tota lProb( i , 1) ; 
MishapP ( i , 1 ) = (MishapL( i , 1 ) *Mh)/TotalProb(i , 1); 
IncidentP ( i , 1) (Incident L(i , 1)* I n) / TotalProb(i , 1 ) ; 
AccidentP(i , 1) (Accident L(i,1)*Ac) / TotalProb(i , 1 ) ; 
CatastropheP(i , 1 ) = (Catastrophe L(i , 1 )*Cat)/Tota l Pr ob (i , 1) ; 
e nd 
disp( ' Safe Near miss Mishap Inci dent Accide nt 
Catastrophe 1 ) 
disp( ~ ---------------------------------------------- - - - ---- -------- --
1 ) 
Pos t eri o rDa ta = [SafeP Nea rMi s sP Mi sha pP I n cide n t P Accid e n tP 
Ca t a s troph e P ) 
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%% - - - ----- --- -- - ------------10 months data plot-- ----------- - ------- -
%% - ----- - - - - - ------ - - -- - ---- - - - Safe plot---------- - ------- - - - -- - ---- -
E = PosteriorData ; 
et1 = E(1 : 10 , 1) ; 
plot (et1 , ' .-g ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Safe events over 10 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Safe) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upp e r l eft : 
legend ( ' Safe ' ) 
%% ------- -------- --- - - -- - -----Near miss plot--- - - --- ------- - - - - - - ----
et2 = E(1 : 10 , 2) ; 
plot (et2 , '. -b ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manua l ly : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Near miss events over 1 0 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Near miss) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper left : 
legend( ' Near miss ' ) 
%% --- - - --- - -------- - - - - --------- - Mi shap p l ot----------------------- --
et3 = E(1 : 10 , 3) ; 
plot (et3 , ' .-m ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Mishap events over 10 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Mishap) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper le f t: 
legend ( ' Mishap ' ) 
%% - - - - - - - ----------------------Incident p l ot------ - - - --- -------------
et4 = E(l : 10 , 4) ; 
plot( e t4 , '. -b ' ) 
% Labels a r e erased , so generat e them manua l ly : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Incident events o v e r 1 0 mo nths ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Incide n t) ' ) 
% Add a l e g e nd in the uppe r l eft : 
legend( ' Incident ' ) 
%%------------------ ---- -------Accident plot-------------------------
et 5 = E(1: 1 0 , 5 ) ; 
p l ot( e t 5 ,' . - m' ) 
% Labels are erased , so ge ne r at e them manua l l y : 
t i t1e( ' Occurrence probability of Acc ident even t s o ve r 10 mo nths ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
y l abel( ' Posterior p r obability (Accident ) ' ) 
% Add a l e g e nd i n t h e uppe r l eft : 
l e g e nd( ' Accide nt ' ) 
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%%---- - ---------------------Catast rophe p l ot- ------------- - ----------
e t 6 = E( 1: 10 , 6) ; 
p lot(et6 , ' . -r ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Catastroph e events over 1 0 mont hs ' ) 
x label ( ' Mon t h' ) 
y l a bel( ' Poster ior p roba bil i t y (Catastroph e) ' ) 
% Ad d a l egend i n t he u p p e r left : 
legend( ' Catastrophe ' ) 
%% -------------------------Subplot end events----- --------- --- - -----
s ubplot(2 , 3 , 1 ) 
plot ( etl , ' . - b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 2) 
plot ( et2 , ' . -b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 3) 
plot (et 3 , ' . - b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 4) 
plot (et4 , ' . -b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 5) 
p lot (et5 , '.-b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 6) 
p lo t (e t 6 , ' . - b ' ) 
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%% - ----- - ------- Likelihood calcul ation(improved methodology) - - - - - - - %% 
%%-------- - - - -----------Cumul ative data 24 months----- - ------- - ------
Safe = [3 5 10 21 24 26 30 3 1 33 35 36 40 45 49 54 64 67 70 74 7 8 81 
83 90 94 ] '; 
NearMiss = [4 6 8 34 39 42 44 46 47 50 54 56 60 66 73 100 1 15 122 1 28 
135 145 148 158 162 ] ' ; 
Mishap= [0 2 2 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 15 15 17 19 2 1 27 33 3 4 34 37 40 
42 44 46 ] ' ; 
Incident [ 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 1 1 13 14 15 16 1 7 19 1 9 
19] '; 
Accident [ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3] ' ; 
Catastrophe = [ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ] ' ; 
Events= [Safe NearMiss Mishap Incident Acc i dent Catas t r ophe ] ; 
%%----- ----24 months cumulative data conversion to real data---- - ----
m = 2 4 ; 
SafeN = zeros(24 , 1) ; NearMissN = ze r os(24 ,1 ) ; 
MishapN zeros( 24 , 1) ; IncidentN = zeros(24 , 1 ) ; 
AccidentN = zeros(24 , 1) ; CatastropheN = zeros(24 , 1 ) ; 
UpdatedRea l Data = zeros(m, 6 ) ; 
SafeN(l , 1 ) = Safe(l , 1 ) ; 
NearMissN(l , 1) = NearMiss(l , 1 ) ; 
MishapN(1 , 1) = Mishap (1 , 1 ) ; 
IncidentN(1 , 1) = Incident(1 , 1) ; 
AccidentN( 1 , 1) = Accident(1 , 1) ; 
CatastropheN ( l , l) = Catastrophe(1 , 1) ; 
for i = l : m- 1 
End 
SafeN(i+l , 1) = Safe(i+1 , 1) - Safe(i , l) ; 
NearMissN (i +l , l) = NearMiss (i+1 , 1 ) - NearMiss(i , l) ; 
MishapN(i+1 , 1 ) = Mishap(i+1 , 1) - Mishap(i , l) ; 
IncidentN(i+1 , 1) = Incident(i+1 , 1) - I ncident(i ,l ) ; 
Accident N(i+l , l) = Accident(i+1,1) - Accident(i , 1) ; 
CatastropheN(i+l , 1) = Catastrophe(i+l , l) - Catastrophe (i , l ) ; 
di sp( ' Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident 
Catastrophe ' ) 
disp( ' ------------------------------------------------------------- ' ) 
Updat edRealData = [SafeN NearMissN MishapN I ncidentN Acc i dentN 
CatastropheN] 
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%%-----------------------Likel ihood estimation--------------- --------
m = 24 ; 
SafeL = zeros(24 , 1) ; NearMissL = zeros (24 , 1 ) ; 
MishapL = zeros(24 , 1) ; IncidentL = zeros(24 , 1) ; 
AccidentL = zeros(24 , 1) ; CatastropheL = zeros(24 , 1) ; 
LikelihoodData = zeros(m, 6) ; 
for i = l : m 
End 
SafeL(i , l ) = SafeN(i , l)/sum(UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
NearMissL(i , l) = NearMissN(i , l)/ sum( UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
MishapL(i , l ) = MishapN(i , l)/sum(UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
IncidentL(i , l) = IncidentN(i , l)/sum(UpdatedRealData (i , : ) ) ; 
AccidentL(i , l) = AccidentN(i , l)/sum(UpdatedRealData(i , :) ) ; 
CatastropheL(i , l) = CatastropheN(i , l)/sum(UpdatedRealData(i , : ) ) ; 
disp( ' Safe Near miss Mishap Incident Accident 
Catastrophe ' ) 
disp( ' ------------------ ------------------ ------------ - ------------ ' ) 
LikelihoodData = [SafeL NearMissL MishapL IncidentL AccidentL 
CatastropheL] 
%%------------Posterior probability estimation 24 months data--------
m = 24 ; 
SafeP = zeros(24 , 1) ; NearMissP = zeros(24,1) ; 
MishapP = zeros(24 , 1) ; IncidentP = zeros(24 , 1) ; 
AccidentP = zeros(24 , 1) ; CatastropheP = zeros(24 , 1) ; 
PosteriorData = zeros (m, 6) ; 
TotalProb = zeros(m, l) ; 
for i = l : m 
end 
TotalProb(i , l) = (SafeL(i , l)*Sf)+(NearMissL(i,l ) *Nm ) + 
(MishapL(i , l)*Mh)+(IncidentL(i , l) * In)+ (AccidentL(i , l )*Ac ) 
+(CatastropheL(i , l)*Cat) ; 
for i = l : m 
e nd 
SafeP(i , l) = (SafeL(i , l)*Sf)/TotalProb (i , l) ; 
NearMissP(i , l) = (NearMissL (i , l)*Nm) / TotalProb( i , l) ; 
MishapP(i,l) = (MishapL(i , l ) *Mh)/TotalProb(i , l ) ; 
IncidentP(i , l) (IncidentL(i , l)*In) / TotalProb(i , l ) ; 
AccidentP(i , l) (AccidentL (i , l)*Ac) / TotalProb(i , l ) ; 
Catas tropheP(i , l ) = (CatastropheL(i , l )*Cat ) /Total Prob (i , l ) ; 
disp( ' Safe Near miss Mishap Inci dent Accident 
Catastrophe ' ) 
disp( ' ------------- ---------------- - - - - - - - ----------------- - - - - - --- ' ) 
PosteriorData = [Sa f eP NearMissP Mi s hapP Incident P Accid e n tP 
CatastropheP] 
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%%--------------------------24 months Data Plot----------------------
%%---------- ---------------------Safe plot - ------------------------- -
E = PosteriorData ; 
etl = E(l : 24 , 1) ; 
plot(etl , '. -g ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manual l y : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Safe events over 24 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Safe) ' ) 
%Add a legend in the upper left: 
legend ( ' Safe ' ) 
%%----------------------------Near miss plot-------------------------
et2 = E(l : 24 , 2) ; 
p lot (et2 ,' . -b ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Near miss events over 24 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Near miss) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper left : 
legend( ' Near miss ' ) 
%%--------------------- -------Mishap plot----------------------------
et3 = E(l : 24 , 3) ; 
plot(et3 , ' . -m ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manuall y : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Mishap events over 24 months ' ) 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Mishap) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper left : 
legend( ' Mishap ' ) 
%%----------------------------- Incident plot-------------------------
et4 = E(l : 24 , 4) ; 
plot(et4 , '. - b ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Incident events over 2 4 months ' ) 
x label ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Incident) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper left : 
legend( ' Incident ' ) 
%%-----------------------------Accident plot-------------------------
et5 = E(l : 24 , 5) ; 
plot(etS ,' . - m' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probability of Accident events over 24 months ') 
xlabel ( ' Month ' ) 
ylabel( ' Posterior probability (Accident) ' ) 
% Add a legend in the upper left : 
legend( ' Accident ' ) 
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%%--------------------------- Catastrophe plot-------- - - - - ------------
et6 = E(1 : 24 , 6) ; 
plot (et6 , '. -r ' ) 
% Labels are erased , so generate them manually : 
title( ' Occurrence probabi l it y of Catastrophe events over 24 months ' ) 
x label ( ' Mont h ' ) 
y label( ' Poster ior p robabi l ity (Catastroph e) ' ) 
% Add a legend i n t he upper left : 
legend( ' Catastrophe ' ) 
%% --- - - --- - - - -----Subplot of 24 months end events ' data- - - - - -- - ------
subplot(2 , 3 , 1) 
plot (etl , ' . - b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 2) 
p lot(et2 , '. - b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 3) 
plot ( et3 , ' . -b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 4) 
plot(et4 , '. -b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 5) 
plot (et5 , '. - b ' ) 
subplot(2 , 3 , 6) 
plot(et6 , '. -b ' ) 
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%%-- Safe=S ; Not safe=nS ; Near miss=N ; Not near miss=nN ; Mishap=M ; 
%%-- Not mishap=nM ; Incident=I ; Not incident=ni ; Accident=A; 
%%-- Not accident=nA; Catastrophe=C ; Not Catastrophe=nC ; 
%% - - ----- - - ---------Posterior data from 19th month----- - - - -----------
PSafe19 = 0 . 87429 ; 
PNmiss19 = 0 . 12556 ; 
PMishap19 = 0 . 0 ; 
Pincident19 = 1 . 4167e-4 ; 
PAccident19 = 3 . 5168e-6 ; 
PCatastrophe19 = 0 . 0 ; 
Posterior = [PSafe19 PNmiss19 PMishap1 9 Pincident 1 9 PAccident1 9 
PCatastrophe19) 
%%----------------------Prior Occu rrence Probability-----------------
fxl 
fx6 
0 . 99 7 1 ; f x2 
0 . 972 9 ; fx7 
0 . 9579 ; fx3 = 0 . 94 7 3 ; fx4 = 0 . 93 8 4 ; fx5 = 0 . 894 ; 
0 . 891 2 ; 
S1 = (fx1* f x2 *fx3 ) ; 
S2 = ((1-fx1 ) *fx2*fx3 ) ; 
S = S1 + S2 ; 
nS 1 - S ; 
N1 (fx1* f x2*fx4*nS) ; 
N2 ( (1 - fx1) *fx2 *fx4*nS) ; 
N3 (fx1*(1 - fx2)*fx4*nS) ; 
N4 ((1 - fxl)*(1-fx2)*fx4*nS ) ; 
N = N1 + N2 + N3 + N4 ; 
nN 1 - S - N; 
M1 ( f x 1 *fx2 *fx5*nN) ; 
M2 (( 1- fxl)* f x2 *f x5*nN) ; 
M3 (fx 1 * (1- fx 2 )*fx5 *nN) ; 
M4 ( ( l -fx1 ) * (1-fx 2 ) *fx 5*nN ) ; 
M = M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 ; 
nM 1 - S - N - M; 
Il ( f x1* f x2 *fx6*nM) ; 
I2 ( (1 - fx1) *fx2 *f x6 *nM ) ; 
I 3 ( f x 1 * ( 1- fx 2 )*fx6*nM) ; 
I4 ( (1- fxl) * (1- f x2 ) * fx6*nM ) ; 
I = I1 + I 2 + I3 + I 4 ; 
ni 1 - S - N - M - I ; 
Al ( f x 1 *f x2 *fx7 *ni) ; 
A2 ( (1- f x1 ) *fx2*fx 7*ni ) ; 
A3 ( f x1*( 1-fx2 ) *fx7*n i) ; 
A4 ( (1- fx1 ) * (1-fx2 ) *fx 7*ni) ; 
A = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 ; 
nA = 1 - S - N - M - I - A; 
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%% - - -------------X1 , X2 , X3 contri butions on Sa f e even ts-------------
X1 S (S1* fx 1* f x 2 * f x 3)/PSafe 1 9 ; 
X2 S ( ( S 1 * f x 1 * f x2 * fx 3) + ( S2 * (l - fx1) * fx2 * fx3) ) IPSa fe 19 ; 
X3 S ( (S1*fx1 *fx2*fx3)+(S2*(1 - fx1)*fx2*fx3) )/PSafe19 ; 
Step1 = [X1 S X2 S X3 S] 
%%------------X1 , X2 , X4 contributions on Near miss events- - ---------
PN1 
PN2 
PN3 
PN4 
PnS1 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnSS 
PnS6 
fx1*fx2 * f x 4*nS ; 
(1 - fx1)*f x 2*fx4 *nS ; 
f x 1 * ( 1- f x 2)*fx4* nS ; 
(1 - fx1)*(1 - f x 2)*fx4*nS ; 
f x 1* (1-fx2)*fx3 ; 
(1-fx1)*(1-fx 2)*fx3 ; 
f x1*fx 2 * (1 - fx3) ; 
(1 - f x1) * fx2 * (1-fx3) ; 
fx1 * (1 - f x2 ) * (1 - f x 3) ; 
(1 - f x 1) * (1 - f x 2) * (1 - f x 3) ; 
X1_N ((PN1*PnS3*fx 1*fx2*fx 4) + (PN3*(Pn S1+PnSS)*fx 1 * (1 -
fx2)*fx4) )/PNmiss19 ; 
X2_N = ((PN1*PnS3*fx1*fx2*fx4) + (PN2*PnS4 * (1-
fx1)*fx2*fx4) )/PNmiss19 ; 
X4 _ N = ( (PN1*PnS3*fx1*fx2*fx4) + (PN2*PnS4*(1-fx1 )*fx2 * f x 4) + 
(PN3* (PnS1+PnS5) *fx1* (1-fx2) *fx4) + (PN4* (PnS2+PnS6) * (l - fx1 ) * ( 1-
fx2)*fx 4 ))/PNmiss19 ; 
Step2 = [X1_N X2_ N X3 S X4_N ] 
%% - - ------- ----X1 , X2 , XS contributions on Mishap events-------------
PM1 
PM2 
PM3 
PM4 
PnN1 
PnN2 
PnN3 
PnN4 
PnS1 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnSS 
PnS6 
fx1*fx2*fx5*nN ; 
(1 - fx1)*fx2*fx5*nN ; 
fx1*(1-fx2)*fx5*nN ; 
(1-fx1)*(1-fx2)*fx5*nN ; 
f x1 *fx 2* (1-fx4)*nS ; 
(1-fx1)* fx2*( 1- fx4)*nS ; 
fx1*(1-fx2)*(1 - fx4)*nS ; 
(1-fx1)*(1-fx2) *(1-fx4)*nS ; 
fx1*(1-fx2)*fx3 ; 
(1 - fx1)* (1-fx2)*fx3 ; 
fx1*fx 2 * (1-fx3) ; 
(1 - f x1)*fx2 *(1- f x 3) ; 
fx1* (1 - f x2 )*(1-fx3) ; 
(1 - fx1)*(1-fx2)*(1 -fx3) ; 
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Xl M = ( (PMl * PnNl *PnS3*fx l * f x 2*fx5) + (PM3*PnN3* (PnSl +PnS5)*fxl*(l -
f x2) *f x5) )/PMishapl9 ; 
X2_M = ((PMl*PnNl*PnS3*fxl * f x2*fx5) + (PM2*PnN2*PnS4*(1 -
fxl)*fx2*fx5) )/PMishapl9 ; 
XS_M = ( (PMl*PnNl*PnS3*fx l *fx2*fx5) + (PM2*PnN2*PnS4*(1-fxl ) *fx2 *fx5 ) 
+ (PM3*PnN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*fxl*(l-fx2)*fx5 ) + (PM4*PnN4*(PnS2+PnS6 ) * (1 -
fxl)*(l-fx2)*fx5) ) /PMishapl9 ; 
Step3 = [Xl_M X2_M X3 S X4 N XS_M] 
%% --- ------- - --Xl , X2 , X6 contributions on Inci dent events--- - - - -----
Pil 
PI2 
PI3 
PI4 
PnMl 
PnM2 
PnM3 
PnM4 
PnNl 
PnN2 
PnN3 
PnN4 
PnSl 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnSS 
PnS6 
fxl*fx2*fx6*nM ; 
(1-fxl)*fx2*fx6*nM ; 
fxl*(l-fx2)*fx 6*nM ; 
(1-fxl)*(l-fx2)*fx6*nM ; 
fxl*fx2*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
(1-fxl)*fx2 * (1 - fx5)*nN ; 
fxl*(l-fx2 ) *(1-fx5)*nN ; 
(1-fxl)*(l-fx2)*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
fxl*fx2*(1-fx4)*nS ; 
(1 - fxl)*fx2* (1-fx4)*nS; 
fxl*(l-fx2) *(1-fx4)*nS ; 
(1 - fxl)*(l-fx2) * (1-fx 4)*nS ; 
fxl*(l - fx2)*fx3 ; 
(1 - fxl)* (1 - fx2)*fx3 ; 
fxl*fx2*(1-fx3) ; 
(1-fxl)*fx2*(1-fx3) ; 
fxl*(l-fx2)*(1 - fx3); 
(1-fxl)*(l-fx2 ) *(1- f x3) ; 
Xl I ((Pil*PnMl*PnNl*PnS3*fxl *fx2 *fx6 ) + 
(PI3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnSl+PnS5 )*fxl*( l -fx2 ) *fx6)) / Pi ncident19; 
X2_ I = ( (Pil * PnMl*PnNl*PnS3* f xl* f x2*fx6 ) + (P I2*PnM2 * PnN2*PnS4* (1-
fxl)*fx2*fx6) )/Pincidentl9 ; 
X6_I = ((Pi l*PnMl*PnNl*PnS3* f xl*fx2 *fx6) + (PI 2*PnM2* PnN 2 * PnS4* (1-
fxl)*fx2*fx6) + (PI3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnS l +PnS5)*fxl*( l -fx2 )* f x 6) + 
(PI4*PnM4*PnN4* (PnS2+PnS6)*( 1-fxl)*(l - fx2)* f x6 ) ) / P i ncidentl9 ; 
Step4 = [Xl I X2 I X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I ] 
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%% -------- -----Xl , X2 , X7 contribu tions on Ac c ident events - - -- - ----- -
PAl 
PA2 
PA3 
PA4 
Pnil 
Pni2 
Pni3 
Pni4 
PnMl 
PnM2 
PnM3 
PnM4 
PnNl 
PnN2 
PnN3 
PnN 4 
PnSl 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnSS 
PnS6 
fx l *fx2 *f x7*ni ; 
(1 - f x l) * f x2*fx7*ni ; 
f xl*(l - fx2)*fx7*ni ; 
(1-fx l)*(l-fx2)*fx 7*ni ; 
f x l*fx 2*(1- fx6) *nM ; 
(1 - f x l)*fx2 * (1-fx6) *nM; 
f x l*(l - f x2) * (1-f x 6) *nM ; 
(1- f x l) * (l - f x2) * (1- f x 6)*nM ; 
fxl*fx 2* (1 - f xS)*nN; 
(1-fxl)*fx 2*(1-fx 5)*nN ; 
f x l*(l - f x2)*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
(1-fxl)*(l-fx2)*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
fxl*fx2*(1 - fx4 ) *nS ; 
(1 - f x l)*fx2 * (1 - fx4)*nS ; 
f xl* (l - fx2)* (1 - f x4 )*nS ; 
(1- f x l)*(l - f x2)*(1 - fx 4 )*nS ; 
fx l *(l - f x2)*fx 3 ; 
(l-fxl)*(l - fx2)*fx3 ; 
fxl*fx2*(1-fx 3) ; 
(1 - fxl)*fx2*(1-fx3) ; 
fxl* (l - f x2) * (1-fx3) ; 
(1 - f x l)*(l - f x2)*(1 - f x 3) ; 
Xl A = ((PAl*Pnil*PnMl*PnNl*PnS3*fx l* f x2*fx7 ) + 
(PA3*Pni3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnS l +PnS5)*fxl*(l-fx2)*fx7) )/PAccident19 ; 
X2_A = ((PAl * Pnil*PnMl*PnNl *PnS3* fxl *fx2*fx 7) + 
(PA2*Pni2*PnM2*PnN2*PnS4*(1- fxl )*fx2 *fx 7 ) ) / PAccident l9 ; 
X7_ A = ((PAl*Pnil*PnMl *PnNl*PnS3*fxl*fx2* f x 7 ) + 
(PA2*Pni2*PnM2*PnN2 *PnS4*(1-fx l )*fx2*fx 7) + 
(PA3 *Pni3* PnM3 *PnN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*fxl * ( l - f x 2) *fx7) + 
(PA4*Pni 4*PnM4 *PnN4*(PnS2+PnS6 )*(1-fx l )*( l - f x2)*fx 7 ))/PAccident19 ; 
StepS = [Xl_A X2 A X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I X7_A ] 
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%% -------------X1 , X2 contributions on Catastrophic events-----------
PC1 fx1*fx2*nA ; 
PC2 (1-fx1)*fx2*nA ; 
PC3 fx1*(1-fx2)*nA ; 
PnA1 fx1*fx2*(1-f x7 )*ni ; 
PnA2 (1-fx1)*fx2*(1-fx7)*ni ; 
PnA3 fx1*(1-fx2)*(1 - fx7)*ni ; 
Pnil fx1*fx2*(1-fx6)*nM ; 
Pni2 (1-fx1)*fx2*(1 - fx6)*nM ; 
Pni3 fx1*(1-fx2)*(1 - fx6)*nM ; 
PnM1 fx1*fx2*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
PnM2 (1-fx1)*fx2*(1-fx5)*nN ; 
PnM3 fx1*(1-fx2)*(1 - fx5)*nN ; 
PnN1 fx1*fx2*(1-fx4)*nS ; 
PnN2 (1-fx1)*fx2*(1-fx4)*nS ; 
PnN3 fx1*(1 -fx2)*(1 - fx4)*nS ; 
PnS1 fx1*(1-fx2)*fx3 ; 
PnS2 (1-fx1)*(1-fx2)*fx3 ; 
PnS3 fx1*fx2*(1-fx3) ; 
PnS4 (1-fx1)*fx2*(1 -fx3) ; 
PnSS fx1*(1-fx2)*(1-fx3) ; 
PnS6 (1-fx1)*(1-fx2)*(1-fx3) ; 
X1 C ((PC1*PnA1*Pni1*PnM1*PnN1*PnS3*fx1*fx2) + 
(PC3*PnA3*Pni3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnS1+PnS5)*fx1*(1-fx2)) )/PCatastrophe19 ; 
X2_C = ((PC1*PnA1*Pni1*PnM1*PnN1*PnS3*fx1 *fx2) + 
(PC2*PnA2*Pni2*PnM2*PnN2*PnS4*(1-fx1)*fx2) )/PCatastrophe19 ; 
Step6 = [X1_ C X2 C X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I X7_ A] 
X1Total [X1 s + X1 N + X1 M + X1 I + X1_ A] 
X2Total [X2 s + X2 N + X2 M + X2 I + X2_ A] 
-
X3Total [X3 S] 
X4Total [ 1 X4 N] 
X5Tota1 [ 1 - XS_M] 
X6Total [ 1 - X6_I] 
X7Total [ 1 - X7_ A] 
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%%-------Posterior data from 20th month as normalizing factor--------
PSafe20 = 0 . 8533 ; 
PNmiss20 = 0 . 14297 ; 
PMishap20 = 0 . 0035958 ; 
Pincident20 = 0 . 00013826 ; 
PAccident20 = 0 . 0 ; 
PCatastrophe20 = 0 . 0 ; 
Posterior =[PSafe20 PNmiss20 PMishap20 Pinci dent20 PAccident20 
PCatastrophe20] 
%% - - - - ------------Updated barrier success probabili t i es--------------
bx1 9 . 6621e-l; 
bx2 9 . 6617e-l; 
bx3 9 . 3636e-l; 
bx4 9 . 701 4e-1 ; 
bx5 1. 0 ; 
bx6 1. 0 ; 
bx7 1. 0 ; 
%% - ------------ - -Prior Occurrence Probabi l ity Estimation---- - ------- -
S1 = (bx1*bx2*bx3) ; 
S2 = ((1-bx1)*bx2*bx3) ; 
S = S1 + S2 ; 
nS 1 - S; 
N1 (bx1*bx2*bx4*nS) ; 
N2 ( (1 - bx1 ) *bx2*bx4*nS) ; 
N3 (bx1*(1-bx2)*bx4*nS) ; 
N4 ((1-bx1)*(1-bx2)*bx4*nS) ; 
N = N1 + N2 + N3 + N4 ; 
nN 1 - S - N; 
M1 (bx1*bx2*bx5*nN) ; 
M2 ( (1-bx1)*bx2*bx5*nN) ; 
M3 (b x1* (1-bx2)*bx5*nN) ; 
M4 ( (1 - bx1 ) * (1-bx2) *bx5*nN) ; 
M = M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 ; 
nM 1 - S - N - M; 
11 (bx1*bx2*bx6*nM); 
I2 ( (1-bx1) *bx2*bx6*nM) ; 
I3 (bx1*(1-bx2)*bx6*nM) ; 
I 4 ((1 - bx1)*(1 - b x 2 ) *bx 6*nM) ; 
I = I1 + I2 + I3 + I 4 ; 
ni 1 - S - N - M - I ; 
A1 (bx1*bx2 *bx7*ni ) ; 
A2 ( (1 - bx1) *bx2*bx7*ni) ; 
A3 (bx1 * (1-bx2)*bx7*ni) ; 
A4 ((1-bx1)*(1-bx 2)* bx7*ni ) ; 
A = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 ; 
nA = 1 - S - N - M - I - A; 
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%% -------- -------Xl , X2 , X3 contributions on Safe events -------------
Xl S (Sl*bxl*bx2*bx 3)/PSafe20 ; 
X2 S ((Sl*bxl *bx2*bx3)+(S2*(1 - bxl)*bx2*bx3))/PSafe20 ; 
X3 S ( (Sl*bxl*bx2*bx3)+(S2*(1-bxl)*bx2*bx3) )/PSafe20 ; 
Stepl = [Xl S X2 S X3 S] 
%% -----------Xl , X2 , X4 contributions on Near miss events- -----------
PNl 
PN2 
PN3 
PN4 
PnSl 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnS5 
PnS6 
bxl*bx2*bx 4*nS ; 
(1-bxl)*bx2*bx4*nS ; 
bxl* ( l-bx2)*bx4*nS ; 
(l -bxl)*(l - b x 2)*bx4* nS ; 
bxl* (1-bx2) *bx3 ; 
(1-bxl) *(l-bx2)*bx3 ; 
bxl*bx2*(1-bx3) ; 
(l-bxl)*bx2*(1 - bx3) ; 
bxl*(l-bx2)*(1-bx3) ; 
(1-bxl)* (1 -bx2) * (1-bx3) ; 
Xl N ( (PNl*PnS3*bxl*bx2*bx4 ) + (PN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*bxl* (l-
bx2)*bx4))/PNmiss20 ; 
X2_N = ( (PNl*PnS3*bxl*bx2*bx4) + (PN2*PnS4* (1-
bxl)*bx2 *bx4 ))/PNmiss20 ; 
X4_ N = ( (PN l *PnS3*bxl*bx2*bx4) + (PN2*PnS4*( 1-bxl)*bx2*bx4) + 
(PN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*bxl*(l - bx2)*bx4) + (PN4*(PnS2+PnS6)*(1 - bxl ) * ( l -
bx2 ) *bx4 ) )/PNmiss20; 
Step2 = [Xl_N X2_N X3 S X4_N ] 
%%---------- - - - Xl , X2 , X5 contr i butions on Mishap event s - -- - ---------
PMl 
PM2 
PM3 
PM4 
PnNl 
PnN2 
PnN3 
PnN4 
PnSl 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnS5 
PnS6 
bxl*bx2 *bx5*nN ; 
(1-bxl)*bx2*bx5*nN ; 
bxl * (l-bx2)*bx5*nN ; 
(1-bxl)*(l-bx2)*bx5*nN ; 
bxl*bx2*(1-bx4)*nS ; 
(1-bxl)*bx2*(1-bx4)*nS ; 
bxl*(l - b x2 )*(1-bx4 )*nS ; 
(1-bxl)*(l-bx2)*(1 - bx4)*nS ; 
bxl* (1 - bx2) *bx3 ; 
(1-bxl)*(l-bx2)*bx3 ; 
bxl*bx2*(1-bx3) ; 
(l - bxl)*bx2*(1 - bx3) ; 
bxl*(l - bx2 )*(1-bx3) ; 
(1- bxl)*(l - bx2)*(1 - bx3) ; 
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Xl M = ((PMl*PnNl*PnS3*bx l*bx2*bx5) + (PM3*PnN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*bxl*(l -
bx2)*bx5))/PMishap20 ; 
X2 M = ( (PMl*PnNl*PnS3*bxl*bx2*bx5) + (PM2*Pn N2*PnS4*(1-
bxl)*bx2*bx5) )/PMishap20 ; 
XS_M = ( (PMl*PnNl*PnS3*bxl*bx2*bx5) + (PM2*PnN 2*PnS4*(1-bx l)*bx2 *bx5) 
+ (PM3*PnN3*(PnSl+PnSS)*bxl*(l-bx2)*bx5 ) + (PM 4*PnN4*(PnS2+PnS6) * (1-
bxl ) * ( l - bx2)*bx5))/PMishap20 ; 
Step3 = [Xl_M X2_M X3 S X4 N XS_M] 
%% ----- - -------Xl , X2 , X6 contributions on Incident events------- - - --
Pil 
PI2 
PI3 
PI4 
PnMl 
PnM2 
PnM3 
PnM4 
PnNl 
PnN2 
PnN3 
PnN4 
PnSl 
PnS2 
PnS3 
PnS4 
PnSS 
PnS6 
bxl*bx2*bx6*nM ; 
(l - bxl)*bx2*bx6*nM ; 
bxl* ( l-bx2)*bx6*nM ; 
(l-bxl)*(l-bx2)*bx6*nM ; 
bxl*bx2*(1-bx5 ) *nN ; 
(l-bxl)*bx2*(1 - bx5)*nN ; 
bxl*(l-bx2)*(1-bx5)*nN ; 
(l- bxl)*(l-bx2)*(1 - b x 5)*nN ; 
bxl*bx2*(1 - bx4)*nS ; 
(l - bxl)*bx2*(1 - bx4)*nS ; 
bxl*(l-bx2)*(1-bx4)*nS ; 
(l-bxl)*(l-bx2)*(1-bx4)*nS ; 
bxl*(l-bx2)*bx3 ; 
(l-bxl)*(l-bx2)*bx3 ; 
bxl*bx2*(1-bx3); 
(l- bxl)*bx2*(1 - bx3) ; 
bxl*(l-bx2)* (1 - bx3); 
(l-bxl)*(l - bx2)*(1-bx3) ; 
Xl I ( (Pil*PnMl*PnNl*PnS3*bx l *bx2*bx6 ) + 
(PI3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnSl+PnS5)*bxl*(l-bx2 ) *bx6) )/Pincident20 ; 
X2_ I = ( (Pil*PnMl* PnNl*PnS 3*bxl*bx2*bx6) + (PI2*PnM2*PnN2*PnS4* (1-
bxl)*bx2*bx6) )/Pincide nt20; 
X6_I = ( (Pil*PnMl*PnNl*Pn S3*bxl*bx2*bx 6) + (PI2 *PnM2*PnN2*PnS4*(1-
bxl)*bx2 *bx6) + (PI3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnSl+ PnSS ) *bxl*( l-bx2)*bx6) + 
(PI4*PnM4*PnN4*(PnS2+PnS6)*( 1-bxl)*(l- bx2 ) *bx6 ))/Pincident20 ; 
Step4 = [Xl I X2 I X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I ) 
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%%--- - ------ ---Xl , X2 , X7 contributions on Acciden t event s - - - - - - -----
PAl bx l *bx2 *b x7*ni ; 
PA2 (1 - bxl ) *bx2*bx7*ni ; 
PA3 bxl* ( l - bx2) *bx7*ni ; 
PA4 (1 - bxl ) * ( l-bx2 )*bx7*ni ; 
Pnil bxl*bx2*(1-bx6 ) *nM ; 
Pni2 (l - bxl)*bx2* (1-bx6 ) *nM ; 
Pni3 bxl * (l-bx2)* (1-bx 6 ) *nM ; 
Pni4 (1 - bx l )*( l - bx2) * (1-bx6)*nM; 
PnMl bxl*bx2*(1 - b x 5 ) *nN ; 
PnM 2 (1- bx l )*bx2 * (1-bx5 ) *nN ; 
PnM3 b x l*( l -bx2) * (1-bx5 )*nN ; 
PnM4 (1-bxl )*(l-bx2) * (1- bx5) *nN; 
PnNl bxl *bx2*(1 - bx4 ) *nS ; 
PnN2 (1-b x l)*bx2 * (1-bx4 ) *nS ; 
PnN3 bxl* ( l - bx2) * (1 - b x 4)*nS ; 
PnN4 (1 - bxl)*(l - bx2) * (1-bx4 )*nS; 
Pn Sl bxl *( l - b x2)* b x3 ; 
PnS2 (1-bx l ) * (l-bx2)*bx3 ; 
PnS 3 b xl *bx 2* (1-b x3 ) ; 
Pn S4 (1-bxl )* bx 2* (1-bx3) ; 
PnS S bxl * (l -bx2) * (1 -bx3 ) ; 
PnS6 (1 - b x l )* (1 - bx2)*( 1- b x 3) ; 
Xl A = ( (PAl * Pnil *PnM l*PnNl *Pn S3*bxl *bx 2*bx 7) + 
(PA3*Pn i3* PnM 3* PnN 3*(Pn Sl +Pn S5)*bx l * ( l -bx2)*bx7))/PAccident20 ; 
X2_A = ( (PAl * Pni l *PnMl * PnNl *PnS3*bxl*b x 2*bx 7 ) + 
(PA2 * Pni 2*PnM2 *PnN2* Pn S4* ( 1-bxl ) *b x2 *b x 7) )/PAcciden t 20 ; 
X7_A = ( (PAl *Pn i l*PnMl*PnNl* Pn S3*bxl* b x 2 *bx 7 ) + 
(PA2 * Pn i2 * PnM2 * PnN 2 *PnS4* ( 1- bx l )*bx2 *b x 7 ) + 
(PA3*Pni 3*PnM3*PnN3 * (PnS l +Pn S5) *bx l * (l-bx 2)*bx 7) + 
(PA4 * Pni4 *PnM4*PnN4* (Pn S2+PnS6)*( 1-bx l)*(l-bx2)*bx7 ) )/PAccident20 ; 
StepS = [Xl_A X2 A X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I X7_A] 
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%%-------- -----Xl , X2 contributions on Catastrophic events---- - -- - ---
PCl bxl*bx2*nA ; 
PC2 ( 1-bxl) *bx2*nA; 
PC3 bxl*(l-bx2)*nA; 
PnAl bxl*bx2*(1-bx7)*ni ; 
PnA2 (l - bxl)*bx2*(1-bx7)*ni ; 
PnA3 bxl* (l - bx2)*(1 -bx7)*ni ; 
Pn il bxl*bx2*(1-bx6 ) *nM ; 
Pni2 (l-bx l)*bx2 * (1-bx 6) *nM; 
Pni3 bxl*(l-bx2)*(1 - bx6)*nM ; 
PnMl bxl*bx2*(1-bx5)*nN ; 
PnM2 (l-bxl)*bx2*(1-bx5)*nN ; 
PnM3 bxl*(l-bx2)*(1-bx5) *nN ; 
PnNl bxl*bx2*(1 - bx4)*nS ; 
PnN2 (l-bxl)*bx2*(1-bx4)*nS ; 
PnN3 bxl*(l - bx2)*(1 -bx4 ) *nS ; 
PnSl bxl*(l - bx2)*bx3 ; 
PnS2 (l- bxl)*(l - bx2)*bx3 ; 
PnS3 bxl*bx2*(1-bx3) ; 
PnS4 (l-bxl)*bx2*(1-bx3) ; 
PnSS bx1*(1-bx2)*(1-bx3) ; 
PnS6 (1 - bx1)*(1-bx2)*(1-bx 3) ; 
X1 C = ( (PC1*PnA1*Pni1*PnM1*PnNl*PnS3*bx1*bx2) + 
(PC3*PnA3*Pni3*PnM3*PnN3*(PnS1+PnS5)*bx1* (1- bx2) ) ) /PCatastrophe2 0; 
X2 C = ( (PC1*PnA1*Pni l *PnMl*PnNl*PnS3*bx1 *bx2) + 
(PC2 *PnA2*Pni2 *PnM2 *PnN2 *PnS4* (1- bx1)*bx2 ) ) / PCatastrop he20 ; 
Step6 = [X1 C X2 C X3 S X4 N XS M X6 I X7 _A] 
X1Tota1 
X2Tota1 
X3Tota1 
X4Tota1 
X5Tota1 
X6To ta1 
X7Tota1 
[X1 S + X1 N + X1 M + X1 I + X1_A] 
[X2_ S + X2 N + X2 M + X2 I + X2_A] 
[X3 S] 
[ 1 X4 N ] 
[1 XS_M ] 
[1 X6_I] 
[1 X7_A] 
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Appendix D 
Calculation (forward and backward analysis) 
Safe state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probabil ity 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
1 Safe Management Factor s 0.9579 
Release Prevention Factor s 0.9473 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
2 Safe Management Factor s 0.9579 
Release Prevention Factor s 0.9473 
Near miss state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
1 Near miss 
Not Safe s 9.2581e-2 
Dispersion Prevention Factor s 0.9384 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
2 Near miss 
Not Safe s 9.2581e-2 
Dispersion Prevention Factor s 0.9384 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
3 Near miss 
Not Safe s 9.2581e-2 
Dispersion Prevention Factor s 0.9384 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor F 0 .0421 
4 Near miss 
Not Safe s 9.2581e-2 
Dispersion Prevention Factor s 0.9384 
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Mishap state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
1 Mishap 
Not Near Miss s 5.7030e-3 
Ignition Prevention Factor s 0.8940 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
2 Mishap 
Not Near Miss s 5.7030e-3 
Ignition Prevention Factor s 0.8940 
Human Factor F 0 .0029 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
3 Mishap 
Not Near Miss s 5.7030e-3 
Ignition Prevention Factor s 0.8940 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
4 Mishap 
Not Near Miss s 5.7030e-3 
Ignition Prevention Factor s 0.8940 
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Incident state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
1 Incident 
Not Mishap s 6.0452e-4 
Escalation Prevention Factor s 0.9729 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
2 Incident 
Not Mishap s 6.0452e-4 
Escalation Prevention Factor s 0.9729 
Human Factor F 0 .0029 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
3 Incident 
Not Mishap s 6.0452e-4 
Escalation Prevention Factor s 0.9729 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
4 Incident 
Not Mishap s 6.0452e-4 
Escalation Prevention Factor s 0.9729 
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Accident state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probability 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
1 Accident 
Not Incident s 1.6382e-5 
Damage Control Emergency Factor s 0.8912 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
2 Accident 
Not Incident s 1.6382e-5 
Damage Control Emergency Factor s 0.8912 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor s 0.9579 
3 Accident 
Not Incident s 1.6382e-5 
Damage Control Emergency Factor s 0.8912 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
Management Factor F 0.0421 
4 Accident 
Not Incident s 1.6382e-5 
Damage Control Emergency Factor s 0.8912 
Catastrophic state: 
End Events Safety Barrier State Success Probabil ity 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
1 Catastrophe Management Factor s 0.9579 
Not Accident s 1.7824e-6 
Human Factor s 0.9971 
2 Catastrophe Management Factor F 0.0421 
Not Accident s 1.7824e-6 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
3 Catastrophe Management Factor s 0.9579 
Not Accident s 1.7824e-6 
Human Factor F 0.0029 
4 Catastrophe Management Factor F 0.0421 
Not Accident s 1.7824e-6 
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Nm = Near Miss, Mishap = Mh, Incident= In, Accident= Ace, Catastrophe = Cat 
P(Safe) = P(SafeiX 1 ,X2,X3) P(X1) P(X2) P(X3) + P(SafeiX 1 ,X2,X3) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X3) 
= (1*0.9971*0.9579*0.9473) + (1*0.0029*0.9579*0.9473) 
= 0 .90479 + 0.0026315 
= 9.0742e-1 
P(Not safe) = 1 - P(Safe) 
= 1 - 9.0742e-1 
= 9.258e-2 
P(Near Miss) = P(Nm I X 1, X2, X4, Not safe) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X4) P(Not safe) 
+ P(Nm I X1, X2, X4, Not safe) P(X1) P(X2) P(X4) P(Not safe) 
+ P(Nm I X1, X2, X4, Not safe) P(X1) P(X2) P(X4) P(Not safe) 
+ P(Nm I X 1, X2, X4, Not safe) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X4) P(Not safe) 
= (1 *0.9971 *0.9579*0.9384*9.258e-2) + (1 *0.9971 *0.0421 *0.9384*9.258e-2) 
+ (1 *0 0029*0.9579*0.9384*9.258e-2) + (1 *0.0029*0.0421 *0.9384 *9.258e-2) 
= 8.2978e-2 + 3.6469e-3 + 2.4134e-4 + 1.0607e-5 
= 8.6877e-2 
P(Not Near Miss) = 1 - P(Safe) - P(Near Miss) 
= 1 - 9.0742e-1 - 8.6877e-2 
= 5.703e-3 
P(Mishap) = P(Mh I X1 , X2, X5, Not Near miss) P(X1) P(X2) P(X5) P(Not Near miss) 
+ P(Mh I X1, X2, X5, Not Near miss) P(X1) P(X2) P(X5) P(Not Near miss) 
+ P(Mh I X 1, X2, X5, Not Near miss) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X5) P(Not Near miss) 
+ P(Mh I X 1, X2, X5, Not Near miss) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X5) P(Not Near miss) 
= (1 *0.9971 *0.9579*0.894*5. 703e-3) + (1 *0.9971 *0.0421 *0.894*5.703e-3) 
+ (1 *0 .0029*0.9579*0.894*5. 703e-3) + (1 *0.0029*0.0421 *0 .894*5. 703e-3) 
= 4 .8697e-3 + 2.1402e-4 + 1.4163e-5 + 6 .2247e-7 
= 5.0985e-3 
P(Not Mishap) = 1 - P(Safe) - P(Near Miss) - P(Mishap) 
= 1- 9.0742e-1- 8.6877e-2- 5.0985e-3 
= 6.045e-4 
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P(lncident) = P(ln I X 1, X2, X6, Not Mishap) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X6) P(Not Mishap) 
+ P(ln I X1 , X2, X6, Not Mishap) P(X1) P(X2) P(X6) P(Not Mishap) 
+ P(ln I X1 , X2, X6, Not Mishap) P(X1) P(X2) P(X6) P(Not Mishap) 
+ P(ln I X1 , X2, X6, Not Mishap) P(X1) P(X2) P(X6) P(Not Mishap) 
= (1*0.9971 *0.9579*0.9729*6.045e-4) + (1*0.9971*0.0421 *0.9729*6.045e-4) 
+ (1*0.0029*0.9579*0.9729*6.045e-4) + (1 *0.0029*0.0421 *0.9729*6.045e-4) 
= 5.6172e-4 + 2.4688e-5 + 1.6337e-6 + 7.1803e-8 
= 5.8811e-4 
P(Not Incident)= 1 - P(Safe)- P(Near Miss)- P(Mishap)- P(lncident) 
= 1 - 9 0742e-1 - 8.6877e-2- 5.0985e-3- 5.8811e-4 
= 1.639e-5 
P(Accident) = P(Acc I X1 , X2, X7, Not Incident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X7) P(Not Incident) 
+ P(Acc I X1 , X2, X7, Not Incident) P(X1) P(X2) P(X7) P(Not Incident) 
+ P(Acc I X 1, X2, X7, Not Incident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(X7) P(Not Incident) 
+ P(Acc I X1 , X2, X7, Not Incident) P(X1) P(X2) P(X7) P(Not Incident) 
= (1*0.9971*0.9579*0.8912*1.639e-5) + (1*0.9971*0.0421 *0.8912*1 .639e-5) 
+ (1 *0.0029*0.9579*0.8912*1.639e-5) + (1 *0.0029*0.0421 *0 .8912*1.639e-5) 
= 1.3951e-5 + 6.1316e-7 + 4.0576e-8 + 1.7833e-9 
= 1.4607e-5 
P(Not Accident) = 1 - P(Safe) - P(Near Miss) - P(Mishap) - P(lncident) - P(Accident) 
= 1- 9.0742e-1 - 8.6877e-2 - 5.0985e-3- 5.881 1 e-4 - 1.4607e-5 
= 1.783e-6 
P(Catastrophe) = P(Cat 1 X 1, X2, Not Accident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(Not Accident) 
+ P(Cat I X 1, X2, Not Accident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(Not Accident) 
+ P(Cat I X 1, X2, Not Accident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(Not Accident) 
+ P(Cat I X 1, X2, Not Accident) P(X 1) P(X2) P(Not Accident) 
= (1 *0.9971 *0.9579*1. 783e-6) + (1*0.9971 *0.0421 *1 .783e-6) 
+ (1 *0 .0029*0.9579*1. 783e-6) + (1 *0 .0029*0.0421 *1 .783e-6) 
= 1.703e-6 + 7.4847e-8 + 4.953e-9 + 2.1769e-10 
= 1.783e-6 
PRIOR EVENTS' SUCCESS PROBABILITIES 
SAFE N.MISS MISHAP INCIDENT ACCIDENT CATASTROPHE 
9.0742e-1 8.6877e-2 5.0985e-3 5.8811 e-4 1.4607e-5 1.7830e-6 
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Prior Barrier Success Probabilities 
P(X1 ) P(X2) P(X3) P(X4) P(X5) 
0.9971 0.9579 0.9473 0.9384 0.8940 
Posterior Events' Success Probabilities 
Month Safe N. Miss Mishap Incident Accident 
19 8. 7 429e-1 1.2556e-1 0.00 1 A 167e-4 3.5168e-6 
P(Safe I X1 = S X2 = S, X3 = S) = 0 9971*0 9579*0.9473 = 0.90479 
P(X 1 I Safe = yes) 
= P(X1 & Safe = yes) I P(Safe =yes) 
=L 2,x 3 P(Xl = S, X2, X3, Safe= yes)/ P(Safe=yes) 
L P(Xl = S, X2, X3, Safe = yes) 
x2,x3 
= PtX1 = S. X2 = S. X3 = S, Safe =yes) + P(X1 = S, X2 = F. X3 = S, Safe = yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = F, Safe= yes)+ P(X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = F, Safe = yes) 
= P(Safe =yes I X1 = S X2 = S, X3 = S) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = S) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = F) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = F) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = S) P(X3 =F) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 =F) P(X1 = S) P(X2 =F) P(X3 =F) 
= (0 90479*0.9971*0.9579*0 9473) + 0 + 0 + 0 
= 0.81864 
P(X1 I Safe= yes) = P(X1 & Safe = yes) I P(Safe = yes) 
= 0.81864 I 0.87429 
= 0.93635 
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P(X6) 
0.8912 
Catastrophe 
0.00 
P(Safe l X1 "'S, X2 = S. X3 = S) = 0.9971'0.9579'0.9473 = 0.90479 
P(Safe i X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 = S) = 0.0029*0.9579'0 9473 = 2.6315e-3 
P(X2 I Safe= yes) 
=P(X2 & Safe =yes) I P(Safe =yes) 
= L 1,x3 P(Xl, X2 = S, X3, Safe = yes) I P(Safe =yes) 
Lx1,,3 P(Xl ,X2 = S, X3, Safe =yes) 
= P(X1 = S, X2 =- S, X3 = S, Safe= yes)+ P(X1 = F, X2"' S, X3 = S, Safe= yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = F, Safe= yes) + P(X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 = F, Safe= yes) 
= P(Safe =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = S) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = S) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe =yes I X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 °' S) P(X1 =F) P(X2 = S) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 =F) P(X 1 = S) P(X2 = S) P(X3 =F) 
+ P(Safe =yes I X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 =F) P(X 1 =F) P(X2 = S) P(X3 =F) 
= {0 90479*0 9971 '0.9579*0 9473) + (2 6315e-3'0 0029'0 9579*0 9473) + 0 + 0 
= 8.1864e-1 + G.9248e·6 + 0 + 0 
= 0.81865 
P(X2 1 Safe =yes) = P(X2 & Safe =yes) I P(Safe = yes) 
= 0.81865 10.87429 
= 0.93636 
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P(Safe I X1 "'S X2 = S. X3 = S) = 0.9971'0.9579'0.9473 = 0.90479 
P(Safe! X1 "'F, X2"' S. X3 = S) = 0.0029*0.9579*0.9473:: 2.6315e-3 
P(X3 I Safe= yes) 
=P(X3 & Safe =yes) I P(Safe = yes) 
= L 1,x2 P(Xl, X2, X3 = S, Safe =yes) I P(Safe =yes) 
Lx1 .x2 P(Xl , X2, X3 = S, Safe = yes) 
= P(X1 '" S. X2:::: S, X3" S, Safe"' yes)+ P(X'I:: F, X2 "' S. X3:::: S, Safe"' yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S, Safe= yes) + P(X1 = F, X2 = F, X3 = S, Safe = yes) 
= P(Safe"' yes I X1 :::: S. X2"' S, X3 = S) P(X1::: S) P{X2:::: S) P(X3:::: S) 
+ P(Safe:::: yes I x·1 =F. X2 = S. X3 = S) P(X1 =F) P(X2 = S) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) P(X1 = S) P(X2 =F) P(X3 = S) 
+ P(Safe = yes I X1 = F, X2 = F, X3 = S) P(X1 = F) P(X2 =F) P(X3 = S) 
= (0.90<1'/9'0.99/1 *0 9579'0.9473) + (2.6315e-3'0 0029' 0.9579 ' 0 9473) + 0 + 0 
= 0.81864 + 6.9248e-6 + 0 + 0 
=0.81865 
P(X3 1 Safe= yes) 
= P(X3 & Safe =yes) I P(Safe =yes) 
= 0.81865 I 0.87429 
= 0.93636 
Step 1: Updated X 1, X2, X3 
X1 I I X2 I Barrier 
0.9971 I 1 I 0.9579 I 
Step Updating 
1 0.93635 I l I 0.93636 I 
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I X3 
1 I 0.9473 
I 0 93636 
P(Nrn =yes I X1 = S. X2 = S, X4 = S, Ns =yes)= (0 9971'0 9579"0 9384'0 09258) = 8.2978e-2 
P(Nm =yes I X1 = S. X2 =F. X4 = S, Ns =yes)= (0.9971'0.0421'0 9384'0.09258) = 3.6469e-3 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S. X3 =F)= (0.9971*0.9579*0.0527) = 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes 1 X1 = S. X2 = F, X3 = S) = (0.9971'0.0421*0 9473) = 3.9766e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 =F)= (0.9971*0.0421 *0.0527) = 2.2122e-3 
So, P(Ns = yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) + P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 =F) 
= 3.9766e-2 + 2.2122e-3 
= 4.1978e-2 
P(X 1 1 Near miss =yes) 
=P(X 1 & Near miss =yes) I P(Near miss =yes) 
= L z,x4 P(Xl = S, X2, X4, Ns = yes, Nm =yes)/ P(Near miss =yes) 
Lxz.x4 P(Xl = S, X2, X4, Ns = yes, Nm = yes) 
= P(X1 = S X2 = S, X4 = S. Ns =yes Nm =yes) • P(X1 = S X2 = F , X4 = S. Ns =yes, Nrn =yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X4 = F, Ns =yes, Nm =yes)+ P(X1 = S, X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns =yes, Nm =yes) 
= P(Nrn =yes 1 X1=S. X2=S. X4=S Ns=y) P(Ns =yes I X1=S X2=S. X4=S) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X4=S) 
+ P(Nm:::: yes 1 X1=S, X2::::F, X4=S, Ns=y) P(Ns =yes 1 X1=S, X2=F. X4=S) P(Xl=Sl P(X2=F) P(X4=Si 
+ P(Nm = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X4=F, Ns=y) P(Ns = yes I X1=S, X2=S, X4=F) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X4=F) 
+ P(Nm = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X4=F, Ns=y) P(Ns = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X4=F) P(X1 =S) P(X2=F) P(X4=F) 
= (8 2978e-2'5.0335e-2'0 9971'0 9579'0.9384! + (3 6469e-3*4.1978e-2·o 9971 '0 0421'0 9384) + 0+0 
= 3 7435e-3 + 6 0305e-6 + 0 + 0 
= 3.7495e-3 
P(X1 I Near miss= yes) 
= P(X1 & Near miss = yes) I P(Near miss = yes) 
= 3.7495e-3 I 0.12556 
= 2.9862e-2 
ISO 
P(Nrn =yes I x ·1 "'S. X2 = S, X4 = S. Ns =yes)= (0 9971'0 9579'0 9384 ' 0 09258) = 8.2978e-2 
P(Nrn ""yes I X1 = F, X2 = S, X4 = S, Ns =yes)== (0 0029' 0 9579"0 9384' 0 09258) = 2.4134e-4 
P(Ns = yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X3 = F) = (0.9971"0.9579*0.0527) = 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns = yes I X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 = S) = (0.0029*0.9579•0.9473) = 2.6315e-3 
P(X2 I Near miss= yes) 
= P(X2 & Near miss= yes) I P(Near miss = yes) 
= L 1.x4 P(Xl, X2 = S, X4, Ns = yes, Nm = yes) I P(Near miss = yes) 
L 1.x4 P(Xl, X2 = S, X4, Ns = yes, Nm =yes) 
= P(X1 = S. X2 = S, X4:::: S Ns =yes, Nrn =yes)+ P(X1 =F. X2 = S, X4::: S Ns:::: yes. Nrn =yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X4 = F, Ns =yes, Nm =yes) + P(X1 = F, X2 = S, X4 = F, Ns =yes, Nm =yes) 
= P(Nm =yes i X1 =S, X2=S, X4=S, Ns=y) P(Ns =yes I x·1 =S. X2=S. X4=S) P(X1 =Sl P(X2=S) P(X4'"S) 
+ F'(Nm =yes I X 1 =F. X2=S. X4=S. Ns=y) F\ Ns:::: yes I X 1 =F. X2=S. X4=S) rrx 1 =F) P(X2=S) P(X4=S) 
+ P(Nm = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X4=F, Ns=y) P(Ns = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X4=F) P(X1 =S) P(X2=S) P(X4=F) 
+ P(Nm =yes I X1 =F, X2=S, X4=F, Ns=y) P(Ns =yes I X1 =F, X2=S, X4=F) P(X1 =F) P(X2=S) P(X4=F) 
= (8.2978e-2'5.0335e-2'0.9971'0.9579'0.9384) + (2.4134e-4'2.6315e-3'0.0029'0.9579'0.9384) + 0 + 0 
= 3.7435e-3 + 1.6555e-9 + 0 + 0 
= 3.7435e-3 
P(X2 I Near miss =yes) 
= P(X2 & Near miss = yes) I P(Near miss = yes) 
= 3.7435e-3 I 0.12556 
= 2.9814e-2 
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P(Nm =yes I X1 = S. X2 = S, X4 = S, Ns =yes)= (0 9971'0.9579' 0.9384'0.09258) = 8.2978e-2 
P(Nrn "'yes I X1:::: F, X2 = S. X4 = S, Ns =yes)= 10.0029*0.9579'0.9384*0.09258) = 2.4 134e-4 
P(Nm =yes I X1 = S, X2 =F. X4 '" S, Ns "' yes)= (0 9971 '0 0421'0 9384'0.09258) = 3.6469e-3 
P(Nrn:::: yes! X 1 = F, X2 = F X4 = S, Ns = yes)= (0.0029'0.0421 ' 0.9384·0.09258) = 1.0607e-5 
P(Ns =yes 1 X1 = S. X2 = S, X3 =F)= (0.9971*0.9579*0.0527) = 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 =F) = (0.0029'0 .9579'0.0527) :::: 1.4640e-4 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) = (0.9971*0 0421 *0.9473) = 3.9766e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 =F)= (0.9971*0.0421*0.0527) = 2.2122e-3. 
So, 3.9766e-2 + 2.2122e-3 
= 4.1978e-2 
P;Ns •••• y<;s 1 X 1 c F X2 ' F, X3 ' S) "' (0 0029'0.0421 ' 0 94?3)"' 1 1566e-4 
PiNs = yes I X 1 :::: F X2 " F X:l :::: F) (D OD29 '0.0421 'D 0~)27\:::: 6.4:~4·: e-6 
·"' 1 22G9e4 
P(X4 I Near miss = yes) 
=P(X4 & Near miss = yes) I P(Near miss = yes) 
= L 1.x2 P(X l , X2, X4 = S, Near miss = yes)/ P(Near miss = yes) 
L xl,xz P(Xl , X2, X4 = S, Near miss= yes) 
= P(X1 = S, X2 = S, X4 = S, Ns = yes, Nm =yes) + P(X1 = F, X2 = S, X4 = S, Ns =yes, Nm =yes) 
+ P(X1 = S, X2 = F, X4 = S, Ns = yes, Nm = yes) + P(X1 = F, X2 = F, X4 = S, Ns =yes, Nm = yes) 
= P(Nm = yes I X1 =S. X2=S, X4 =S. Ns=y) P(Ns = yes I X1=S. X2=S. X4=S) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X4=S) 
+ P(Nrn:::: yes i XI::::F, X2:::: S, X4""S, Ns=y) P(Ns = yes I X 1=F. X2=S, X4=S) P(X1=F) P(X2=S) P(X4=S) 
+ P!Nrn =yes! X1=S X2=F, X4=S, Ns=yl P(Ns = yes I X1 =S. X2=F. X4=S) P(XI =S) P(X2=F) P(X4=S) 
+ P(Nm " yes ! X1"F. X2"F, X4"S. Ns "y) P(Ns " yes 1 Xi=F. X2ccf, X4"S) P(X1 =F) P(X2=F) P(X4=S) 
= (8 2978e-2'5.0335e-2'0.9971'0 9579'0 9384) + (24 134e-4'1 .4640e-4' 0 002s·c.9579' 0 9384) 
+ {3 64G9e-3'4 1978e-2'0 99!1 "0.0421'0.9384) + (! .060/e-5"1.220Se-4"0 0029'0 0421'0.9384) 
= 3.7435e-3 + 9.2104e-11 + 6.0305e-6 + 1.4837e-13 
= 3.7495e-3 
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P(X4 I Near miss = yes) 
= P(X4 & Near miss= yes) I P(Near miss =yes) 
= 3.7495e-3 / 0.12556 
= 2.9862e-2 
Step 2: Updated X1 , X2, X4 
X1 I I X2 I I X3 Barriers I 1 I I . I 0.9971 0.9579 0.9473 
Step Updating 
1 0.93635 I J I 0 93636 I . I 0.93636 
2 2 98l)2e-2 1 J 1 2.9814e-2 I , I 
!53 
I I X4 
I t I 0.9384 
I ~ I 
I ; I 2.9862e-2 
NOT 
NEAR 
MISS 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 = S) = (0 9971*0.0421*0 9473) = 3.9766e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 =F) = (0.9971*0.0421*0.0527) = 2.2122e-3 
So, 3.9766e-2 + 2.2122e-3 = 4.1 978e-2 
NOT 
SAFE 
F'iNNm "yes X1 "" S X2 •• S. X4 "'F. Ns " yesj " (0 9971'0 (1579'0 OG16."0.092Sg; '" S 44ie-3 
P(NNrn = yes I X1 = S. X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns =yes)= (0.9971 *0.0421 *0.0616*0.09258) = 2.394e-4 
f>(Mishap = yes : X 1 = S, X2 "' S X5 = S. NNrn =yes) = (0 Sl971 '0. 9579*0 894'0 005703) = 4 8697e 3 
P(Misllap"' yes I X1 "'S. X2 =F. XS '" S. NNm =yes)= 10.9971"0.0421 ' 0 894'0.005703) = 2 1402e-4 
P(X1 I Mishap= yes) 
=P(X1 & Mishap = yes) I P(Mishap = yes) 
= Lxz,xs P(Xl = S, X2, XS, Misha p = yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
= P(X 1 =S. X2=S. XS=S. NNrn=yes, Mishap=yes) + P(X 1 =S, X2=F, X5=S, NNrn=yes. Mis!1ap=yes) 
+ P(X1 =S, X2=S, XS=F, NNm=yes, Mishap=yes) + P(X 1 =S, X2=F, X5=F, NNm=yes, Mishap=yes) 
= P(Mis rlao =yes I x·t = S. X2 = S, X5 = S, NNrn =yes) F'(NNm =yes i X1 = S, X2 = S, X5 = S. Ns = y) 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S. X2 = S, X5 = SJ P(X1 = S) P(X2" S) P(XS = S) 
+ P(Misnap =yes I X1 = S X2 = F, X5"' S NNm =yes) P(NNrn =yes! X1 = S, X2 =F. X5 = S Ns = y) 
P(Ns =yes! X1 " S, X2 "F. X5 "S) P(X1 "' S) P(X2 • F) P(X5 = Si 
+ P(Mishap = yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X5 = F, NNm =yes) P(NNm =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X5 = F, Ns = y) 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X5 = F) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = S) P(X5 =F) 
+ P(Mishap =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X5 = F, NNm =yes) P(NNm = yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X5 = F, Ns = y) 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X5 = F) P(X1 = S) P(X2 = F) P(X5 = F) 
= (4.869/e-3'5.44/e 3 ' :;,,::;:3se 2'099?1'0.9579•0.894) 
+ (2 1402e-4'2.394e-4'4 .1978e-2'0 9971 '0.0421 '0 894; + 0 + 0 
= 1.1401e-6 + 8.0716e-11 
= 1.1402e-6 
P(X1 I Mishap= yes) 
= P(X1 & Mishap = yes) I P(Mishap = yes) 
= 1. 1402e-6 I 0 0 
= 0.0 
!54 
P(Ns" yes i X 1 = S. X2"' S X3 =F)= (0 89/1 '0 9579'0 0527) "' 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes i X1 = F, X2 = S, X3 =F)= (0.0029'0 9579'0.0527) = 1 464e-4 
P(Mishap =yes! X1 = S X2" S, Xb = S. NNrn =yes)= (0.99/1'0.9Sl9'0.884'0.005703) = 4.869/e-3 
P(Mishop =yes i X 1 = F, X2 = S X5 = S, NNm o= yes) = (0 0029'0 95/9'0 894'0 005/03) '" 1 4163e-5 
P(X2 I Mishap = yes) 
=P(X2 & Mishap =yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
=L1.xs P(Xl, X2 = S, XS, Mishap =yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
= P(X1 "''S, X2"S. X5"S. NNm=-yes. fv'llshap"''yes) + P(X1 =F. X2=-S, X5=S, NNm=yes, M!shap::yes) 
+ P(X1 =S, X2=S, X5=F, NNm=yes, Mishap=yes) + P(X1 =F, X2=S, X5=F, NNm=yes, Mishap=yes) 
= P(Mishap =yes I X1=S, X2=S, Xb=S. NNrn"yesl P(NNm =yes! X1"S . X2"S. X~)=-S . Ns"y) 
P(Ns =yes [ X1=S. X2=S. X5=S) P(X1=SlF'i.X2=S)P(X5=<-3) 
+ P(Mishap "yes I X1"F. X2=S, X5=S. NNm"yes) P(NNrn =yes! X1"F, X2 S , X5=S, Ns"y) 
P(Ns =yes [ X1 =F. X2'=S , X5=S) P(X1 =F)P(X2=S)f'(X5=S) 
+ P(Mishap =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X5=F, NNm=yes) P(NNm =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X5=F, Ns=y) 
P(Ns = yes I X1=S, X2=S, X5=F) P(X1 =S)P(X2=S)P(X5=F) 
+ P(Mishap = yes I X 1 =F, X2=S, X5=F, NNm=yes) P(NNm = yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X5=F, Ns=y) 
P(Ns = yes I X1 =F, X2=S, X5=F) P(X1 =F)P(X2=S)P(X5=F) 
= (4 . 8697e-3*~> 44 ie T 5.0335e-2' 0 9971*0.9579*0.894) 
+ (14163e-5* 1 '.b42?-5' 1 464e-4'0.0029*0.9579*0.894) + 0 + 0 
= 1 . 1401 e-6 + 8. 1 5 76e-17 
= 1.1401 e-6 
P(X2 I Mishap= yes) 
= P(X2 & Mishap = yes) I P(Mishap = yes) 
=1 .1401e-6 I 0.0 
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P(Ns"' yes: X1 c S, X2 = S. X3 =F):::: (0 997 1'0.9579 ' 0 052/) = 5 0335e-2 
P(Ns = yes ! X 1 = F, X.2 = S. X3 :::: F) = (0 0029'0.9579'0 052/) "' 1.464e-4 
P,Ns =yes i X1 :::: S, X2 =F. X3::: S):::: (0 9971"0 0421 '() fJ4?:li = 3 ~l76c-Je<2 
P(Ns"' 'j(;S j Xi= S X2"' F, X3" F)"' {0 9971'0 0421 ' 0 0527) = 2.2122e-3 
So. 3. 976Ge-2 + 2 2: 22e ·3 = 4 : 978e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1:::: F. X2 =F. X3 :::: S) = (0.0029'0.0421*0.94'13)::: 11566e-4 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = F, X2 =F. X3 =F)= (0.0029*0.0421*0 0527) = 64341e-6 
So. 1.1566e-4 + 6.4341e-6 = 1 2209e-4 
P(Nf-411i ::~yes: X1 S. X.2 :~ F X4 :~ F, r\Js ::::yes; ro_9rJ71 ''0 QJ.2" *D OG16-~0.C9""'t..:S 2 --~.S40e 4 
P:NNn~ ::::yes x: ~:: r· X2:::: r:. X4 ::~ r:~ Ns ·:::yes} (0 00:20·to C42,.~) OG1r3·-~o C92~)3) ~ {:).962·-;·e--'/ 
P(tvlishap =yes X1 = S. X2:::: S , X5 = S, NNm =yes)= (0 9971*0 9579'0.894'0.005703):::: 4.il697e<3 
P(P·ilishap::: yes XI :::: F, X2. = S, X5:::: S, NNm =yes) = (0 0029*0 9579'0.894*0.005703):::: 1.4163e-5 
P(Misl1ap:::: yes X1 :::: S X2 =F. X5:::: S. NNm"' yes)"' (0.9971'0.0421 ' 0.894'0.005703)" 2.1402e-4 
P(Misl<ap =yes X1 = F. X2 =F. X5"' S. NNm "'yes)" (0.0029'0 0421'0 894'0.005703) "'6.2247e-7 
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P(X51 Mishap= yes) 
=P(X5 & Mishap= yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
=L1.xz P(Xl, X2, XS = S, Mishap = yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
= P(X1=S X2"S X5=S. NNtn=yes. Mtshap=yes) + P(X1 =F. X2=S. X5=S, NNm=yes. Mishap=yesj 
+ P(X1=S X2=F, XS=S NNm=yes Mtshap=yes) + P(X1=F X2=F. X5=S NNm=yes Mtshap=yes) 
= P(Mtsl1ap =yes I X l=S, X2=S, X5=S NNm=yes) P(NNrn =yes i X l=S X2=S. X5=S. Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=S X2=S X5=S) P(Xl=SJ P[X2=S) PtX5=SJ 
+ P(Mtshap =yes I X1=F X2=S, X5=S. NNm=yesJ P(NNrn =yes! X1=F, X2=S, X5=S, Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=F. X2=S. X5=S) P{X1=F) P(X2=S) P(X5=S) 
+ P(Mishap =yes I X1=S. X2=F X5=S NNrn=yes) P(NNrn =yes I X1=S X2=F X5=S Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=S. X2=F, XS=Sj P(X1=S) P(X2=F) P[X5=S) 
+ P(Mishap '"yes I X1 '-'F, X2""F . X5=S. NNrn=yes) P(NNm '=yes! X1=F, X2'-'>F, X5=S, Ns=•yes) 
P(Ns = yes ! X1 =F. X2=F, X5=S) P(X 1 =F) P(X2=F) P(X5=S) 
= (4 8697e-3* 5 0335e-2'0.9971 *0.9579*0.894) 
+ (1 4163e-5* 1 464e-4*0 0029*0 9579*0.894) 
+ (21402e-4* 4 ~ 4 ·~,78e2'0. 997 1*0.0421*0 .894) 
+ (6 2247e-7* 1 2209e-4*0 0029*0.0421 *0.894) 
= 1.1401 e-6 + 8.1576e-17 + 8.0716e-11 + 5. 7756e-21 
= 1.1402e-6 
P(XSI Mishap= yes) 
= P(X5 & Mishap = yes) I P(Mishap =yes) 
= 1.1402e-6 I 0.0 
Updated X 1, X2, X5 
X1 X2 X3 
Barrier 
0.9971 ~ 0.9579 0.9473 
Step Updating 
1 0.93635 
. 
0.93636 
. 
0 93636 
2 2.9862e-2 
.;. 2.9B14e-2 . 
3 0.0 
.;. 0.0 . 
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X4 X5 
; 0.9384 . 0.894 
L - . -
l 2.9862e-2 -
' - 0.0 ..
NOT 
MISHAP 
NOT 
NEAR 
MISS 
PiNs= yes i X1 ::: S. X2 = S. X3" F)::: (0.9971'0.9579'0.0527) = 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns- yes X1 ~ S X2 -· F X3 -~ S) o• iO 9971 'G 0421-c 94/3)" 3.9766& 2 
P(Ns "'yes X1 "'S X2 · F X3"' Fl "'.0 9971 0 0421'C C£>27: ·c. 2 2t22E><' 
So 3.;;76f3e 2 - 2 2 1 22e 3 = 4 ~ 978e -2 
NOT 
SAFE 
P(NNm =yes t X 1 = S. X2 = S, X4::: F , Ns::: yes)= (0.9971'0 95!9-0.0616'0 09258) "5.44/0e-3 
P(NNm • yes X1 •• S X2 "F. X4 = F Ns "'yes)= (0 9971'0.0421'0 0616'0 09?58) = 2 3940(;-4 
P(NMh =yes l X 1 = S. X2 = S, XS = F, NNm ::yes)= (0.9971 '0 9579'0.1 06'0.005703) = 5.7739e-4 
P(NMt,::: yes i X' --..: ~i. x:• " F. X5 " S NNrn "' yesl "-' :C 9871 ·o 0421 '() BSWO 005703) =- :U402H4 
P(lnc1dent =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S, X6 = S. NM!1 =yes)= (0 9971'0 9579'0.9"129'6.C45e-4) = 5 6172e-4 
P(lnc:()Cnt =yes X1 = S X2 =F. X6 = S NMh =yes)= :1) 9971 '0 0421'0 9729'6 045,, 4:" 2 4688c-5 
P(X1 I Incident= yes) 
=P(X1 & Incident= yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
=L2,x6 P(Xl = S, X2, X6, Incident = yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
= P(X1=S, X2-=S. X6=S. NMh=yes. lncident=yes) + P(X1,~S . X2=F, X6=S, NMh=yes, lnciclent=yes) 
+ P(X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes, lncident=yes) + P(X1 =S, X2=F, X6=F, NMh=yes, lncident=yes) 
= P(lncideni =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X6=S. NM11=yes) P(NMh =yes I X 1=S, X2=S. XG=S. NNrn=yes) 
P(NNm =yes i X 1=S X2=S XG=S. Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=S. X2=S. X6=S) P(X1=S)P(X2=SjP(X6=S) 
+ P(lnc1dent = yes I X1 =S X2=F, XG=S NMh=yes) P(NMh = yes I X 1 =S. X2=F. X6=S. NNm=yes) 
F'tNNm = yes i X1::S . X2=F , X6=S, Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1 =S. X2=F. X6=SJ PtX1=S)P(X2=F)P(X6=Sl 
+ P(lncident = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes) P(NMh = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, NNm=yes) 
P(NNrn = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, Ns=yes) P(Ns = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F) P(X1 =S)P(X2=S)P(X6=F) 
+ P(lncident = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X6=F, NMh=yes) P(NMh = yes I X 1=S, X2=F, X6=F, NNrn=yes) 
P(NNm =yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X6=F, Ns=yes) P(Ns = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X6=F) P(X1 =S)P(X2=F)P(X6=F) 
= (5.6172e-4*5.7739e-4' '. 44/Ce T 5 0335e-2*0 9971*0 9579*0.9729) 
+ (2.4688e-5*2 140?.o.ti ·2 3>140e -1' 4 1 978c-2' 0.9971 *0.0421 *0.9729) + 0 + 0 
= 8.2631e-11 + 2.1686e-15 
= 8.2633e-11 
!58 
P(X1 I Incident= yes) 
= P(X1 & Incident= yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
= 8.2633e-11 /1.4167e-4 
= 5.8328e-7 
!59 
NOT 
MISHAP NEAR 
MISS 
P(Ns = yes i X1 = S, X2 = S. X3 =F)= (0 991''1'0.9579'0 0527) = 5 0335e-2 
P(Ns"' yes; X I "F X2 = S X3 '"F)"' {0 0029'0 9579"0 0527)"" '• 464c-4 
NOT 
SAFE 
P(NNm ==yes i XI= S, X2 = S. X4 = F, Ns =yes)= (0.9971'0 9579"0 0616'0 09258) = 5.4470e-3 
P(NMh =yes i XI= S, X2 "' S. X5 =F. NNm =yes)= (0.9971'0.95i9•o 106'0 005703) = 57739e-4 
P(NMh "yes i X1 =F. X2 = S, X5 c F, NNm =yes) • (0 .0029'0 9579'0.106"0 005703! = 1.6!93e-G 
P(lncident "' yes 1 X1 = S. X2 '" S, XG -= S. NMi1 = yes) = (0 9971 •o 9579'0 9729'6 045e-4) = 5.6172e-4 
P(lncidcnt"" yes 1 X1 = F X2 = S X6 = S NMh =yes)= (0 0029'0 9579'0 9729"6.0452:-4) = 1 6337c-6 
P(X2 ! Incident= yes) 
=P(X2 & Incident= yes) I P(lncident = yes) 
=L1.x 6 P (Xl , X2 = S, X6 , Incident = yes) I P(lncident = yes) 
= P(X1=S. X2"'S, X6=S, NMtFyes. lncident=yes) + P(X1"'F, X2=S, XG=S. NMh"'yes, lnclcient"'yes) 
+ P(X1=S, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes, lncident=yes) + P(X 1=F, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes, lncident=yes) 
= P(lncident =yes I X1cS, X2c•S, XG=S. NMir'yes) P(NMil "'yes! X1=S, X2=S. X6"'S. NNm•=yes) 
P(NNm =yes! X1=S. X2=S. X6=S. Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes ! X1=S. X2=S. X6=S) P(X1=S)P(X2=S)P(X6=S) 
+ P(!ncident =yes I X1=cf, X2=S. X6=S. NMIFyes) P(NI\t1h "'yes! X1=F, X2=S, X6=S, NNm"'yes) 
P(NNm =yes! X1=F, X2=S, X6=S, Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes J X1=F, X2=S, X6=S)P(X1=F)P(X2=S)P(X6=S) 
+ P(lncident = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes) P(NMh = yes I X1=S, X2=S, X6=F, NNm=yes) 
P(NNm = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X6=F, Ns=yes) P(Ns = yes I X1=S, X2=S, X6=F)P(X1 =S)P(X2=S)P(X6=F) 
+ P(lncident = yes I X1 =F, X2=S, X6=F, NMh=yes) P(NMh = yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X6=F, NNm=yes) 
P(NNm =yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X6=F, Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X6=F)P(X1 =F)P(X2=S)P(X6=F) 
= (5 61 /2e4*5. !/39e·A'5 44i0e-3"5.0335e-2'0.9971*0.9579*0.9729) 
+ (1 :3337e S* l 6793e-6"1 58,1/c-5' 1 164e-4·0.0029*0.9579*0.9729) + 0 + 0 
= 8.2631 e-11 + 1.7196e-23 
= 8.2631 e-11 
P(X2 I Incident= yes) 
= P(X2 & Incident = yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
= 8.2631 e-11 11 .4167e-4 
= 5.8326e -7 
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P(Ns = yes i X 1 " S, X2 = S. X3 = F) = (0.9971-0.9579'0 0527) "' 5 0335e-2 
P(Ns'" 'jes! X1 "F X2 "S, X3"' F)= (0 0029'0 9579*0 0527) = 1 464e-4 
P(Ns =yes i X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 = S) = (0.9971•0.0421'0.9473) = 3.9766e-2 
P(Ns =yes i X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 =F) = (0.9971*0.0421 *0.0527) = 2.2122e-3 
So, 3.9766e-2 + 2.2122e-3 = 4.1 978e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 =F. X2 =F. X3 = S) = (0.0029*0.0421*0.9473) = 1.1566e-4 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = F, X2 = F. X3 = F) = (0.0029*0.0421•0.0527) = 6.4341e-6 
So, 1.1566e-4 + 6.4341 e-6 = 1.2209e-4 
P(NNm =yes! X1 = S. X2 = S, X4 =F. Ns =yes)= (0 997"1'0.9579*0 0616'0 09258) = 5 4470e-3 
P(NNm " yes! X1 = F X2' S. X4 =F. Ns" yes)" iO 0029'0 9579' 0 0616'0.09258) = ·: SS42e-5 
P(NNm = yes i X1 = S. X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns =yes)= (0.9971*0.0421*0 0616•0 09258) = 2.394e-4 
P(NNm = yes I X1 = F, X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns =yes)= (0.0029*0.0421*0.0616•0.09258) = 6.9627e-7 
P(NMil =yes! X1 = S. X2 "S, XS = F, NNm =yes)= (0 9911'0.9579'0 106*0 005703)" 5 Ti39e-4 
1J(NMh ' y'eS X 1 =F. X2 ' S_ X5 "F, NNm "yes) "(0 0029'0.9579'0 1 06'0 005703) 1.6793e-6 
P(NMh = yes i X1 = S, X2 = F, X5 = F. NNm = yes)= (0.9971*0.0421*0.106.0.005703) = 2.5376e -5 
P(NMh = yes I X1 = F. X2 = F, X5 =F. NNm = yes) = (0 .0029*0.0421'0.1 06*0.005703) = 7.3806e-8 
Pflncident =yes I X1 = S, X2 = S. XG = S. NMil =yes)" (0.997-; '0 9579 '0.9'729'6 045e-4) = S.6172e-4 
F'[lnc:cient ·o. yes , X·l = F X2 " S X6"' ~). NfvF1 =yes) " ;C 0029'0 S579'C 97:::::1'!3 045e-4) "' 1 6337e-6 
16 1 
P(lncident = yes 1 X1 = S, X2 = F, X6 = S, NMh =yes)= (0.9971*0.0421 ' 0.9729' 6.045e-4) = 2.4688e-5 
P(lncident = yes 1 X 1 = F, X2 = F, X6 = S, NMh =yes) = (0.0029*0.0421'0.9729*6.045e-4) = 7.1803e-8 
P(X6 !Incident= yes) 
=P(X6 & Incident= yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
=L 1,x 2 P(Xl , X2, X6 = S, lncident =yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
= P(X1=S, X2=S. XG=S. NMI1=yes, lncident=yes) + P(X1=F. X2=S. X6=S. NMt1=yes. lncident=yes) 
+ P(X1=S X2=F. X6=S NMh=yes lnc1dent=yes) + P(X1=F X2=F. X6=S, NMh=yes, lncident=yes) 
= P(lnc1dent =yes I X1=S X2=S X6=S. NMt1=yes) P(NMh =yes I X1=S X2=S. X6=S. NNm=yes) 
PtNNm =yes l X1=S. X2=S. X6=S, Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=S. X2=S, X6=S) P(X1=S)P(X2=SlP(X6=S) 
+ P(lnc1dent:: yes I Xl =F. X2=S. X6:::S, NMf1:"yesJ P(NMt1 =yes I X1 =F. X2'"S. XG'"S. NNm:::yes) 
P(NNm =yes i X1=F. X2=S. X6=S. Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes 1 X1=F X2ccS. XG=Sl PCX1=F)PCX2=SlP(X6=S) 
+ P(lnc1dent =yes I X1=S X2=F. XG=S. NMh=yes) P(NMh =yes I X1=S X2=F, X6=S, NNm=yesj 
P(NNm =yes I X1=S. X2=F XG=S. Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes X1=S X2=F, X6=S) P(X1=SJP(X2=FjP(X6=S) 
+ P(lncJdent =yes J X1=F X2=F. X6=S. NMh=yes) P(NMh =yes I X1 =F. X2=F. X6=S . NNm=yes) 
P(NNrn =yes I X1=F. X2=F. X6=S Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes! X1=F, X2=F. X6=S) P(X1=FJP(X2=FJP(X6=S) 
= ( 5 6172e-4 ·s 7739e-4 · s 44 70e-3' 5. 0335e-2*0. 9971*0. 9579*0. 9729) 
+ (' 6337e-6'1.6793e-e'1 5842e-5'1 464e-4*0.0029*0.9579*0.9729) 
+ (24688e-5'2.5376e-5*2. 394e-4*4.1978e-2*0.9971 *0.0421 *0.9729) 
+ (7.1803e-8'7.3806e-8*6.9627e-7*1 2209e-4*0.0029*0 0421 *0.9729) 
= 8.2631e-11 + 1.7196e-23 + 2.571 2e-16 + 5.3511e-29 
= 8. 2631 e-11 
P(X6 Jlncident =yes) 
= P(X2 & Incident =yes) I P(lncident =yes) 
= 8.2631e-111 14 167e-4 
= 5.8326e-7 
Updated X1 , X2, X6 
X1 X2 
Barrier 
0.9971 
. 
0.9579 
.;. 
Step 
1 0 93635 0.93636 ! 
2 2 9862e-2 2.9814e-2 i 
3 00 l 00 l 
4 5.8328e-7 l 5.8326e-l ! 
X3 X4 
0.9473 
. 
0.9384 
Updating 
0.93636 
. 
2 9862e-2 
- -
- -
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X5 X6 
. 
0.894 0.9729 
. 
- -
00 
. 
-
; . 5.832Ge-l 
P(Ns =yes! X1 = S X?= S. X3 =F)= (0 997'1'0.9579'0 0527; = 5.0335e-2 
P;Ns =yes ! X 1 = S, X2 = F. X3 = S) = {0 9971'J 0421 '0 9473 l::.: 3.8766e-2 } 
4 i978e-2 P 'N e-·x· s x··· r .. X'" Fl (·A..-)(';""1'1*r''"'421''A0~·..--··7' "')'")12A -, \• s::::'/'·~·' I:::: , ":::: ·, J ·.:::: <J~J:!' UU 'J. :!.!..)"'"-·"- LC .. ,). 
P(NNrn ::::yes! X1 :::: S. X2:::: S, X4 = F, Ns "yes):::: (0 99/1'0 9~)/9'0 0616'0 09258) = 5.44/0e-3 
P(NNm :::: ye~., t X 1 :::: S. x;;:::: F ... X4 :::: F , f.b ::::yes) = (0.99/ 1'0 0421 '0 0616'0 09258; = 2 394e4 
F'(NMh =yes X1 :::: S X2 = S X5 =F. NNrn =yes)= (0 9971'0 9579'0 106*0 005703) = 5.7739e4 
P(Nin:::: yes I X1 = S, X2:::: S, XG = F, NMh:::: yes):::: (0.99/1'0.95/9'0 0211'6.045e-4):::: 1.564i ..e·5 
P(Nirl '"'yes I X I :::: S. X2 " F XG:::: r·, Nfvh :::: yes) ' (0.99/ 1'0 0421'0 0211'6 045e4) • G.8768e ! 
!"(Accident= yes 1 X1 = S , X2 = S. X7 = S, Nln =yes)= (0 9971*0.9579'0.8~J12*1.G39e·5) = 1.3951e .. 5 
P:.!\cc1dent Y X' :::: S X2 :::: F Xl:::: S Nln :::: yesi :::: (0 fJS/" '0.0421'0 8912'1 63Se .. b) "'6 1316e-! 
163 
P(X1 I Accident= yes) 
=P(X1 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
=L2.x7 P(Xl = S, X2, X7, Accident = yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= P(X1"-S , X2"-S . X7c•S. Nln,yes, Acc!cient=yes) + P(X1,•S, X2"-F. X!,=S. Nln=yes, Accident=yes) 
+ P(X1 =S, X2=S, X7=F, Nln=yes, Accident=yes) + P(X1 =S, X2=F, X7=F, Nln=yes, Accident=yes) 
= P(Accidenl =yes i X i =S. X2=S, Xl=S, Nin"'yes) P(Nin.::yes J X1=S, X2=S. X!o=S. Ntvlhooyes) 
P(NMh =yes! X1"'S, X2=S, X7"S. NNrn=yes) P(NNm =yes i Xi=S. X2=S. X7=S. Ns=yes) 
P(Ns' yes i X1=S, X2=S, X!=S) P(X1"-S) P(X2=S) P(Xi=S) 
+ P(Accident =yes i Xi=S. X2=F, X7=S, Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes! X1=S. X2=F, X7=S. NMh=yes) 
P(NMt1 = ye5j X1='S. X2=F, X7=S NNm=ye5) P(NNm =yes i Xi=S. X2=F. X?=S Ns=ye5) 
PtN5 =yes i X1=S. X2=F, X7=Sj P(X1=S) P(X2=F) P(X7=S) 
+ P(Accident =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=F, Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=F, NMh=yes) 
P(NMh =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=F, NNm=yes) P(NNm =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=F, Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=F) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X7=F) 
+ P(Accident = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X7=F, Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes I X1=S, X2=F, X7=F, NMh=yes) 
P(NMh = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X7=F, NNm=yes) P(NNm = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X7=F, Ns=yes) 
P(Ns = yes I X1 =S, X2=F, X7=F) P(X1=S) P(X2=F) P(X7=F) 
= (1 3~J51 e 5*1.5647e-5*5. 7739e4"5.4470e-3*5.0335e 2*0.9971*0.9579*0.8912) 
+ (61316c:-7'6.876Gc-7'2 5376e-5"2 394c-4'4 1978e-2*0.9971*0.0421*0.8912) + 0 + 0 
= 2.9415e-17 + 4.0228e-24 
= 2.9415e-17 
P(X1 I Accident= yes) 
= P(X1 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= 2.9415e-1 7/3.5168e-6 
= 8.3641e-12 
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s s F s s F NOT 
F s F NOT F s F SAFE 
NEAR 
s F F MISS s F F 
F F F F F F 
P(Ns = yes : X1 = S X2 = S. X3 =F) = (0 9971 '0.9579'0 0527) = 5.0335e-2 
f\Ns ==yes I X 1 - F X2.:. S. X3 = F)- (0 OO:'WO 8579'0 0527j::. 14G4e 4 
P(NNm =yes! X1 = S X2 = S. X4 =F. Ns =yes)= (0 9971•0.9579*0 0616'0 09258) = 5 4470e-3 
P(NNm- yes i X 1 F X2 'S. X4" F. Ns vesl (C 8029'0.95!9'0 0616 0 09258! "1 5842e S 
P(NMh =yes, X1 = S. X2 = S X5 = F NNm = yesl = (0 9971 ' 0 9579"0.106•0 005703) = 5.7739e-4 
P .. NMh- yes X1 -'f. X2.::. S XS = F NNrn- yes) (0 C028'D 9579'0 106'0.00:3703, ~ 1.6793e-6 
P(Nin =yes I X1 = S. X2 = S X6 =F. NMh =yes)= (0.9971 '0 9579"0 0271 '6 045e-4) = 1.5647e-5 
P(Nin -yes I X1 "'F. X2- S. X6 '- F NMi' yes}" O.OC CJ'C 9579"0 0271'6 84~·.;;-4, 4 t·508e 8 
P(Accident =yes 1 X1 = S, X2 = S. X?= S Nln =yes)= {0 9971'0 9579'0 8912*1 639e-5) = 1 3951e-5 
P(ACCidert yes I Xl -, F, X2 "'S X! S, Nln' yes) "{0 0029'0 9579'0.8912'·: G39e-5)- 4 OS'i'Ge-8 
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P(X2 I Accident= yes) 
= P(X2 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
=L,,x7 P(Xl, X2 = S, X7, Accident = yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= P(X1=S X2"S, X7=S. Nln=yes. Acc1dent=yes) •· P(X1~T. X2=S. Xl"'S. Nln=yes Accident=yes) 
+ P(X1=S. X2=S. X7=F, Nln=yes, Accident=yes) + P(X1=F, X2=S. X7=F. Nln=yes, Accident= yes) 
= P(Accident =yes I X1=S. X2=S. XI=S. Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes! X1=S X2=S X7=S NMh=yesi 
P(NMh =yes I X1=S, X2=S, X7=S. NNrn=yes) P(NNm =yes I X1=S. X2=S. X7=S Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=S. X2=S, X7=S) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X7=S) 
+ P(Accident = yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X7=S. Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes i X1 =F, X2=S X7=S. NMh=yes) 
P(NMh =yes I X1=F, X2=S X7=S NNm=yes) P(NNm =yes I X1=F. X2=S X7=S Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=F X2=S. X7=Sj P(X1=F) P(X2=S) P(X7=S) 
+ P(Accident =yes I X1=S. X2=S. X7=F. Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes I X1=S. X2=S. X7=F. NMh=yes) 
P(NMh = yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X7=F. NNm=yes) P(NNm = yes I X1=S, X2=S. X7=F. Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1 =S. X2=S. X7=F) P(X1=S) P(X2=S) P(X7=F) 
+ P(Accident = yes I X1 =F. X2=S. X7=F. Nln=yes) P(Nin = yes I X1=F. X2=S. X7=F, NMh=yes) 
P(NMh = yes I X1 =F. X2=S. X7=F, NNm=yes) P(NNm = yes I X1 =F. X2=S, X7=F, Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1=F. X2=S, X7=F) P(X1 =F) P(X2=S) P(X7=F) 
= (1 3951 e-5'1 5647e-5'5 7739e-4 '5.4470e-3*5.0335e-2*0.9971 *0.9579*0.891 2) 
+ (·1 0576e-3'1 5508e-3'' 6793e-6*1 581i2e-5'1 464e-4*0.0029*0.9579*0.891 2) + 0 + 0 
= 2.9415e-17 + 1.7804e-32 
= 2. 941 5e-17 
P(X2 I Accident= yes) 
= P(X2 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= 2.9415e-17 I 3.5168e-6 
= 8.3641 e-12 
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P(Ns = yes i X 1 = S X2 = S. X3 =F)= (0 9971'0 9579'0.0527) = 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S. X2 = F, X3 = S) = (0 9971*0.0421•0 9473) = 3.9766e-2} 
4.1978e-2 
P(Ns = yes 1 X 1 = S. X2 = F. X3 = F) = (0.99-11*0.0421 '0 0527) = 2.2122e-3 
} 
P(NNm = yes ! X1 = S , X2 "'S . X4 = F, Ns = yes)= tO 9971'0 9579'0.0616' 0 09258) = 5.4470e-3 
P(NNrn = yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns = yes) = (0.9971 '0.0421*0.0616'0 09258) = 2.394e-4 
P(NM!1 =yes I X1 = S. X2 = S. X5 = F. NNrn = yes)= (0 997'1'0.9579''0.106'0.005703) = 5.7739e-4 
P(NM11 ::: yes X1 = F X2 = S. X5 =F. NNrn =yes)= (0 0029'0.9579'0 106•0 005703) = 1 5793e-5 
P(NMh = yes I X1 = S. X2 = F. X5 = F. NNrn = yes) = (0 9971•0 0421 *0.1 06•0.005703) = 2.5376e-5 
P(Nin = yes I X I " S. X2 " S . X6 " F. NMh " yes )= (0 9971'0 9579*0 0271'6 045e-4 J = 1.5647e-5 
'"(NL - yes I X 1 - F X2 = S X6 -:- F NMi1 - yes 1 - • 0 0' 19'0 9579-o 02/1 'UJ45e -4 i ·· 4 5508e 8 
P(Nin =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X6 = F. NMh =yes)= (0 9971•0 0421*0 0271•6 045e-4) = 6.8768e-7 
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P(Accident =yes 1 X1 = S, X2 = S. X7 = S, Nln =yes)= (0 9971'0 9579'0.8912'1 639e-5) = 1 3951e-5 
f)rA:xldellt ·-yes 1 X - V X2 S X7' S Nin = yes1- 0.0029' 0.% 79 '0 8912' : 639e-'i;'"" 4.05i6e-5 
P(Accident =yes 1 X1 ::: S. X2 = F, X7 = S. Nln = yes) = (0 9971*0.0421'0.8912*1.639e-5) = 6.1316e-7 
P(X7 1 Accident= yes) 
= P(X7 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
=L 1,x2 P(Xl, X2, X7 = S, Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= P(X1=S X2=S. X?=S. Nln=yes, Accident=yes) • PfX' ~F X2=S X?=S Nlr yes ACCJdent"yesj 
+ P(X1 =S. X2=F, X7=S, Nln=yes, Acc1dent=yes) 
= P(Acc1dent::: yes I X1 =S, X2=S, X?=S . Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes i X 1=S. X2=S. X?=S, NMh=yes) 
P(NMI! = yes I X1,=S. X2=S. X/=S. NNm=yes) P(NNm = yes I X1=S, X2'-'S, Xl'-'S, Ns=yes) 
PfNs = yes I Xl =S X2=S Xl=Sj P(X1 =S) PfX2=Sl P(X?=S) 
, P hC •!J •ll es X1 r X2-S Xf-c.S. Nl•- ve:.; P Nl"- yeo· X1 F X2 S X! S NM!l yes·, 
s X F X2=,.,. X:-=S NNJ11 yes) P1NN 1 yt.:s X'"'F X2=S. X7-S. Ns yc·s 
+ P(Accident =yes I X1=S. X2=F , X7=S. Nln=yes) P(Nin =yes I X1=S, X2=F. X?=S. NMh=yes) 
P(NMh =yes I X1=S. X2=F , X?=S. NNm=yes) P(NNm =yes I X1=S. X2=F , X7=S, Ns=yes) 
P(Ns =yes I X1 =S, X2=F , X?=S) P(X1=S) P(X2=F) P(X?=S) 
= (1 3951e-5' 1 5647e-5*5 7739e-4'5 4470e-3'5 0335e-2*0.9971*0 9579*0.8912) 
+ (A J'.; fiE .-1" ./', 'i '~793e · 6'1 5i:l~··1C" 1 4<.1,, " *0.0029*0.9579*0.8912) 
+ (6 1316e-7*6 8768e-7'2.5376e-5*2.394e-4 *4.1978e-2*0.9971 *0.0421 *0.8912) 
+ ( *0.0029*0.0421 *0.8912) 
= 2.9415e-17 + 1.7804e-32+ 4.0228e-24 + 2.4349e-39 
= 2.9415e-17 
P(X7 I Accident= yes) 
= P(X7 & Accident= yes) I P(Accident =yes) 
= 2.9415e-17 13.5168e-6 
= 8.3641e-12 
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Updated X1 , X2, X7 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 XS X6 X7 
Barrier 
0.9971 0.9579 0.9473 0.9384 0.894 i 0.9729 0.8912 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
0 ~!:)(;'J!' 0.8:JC:J0 o.~i3o3o 
2 ~:;B!9<~ :' 2 9H 14e-:~ L.DH62P:·2 
3 00 00 0.0 
4 ') . S;~2~i{·)·7 r..; _8326e·7 b i3:L?6n··l 
8 ,\t341o ;z 8 :;!341<·>'2 8 3C41e··12 
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NOT 
ACCIDENT 
SAFE 
NOT 
INCIDENT 
P(Ns =yes i X1 = S X2 = S. X3 =F) = (0 997'1*0.9579*0 0527) = 5 0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 =F. X3 = S) = (0.9971*0.0421*0.9473) = 3.9766e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F, X3 =F)= (0.9971 ' 0.0421 .0.0527) = 2.2122e-3 
So, 3.9766e-2 + 2.2122e-3 = 4.1978e-2 
NOT 
NEAR 
MISS 
NOT 
MISHAP 
P(NNm = yes i X1 = S, X2 = S. X4 '"F. Ns "yes) "'(0 9971 '0.9579' 0.0616'0.09258) '" 5.4470e-3 
P(NNm = yes I X1 = S. X2 = F, X4 = F, Ns =yes)= (0.9971*0.0421 *0 0616*0.09258) = 2.394e-4 
P(NMI1 =yes i X1 = S. X2 = S, XS = F, NNm =yes)= (0.9971 ' 0.9579'0. 106'0.005703) = 5.7/39e-A 
P(NMh =yes I X1 = S, X2 = F. X5 = F. NNm = yes) = (0.9971.0.0421*0.106*0.005703) = 2.5376e-5 
P(Nin =yes ! X 1 = S X2 = S X6 = F NMh = yesl = (0 9971'0.9579'0 0271'6 045e-4) = 1 5647e 5 
P(Nin = yes I X 1 = S, X2 = F. X6::: F, NMh = yes) = (0.9911'0 0421 *0.0271'6 045e-4) = 6.8768e-l 
P(NAc = yes i X 1 = S. X2 = S. X 7 = F. Nin = yes)= (0.9971'0.9579*0.1 088'1 .639e-5) = 1.7032e-6 
P(NAc = yes I X1 = S, X2 = F. X7 = F, Nin = yes) = (0.9971*0.0421 *0.1088*1.639e-5) = 7.4856e-8 
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PfCatastrophe =yes 1 X1 = S, X2 = S. NAc =yes)= (0 9971''0.9579*1.7824e-6) = 1 7024e-6 
P(Catastrophe =yes 1 X1 = S, X2 = F, NAc =yes) = (0.9971'0.0421*1.7824e-6) = 7 4821 e-8 
P(X 1 I Catastrophe = yes) 
= P(X1 & Catastrophe= yes) I P(Catastrophe =yes) 
=L 2 P(Xl = S, X2, Catast ro phe = yes) I P(Catastrophe =yes) 
= P(X1=S X2=S NAc=yes Catastrophe=yes) + P(X1=S, X2=F. NAc=yes, Catastrophe=yes) 
= P(Catas!rophe =yes I X1=S X2=S NAc=yes) P(NAc =yes' X1=S. X2=S. Nln=yes) 
P(Nin =yes I Xi=S. X2=S. NMI1=yes) P(NMh:::: yes I X1=S. X2=S. NNrn=yes) 
P(NNrn =yes I X1=S X2=S Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=S X2=S) P(X1=Sl P(X2=S) 
+ P(Catastrophe =yes 1 X1=S, X2=F, Nln=yes) P(NAc =yes 1 X1=S, X2=F, Nln=yes) 
P(Nin =yes I X1=S, X2=F. NMh=yesj P(NMh =yes I X1=S. X2=F, NNm=yes) 
P(NNm =yes I X1=S, X2=F, Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=S. X2=F) P(X1=S) P(X2=F) 
= (1 7024e 6'1 7032e-6'1 5647e-5'5 7739e-4•s 4470e-3*5 0335e-2*0.9971 *0.9579) 
+ (7.4821e-8'7.4856e-8'6 8768e-7'2 5376e-5*2 394e-4'4.1978e-2*0.9971*0.0421 ) 
= 6.8598e-24 + 4.1231 e-32 
= 6.8598e-24 
P(X1 I Catastrophe= yes) 
= P(X1 & Catastrophe = yes) I P(Catastrophe = yes) 
= 6.8598e-24 I 0.0 
= 0.0 
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NOT 
ACCIDENT 
NOT 
NEAR 
MISS 
NOT 
INCIDENT 
NOT 
SAFE 
P(Ns " yes I X 1 •••• S, X2 = S, X3 = F)= (0 9971 '0 9579'0 0527) •= 5.0335e-2 
P(Ns =yes I X 1 = F. X2 = S, X3 = F)= (0.0029*0.9579*0.0527) = 1.464eA 
NOT 
MISHAP 
P(NNrn = yes! XI= S X2 = S, X4 = F, Ns =yes) = (0 \1~)71*0 9579*0 0616'0 0925il) = 5 4470e-3 
P(NNrn =yes! X1 = F, X2 = S, X4 = F. Ns =yes)= (0.0029*0.9579'0.0616*0.09258) = 1 .5842e-5 
P(NMh "yes: X1 = S. X2 = S, X5 ~· F, NNm =yes)" (0 9971 ' 0 9579'0. 106'0 005703j"' 5.7139e-4 
P(NMh = yes j X 1 = F, X2 = S. X5 = F. NN1n = yes) = (0 0029*0 9579'0 1 06*0 005703) = 1 .6793e-6 
P(Nin =yes j X1 = S. X2 = S X6 =F. NMh =yes)= (0 9971 '0.9579' 0 0271 ' 6 045eA) = 1 564?e--5 
P(Nin =yes jX1 = F, X2 = S, X6 = F, NMh =yes)::: (0 0029*0 9579*0.02/1 *6.045e-4) = 4.5508e-8 
P(NAc = yes i X 1 " S, X2"' S. X7 = F. Nln "'yes) ' (0.9971 '0.9579' 0. 1 088' 1 .639e-5) •••• 1 .7032e-6 
P(NAc =yes i X1 =F. X2 = S, X7 = F, Nln =yes)= (0 0029*0 9579*0 1088*1 .639e-5) = 4.9537e-9 
P(Catastropr1e = yes : X1 = S X2 = S. Nf\C =yes)= (0 9971 '0.9579*1 7il24e-6) = 1 7024e-6 
P(Catastrophe =yes ! X1 "'F, X2 = S, NAc:::: yes) = (0 0029*0.95-79*1 7824e-6) :::: 4.9513e-9 
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P(X2 I Catastrophe =yes) 
= P(X2 & Catastrophe= yes) I P(Catastrophe =yes) 
=L1 P(Xl, XZ = S, Catastrophe = yes) I P(Catastrophe = yes) 
= P(X1 =S. X2=S, NAc=yes. Catastrophe=yes) + P(X1 =F, X2=S. NAc=yes, Catastrophe=yes) 
= P(Catastrophe =yes 1 X1 =S. X2=S. NAc=yes) P(NAc =yes! X1=S. X2=S. Nln=yes) 
P(N in =yes I X1=S X2=S. NMh=yes) P(NMh =yes I X1=S. X2=S. NNm=yes} 
P(NNm =yes I X1=S X2=S Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=S X2=S) P(X1=S) P(X2=SJ 
+ P(Catastrophe = yes 1 X1 =F. X2=S, Nln=yes) P(NAc = yes 1 X1 =F, X2=S. Nln=yes) 
P(Nin =yes I X1 =F, X2=S. NMh=yes) P(NMh =yes I X1=F, X2=S, NNm=yes) 
P(NNm =yes I X1=F. X2=S. Ns=yes) P(Ns =yes I X1=F, X2=S) P(X1=F) P(X2=SJ 
= (1 7024e-6* 1 7032e-6•1 .5647e-5*5. 7739e-4*5.4470e-3*5 0335e-2*0.9971 *0.9579) 
+ (4.9513e-9*4 .9537e-9*4 5508e-8'1 .6793e-6*1 .5842e-5*1464e-4*0.0029*0.9579) 
= 6.8598e-24 + 1.2076e-41 
= 6.8598e-24 
P(X2 I Catastrophe= yes) 
= P(X2 & Catastrophe =yes) I P(Catastrophe = yes) 
= 6.8598e-24 I 0.0 
= 0.0 
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Updated X1 , X2, X7 
Prior va lues 
X1 X2 X3 X4 XS X6 X7 
Barrier 
0.9971 0.9579 
' 
0.9473 0.9384 0.894 0.9729 0.8912 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 xs X6 X7 
0 9:;63~~ 0 D:}';:~l3 0.9l6l6 
2 21J0ti2t<> .. 2 2 90,4::>-·2 2.9Stj2~-2 
3 oo 0.0 00 
' 
5 8:32Be-7 s eJ26e-7 5.83200--7 
5 fJ.364; c-12 B.3641~ 12 o304 1e-12 
6 00 00 
Total 0.96621 0.96617 0.93636 0.97014 
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Step 1: Updated X 1, X2, X3 
Prior values 
Barrier I X1 I I X2 I I X3 
0.9971 I t I 0.9579 I t I 0.9473 
Updating 
Step I X1 I I X2 I I X3 
1 I 0.93635 I . I 0.93636 I i I 0 93636 
Step 2: Updated X 1, X2, X4 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 
Barrier 
0.9971 1 0.9579 1 0.9473 1 0.9384 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 
1 0 93635 0.93636 ~ 0.93636 -
2 2.9862e-2 2.9814e-2 I 
.;, - ' 
' 
2.9862e-2 
Step 3: Updated X 1, X2, X5 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
Barrier 
0.9971 1 0.9579 1 0.9473 ! 0.9384 ! 0.894 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
1 0.93635 l 0.93636 . 0.93636 . - l 
2 2.9862e-2 I 2.9814e-2 L 2.9862e-2 j -. . 
3 00 L 00 . L j 00 
Step 4: Updated X 1, X2, X6 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Barrier 
0.9971 l 0.9579 L 0.9473 ! 0.9384 L 0.894 l 0.9729 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
1 0.93635 l 0 93636 . 0.93636 . -· - l 
2 2.9862e-2 j 2.9814e-2 j . 2 9862e-2 
' 
- l 
3 00 1 0.0 j - - . 0.0 j -
4 5.8328e-? I 5.8326e-7 I - - - l 5 8326e-7 ~ 
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Step 5: Updated X1 , X2, X7 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
Barrier 
0.9971 0.9579 0 .9473 0 .9384 0.894 0.9729 0.8912 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
1 0.9~<.6:'5 0 !)3636 on636 
2 2 9HG2H--2 2 9814c t. 2.98t)2f:'··?. 
3 ().[) 00 0.0 
[; ~:32% 5.d32G•:" 7 :J.B326e-7 
5 H ,J641e· 12 l~ :561; 10--12 S.3fo4 Je- 12 
Step 6: Updated X 1, X2 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 
Barrier 
X4 X5 X6 X7 
0 .9971 0.9579 0.9473 0.9384 0.894 0.9729 0.8912 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 xs X6 X7 
1 0.93635 0 93636 0.93G:l6 
2.9362e--2 2 98 J4e·2 2 9852e--2 
3 00 0.0 0.0 
4 !).8328e- i b S32i)e -; 
5 B :it14lo 1?. "3641,, 1/ 
6 0.0 00 
Updated Barrier Success Probabilities 
X1 I X2 I X3 I X4 I XS I X6 I X7 
0.96621 I 0.96617 I o.93636 1 0 .97014 l 1.0 l 1 0 l 1.0 
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Step 1: Updated X1 , X2, X3 
Prior values 
Barrier l X1 I I X2 I I X3 0.96621 I 1 I 0.96617 I 1 I 0.93636 
Updating 
Step I X1 I I X2 I I X3 
1 I 0.89544 I • I 0.89653 I t I 0 89653 
Step 2: Updated X1 , X2, X4 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 
Barrier 
0.96621 1 0.9661 8 1 0.93636 1 0.97014 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 
1 0.89544 0.89653 0 89653 -
2 3.2508e-2 
. 
3.2488e-2 ! -
. 
3.2510e-2 
Step 3: Updated X1 , X2, X5 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
Barrier 
0.96621 1 0.96618 1 0.93636 1 0.97014 1 1.0 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
1 0.89544 
. 0 89653 . 0.89653 
' 
-
2 3 2508e-2 3.2488e-2 - I 32510e-2 -. . 
' 
3 1.0888e-4 
' 
1.0888e-4 L - ~ - 1.0888e-4 
Step 4: Updated X1 , X2, X6 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Barrier 
0.96621 1 0.96618 1 0.93636 ! 0.97014 ! 1.0 1 1.0 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
1 0.89544 J 0 89653 0.89653 . - t - l -
2 3.2508e-2 I 3.2488e-2 3.2510e-2 ; - ~ . . 
" " 
3 1.0888e-4 1 1.0888e4 .. 1 0888e-4 ; . . . 
" 
4 00 1 00 - ' 00 . . . .;. 
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Step 5: Updated X1 X2. X7 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 X4 XS X6 X7 
Barrier 
0.96621 0.96618 0.93636 0.97014 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
1 0 89544 0.80853 0.80853 
2 :~ 2S<mn·2 :3 24SBc·2 ~~.?.~·i10~~~?. 
1 OHBi:" 4 D~:B~:t:> 4 1 OB8Bc-4 
\) 0 on n.o 
5 no co ~0 
Step 6: Updated X 1. X2 
Prior values 
X1 X2 X3 
Barrier 
X4 X5 X6 X7 
0.96621 0.96618 0.93636 0.97014 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Updating 
Step X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
1 0.88544 0.89653 0.89053 
2 3 250f:e·2 3 24l1Be-·Z 3.25t0e-2 
3 I.C888v -4 ' .D8B8n-4 1 G888n·4 
00 ()(J DV 
5 ()() ()() 0.0 
6 ('!(.) on 
Updated Barrier Success Probabilities 
X1 I X2 I X3 I X4 I X5 I X6 I X7 
0.92806 I 0.92913 I o.89653 1 0.96749 I 0.99989 I 1.0 I 1.0 
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